McDonald v. Cnty. of Sonoma
| Decision Date | 11 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20-cv-04183-CRB |
| Citation | 506 F.Supp.3d 969 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | La'Marcus MCDONALD, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SONOMA, et al., Defendants. |
Reed R. Kathrein, Wesley Aaron Wong, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Berkeley, CA, Jacob P. Berman, Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff.
Noah G. Blechman, McNamara, Ney, Beatty, Slattery, Borges & Ambacher LLP, Randolph S. Hom, McNamara Law Firm, Pleasant Hill, CA, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
Plaintiff La'Marcus McDonald brings this private right of action against County of Sonoma, Town of Windsor, Sheriff Mark Essick, Deputy Sheriff ("DS") Travis Perkins, Administrative Sergeant ("Adm. Sgt.") Brent Kidder, and Deputy Gregory Clegg (collectively "Defendants") for various violations of California and Federal civil rights laws. See generally First Amended Complaint ("FAC") (dkt. 15). McDonald alleges that DS Perkins and Deputy Clegg unlawfully arrested, used excessive force, and searched McDonald in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as article I, sections 7 and 13 of the California Constitution. See id. ¶¶ 88–98. McDonald also alleges that Sonoma County, Town of Windsor, Sheriff Essick, and Adm. Sgt. Kidder effectively acquiesced to and condoned ongoing constitutional violations. See Opp. (dkt. 29) 8–15. Defendants now move to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See generally MTD (dkt 21). After carefully considering the parties’ briefs and oral argument, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss, with the sole exception of McDonald's request for injunctive relief.
Around 8:34 PM on July 9, 2019, Sonoma County Sheriff Deputies, acting as contracted officers for the Windsor Police Department, responded to a welfare check of La'Marcus McDonald, a Black Sonoma County resident, sleeping alone in a parked car.1 See FAC ¶¶ 33–34. Andrew Chambers drove past McDonald and called 9-1-1 to request that an officer check on McDonald's welfare—Chambers suspected that McDonald might have overdosed. See id. ¶ 33. DS Perkins arrived on scene first and found McDonald asleep in the car with the door open. See id. ¶ 32. The vehicle was legally parked, with the ignition off. See id. ¶ 34. DS Perkins prodded McDonald awake and reached into the car to take a comb out of McDonald's hair. See id. ¶¶ 35–36. When McDonald woke up, DS Perkins asked him if he had consumed any alcohol or drugs. See id. ¶¶ 34–38. McDonald stated that he had drank alcohol earlier that night. See id. ¶ 39. DS Perkins then asked McDonald to step out of the car and turn around—McDonald complied. See id. ¶ 40.
The parties dispute what occurred next. The Incident Report2 states that McDonald tensed up after DS Perkins grabbed his right arm, at which point the officer employed a takedown maneuver to bring McDonald to the ground. Id. ¶ 44 (citing FAC, Ex A (dkt. 15-2)). McDonald alleges that DS Perkins, without warning, grabbed McDonald's right arm in an effort to handcuff McDonald. See id. ¶¶ 40–42. After DS Perkins grabbed McDonald's arm, McDonald only remembers "waking up bloodied, face first on the ground with pain in his head and mouth." Id. ¶ 43. McDonald watched the body camera footage once in the presence of a police officer and observed DS Perkins say "Don't f*****g do that again," just before he slammed McDonald headfirst into the pavement rendering him unconscious and breaking several teeth. Id. ¶ 44 (citing FAC, Ex A).
Deputy Clegg and the paramedics arrived as DS Perkins attempted to handcuff McDonald and witnessed DS Perkins slam McDonald to the pavement. See id. ¶ 46. Both officers then searched McDonald and the car for contraband but found nothing.3
See id. The ambulance then transported McDonald, handcuffed while wearing a spit hood, to the hospital. See id. ¶ 47. Over the course of several hours, Deputy Clegg refused to provide McDonald with water. See id. After being discharged from the hospital, the officers transported McDonald to the county jail without telling McDonald that he was under arrest or charged with anything. See id. ¶ 48. On or around July 12, 2019, the District Attorney refused to press charges against McDonald, yet McDonald remained in jail until his relatives bailed him out. See id. ¶ 49.4 The officers also impounded the car that McDonald slept in, and it remained impounded as of September 8, 2020.
McDonald requested the police body cam footage, but Sonoma County refused to provide him with a copy. See id. ¶ 13. The County did permit McDonald to watch the footage in the Sonoma County Sheriff's office with presence of a police officer. See id. However, Sonoma County recently released the footage to McDonald. See Opp. at 4.
McDonald requests general damages, special damages, punitive and exemplary damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, statutory damages, costs incurred, prejudgment interest, and declaratory and injunctive relief. See FAC ¶ 196. McDonald premises his requested relief on fifteen causes of action:
On September 19, 2020, County of Sonoma, Town of Windsor, Sheriff Essick, DS Perkins, Adm. Sgt. Kidder, and Deputy Clegg filed a motion to dismiss several of McDonald's claims. See, e.g., MTD.
Dismissal is proper where the complaint fails to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A court "must presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Usher v. City of L.A., 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). A court need not, however, "accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) ; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ().
Defendants move to dismiss several causes of action. The Court addresses each in turn below.
McDonald alleges that DS Perkins and Deputy Clegg violated his Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights, which gives rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See FAC ¶¶ 88–98. Section 1983 "provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States." Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ). Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a person violated a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) that said person acted under the color of state law when they committed the alleged violation. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) ; Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).
McDonald's claim hinges on whether he agrees with the incident report's assertion that he "tensed up his body and attempted to pull his right arm" away when DS Perkins attempted to handcuff him—conduct that may constitute "resisting arrest." FAC, Ex. A at 7. McDonald denies the veracity of incident report,...
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