McDonald v. Blue Jeans Corp.

• Decision Date: 28 March 1960
• Citation: 183 F. Supp. 149
• Parties: Edith Maude McDONALD, individually and as Guardian ad Litem of Nicholas McDonald, an infant under the age of 14 years, Plaintiffs, v. BLUE JEANS CORP., Defendant. BLUE JEANS CORP., Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff, v. STERLING TRIMMING CO., Third Party Defendant. STERLING TRIMMING CO., Third Party Defendant and Fourth Party Plaintiff, v. IDEAL BRAID CO. and Fibre Yarn Co., Inc., Fourth Party Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

183 F. Supp. 149

Edith Maude McDONALD, individually and as Guardian ad Litem of Nicholas McDonald, an infant under the age of 14 years, Plaintiffs, v. BLUE JEANS CORP., Defendant.

BLUE JEANS CORP., Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff, v. STERLING TRIMMING CO., Third Party Defendant.

STERLING TRIMMING CO., Third Party Defendant and Fourth Party Plaintiff, v. IDEAL BRAID CO. and Fibre Yarn Co., Inc., Fourth Party Defendants.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

March 28, 1960.

John J. O'Connor, New York City, for Blue Jeans Corp.

Leon, Weill & Mahony, New York City, for Sterling Trimming Co.

Sugarman, Kuttner & Fuss, New York City, for Ideal Braid Co.

Michels, Gangel & Walton, New York City, for Fibre Yarn Co., Inc.

McGOHEY, District Judge.

This is a motion by the defendant Blue Jeans Corporation for leave to file a third party complaint.

On March 12, 1955, Nicholas McDonald, an infant, was severely burned when the fringes of a cowboy suit he was wearing caught fire. The infant's mother as his guardian ad litem commenced an action against Blue Jeans Corporation, the manufacturer of the suit, on March 4, 1957. The McDonalds being citizens of Maryland and Blue Jeans being a New York corporation, jurisdiction of that action rested on the diverse citizenship of the parties. In December, 1958, Blue Jeans filed a third party complaint against Sterling Trimming Co. which had sold Blue Jeans the fringe. In February, 1959, Sterling filed a fourth party complaint against Ideal Braid Co. and Fibre Yarn Co., Inc., its suppliers. Sterling, Ideal Braid and Fibre Yarn are citizens of New York.

In March, 1959, the plaintiff's claim against Blue Jeans was severed and proceeded to trial during which, on April 28, 1959, terms of settlement were agreed on and the settlement was consummated on July 1, 1959.

Blue Jeans now moves for leave to file a third party complaint asserting claims against Ideal Braid Co. and Fibre Yarn Co., Inc., the present fourth party defendants. The latter oppose the motion on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over Blue Jeans' proposed claims against them for the following reasons: all of the parties thereto are citizens of New York; the claims possess no independent attributes of federal jurisdiction; and there is no longer any action pending in this court between the original Maryland plaintiff and Blue Jeans, to which the latter's proposed claims can be ancillary.

Ideal Braid and Fibre Yarn do not contend that, prior to the settlement of the main action against Blue Jeans, the court lacked jurisdiction of Sterling's claims then pending against them. They make two other contentions, however. The first is that, jurisdiction of Sterling's claims against them was lost when the main action was settled. The second is that, even if jurisdiction of those claims was not lost, it cannot be "extended" to embrace the claims Blue Jeans is now, for the first time, attempting to assert against them.

The first contention is rejected on the authority of Dery v. Wyer.¹ The second contention seems not to have been passed on directly. It is, however, "the spirit and purpose of Rule 14 * * * to dispose of all related controversies arising out of one transaction or occurrence in a single suit";² and also to afford "complete relief * * * between those already parties."³ There can be no doubt, indeed it is not questioned that, the injury to the infant is the "transaction or occurrence" out of which the claims which are still pending in this action arose. Neither can there be any doubt that the claims Blue Jeans now asks leave to assert arise out of and are related to that occurrence. It is clear therefore that, if Blue Jeans' present motion had been made prior to the settlement of the infant's claim, the motion could not have been successfully opposed on jurisdictional grounds. In view of this, there is no basis in logic nor in Rules for denying Blue Jeans leave, on jurisdictional grounds, to assert its proposed claims against parties presently in this action of which the court has jurisdiction, who were also parties before the settlement. Indeed achievement of the purpose of Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 14, 28 U.S.C.A., seems to require that...