McDonald v. Ford Motor Co., 74-139

• Citation: 326 N.E.2d 252,42 Ohio St.2d 8
• Decision Date: 02 April 1975
• Docket Number: No. 74-139,74-139
• Parties: , 71 O.O.2d 4 McDONALD et al., Appellees, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

Page 8

42 Ohio St.2d 8

326 N.E.2d 252, 71 O.O.2d 4

McDONALD et al., Appellees, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Appellant.

No. 74-139.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

April 2, 1975.

Syllabus by the Court

The testimony of witnesses which is positively contradicted by the established physical facts is of no probative value and a jury will not be permitted to rest a verdict thereon.

On May 12, 1969, Ernest McDonald, one of the appellees hrerin, obtained delivery of a newly purchased Ford Cobra automobile from Gillen Motor Sales, an authorized Ford dealer. ^*

On June 28, 1969, Ernest and his brother Harlan, the other appellee, drove into the town of Burlington and spent that Saturday evening at a pool hall. The two brothers left Burlington early in the morning of June 29. At about 3:30 a. m., Ernest was driving his car along the Burlington-Macedonia Road, when the automobile failed to make a left-hand curve, ran off the road and struck a tree about 11 1/2 feet from the right edge of the pavement. Ernest sustained only slight cuts and bruises, but Harlan suffered a fractured pelvis and a dislocated hip. The automobile was demolished.

Appellees brought this action against the Ford Motor Company, alleging that the accident was caused by a defect in the mounting of the steering column. Appellees claim that the column fell away from the instrument panel before the accident, causing the driver to lose control of the automobile. At trial, both appellees testified that the steering column broke loose immediately before the automobile ran off the road. Appellees submitted no other evidence as to the facts of the accident or as to the existence of any defects in the mounting of the steering column.

Ford Motor Company, appellant, called witnesses who disputed appellees' account of the accident. A product quality engineer employed by Ford testified that the steering column was designed to give impact protection to the driver in a collision, as required by federal regulations, and that the falling away of the steering column could only occur upon impact. He testified further that if a driver were ptiched forward onto the steering wheel with a force equivalent to an impact of 15 mph, the steering column would be compressed due to an energy absorbing device at the base of the column. Should the column be compressed more than an inch, it would break free of the mountings securing the column, and fall away from the instrument panel. The appellant's theory of the accident was that the steering column must have fallen away upon impact, after the automobile struck the tree, and thus could not have been a cause of the accident. Three other witnesses also testified that the steering column must have fallen away upon impact. Appellant introduced in evidence the actual steering column and the brackets on the instrument panel to which it had been mounted.

At the colse of the evidence, upon motion, the trial judge granted a directed verdict, in favor of appellant.

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas granting a directed verdict on the ground that reasonable minds could come to more than one conclusion.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Kaiser & Burd and J. Stewart Kaiser, Chesapeake, for appellees.

Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Herbert R. Brown, Robert E. Leach, Robert E. Tait, Columbus, Collier & Collier and J. B. Collier, Ironton, for appellant.

STERN, Justice.

This is a product liability action brought under the theory of implied warranty, which is a form of strict liability in tort. The plaintiff's burden of proof for breach of implied warranty, as stated by this court '* * * consists of alleging and proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) There was, in fact, a defect in the product manufactured and sold by the defendant; (2) such defect existed at the time the product left the hands of the defendant; and (3) the defect was the direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries or loss.' State Auto Mutual Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp. (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 151, 304 N.E.2d 891. In the instant case, there is no question that, if a defect in the mounting of the steering column has been proved, there is sufficient indication of probable cause to allow the case to be submitted to the jury. The dispute is wholly whether appellees have shown that a defect existed.

Under the doctrine of implied warranty, a defect is considered to exist in a product which is not fit for the ordinary purpose for which that product is used. Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp. (1966), 6 Ohio St.2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185. A manufacturer of a product impliedly warrants, in the sale of that product, that it is 'of good and merchantable quality, fit and safe for * * * (its) ordinary (intended use.)' Lonzrick v. Republic Steel,supra, at 235, 218 N.E.2d at 192. The claim made by appellees in the instant case is that the mountings used to attach the steering column to the instrument panel failed approximately 50 days after the automobile was purchased from Ford's dealer, about nine months after the automobile was shipped from the factory. That claim is sufficient, if proved, to raise an issue that the mountings were not fit and safe for their ordinary and intended use, and were, therefore, defective.

The evidence at trial indicated that no one had serviced or tampered with the mounting assembly, which was original equipment on the automobile, at any time before the accident. This evidence was sufficient, if a defect were proved, to present a jury issue as to whether the defective condition existed at the time the product left the hands of the appellant.

The fundamental question which remains in the case is whether appellees have presented sufficient credible evidence to warrant submission to the jury of the issue of the existence of a defect in the mounting assembly, and (as a question of fact which is determinative) whether the steering column broke away while the automobile was still on the road, or whether it dropped, perhaps less than a second later, when the automobile struck the tree at a speed of at least 30 miles per hour, by the testimony of both appellees.

The trial court found that there was not sufficient credible evidence of a defect and sustained a directed verdict in favor of appellant.

The test to be applied to a motion for directed verdict was set out by this court in O'Day v. Webb (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 215, 280 N.E.2d 896:

'It is the duty of a trial court to submit an essential issue to the jury when there is sufficient evidence relating to that issue to permit reasonable minds to reach different conclusions on that issue, or, conversely, to withhold an essential issue from the jury wnen there is not sufficient evidence relating to that issue to permit reasonable minds to reach different conclusions on that issue.'

If there was sufficient evidence relating to the existence of a defect in the mounting assembly to permit reasonable minds to reach different conclusions, the case should have been submitted to the jury.

The evidence of appellees was their testimony that the steering column fell before the accident. Ordinarily, where testimony conflicts, the credibility of witnesses is a matter for the jury. However, in certain instances testimony cannot be considered credible. Where a witness testifies that he looked and listened at a railroad crossing, but neither saw nor heard a train approaching, and the only reasonable conclusion upon the evidence is that there is no doubt that had he looked he must have seen the train, the witness's testimony cannot be considered credible. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Rd. Co. v. Rohrs (1926), 114 Ohio St. 493, 151 N.E. 714. See, also, Zuments v. B. & O. Rd. Co. (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 71, 271 N.E.2d 813.

The 'railroad crossing' cases are a single example of the broad range of cases in which courts have recognized that eye-witnesses' testimony, essential though it may be, is fundamentally 'soft' evidence, subject to human failings of perception, memory and rectitude. In law, as in other spheres of human affairs, simple facts may be far more persuasive than the most learned authorities. As in Dean Prosser's homely example, 'there is still no man who would not accept dog tracks in the mud against the sworn testimony of a hundred eye-witnesses that no dog has passed by.' Prosser on Torts (4 Ed.), 212.

The name generally given to this concept is the 'physical facts rule.' The rule has been variously stated: E. G., 'the testimony of a witness which is opposed to the laws of nature, or which is clearly in conflict with principles established by the laws of science, is of no probative value and a jury is not permitted to rest its verdict thereon.' Connor v. Jones (1945), 115 Ind.App. 660, 670, 59 N.E.2d 577, 581; Zollman v. Symington Wayne Corp. (7 Cir. 1971), 438 F.2d 28, 31-32, certiorari denied, 404 U.S. 827, 92 S.Ct. 59, 30 L.Ed.2d 55.

'The testimony of a witness which is positively contradicted by the physical facts cannot be given probative value by the court.' Lovas v. General Motors Corp. (6 Cir. 1954), 212 F.2d 805, 808.

' The palpable untruthfulness' of plaintiff's testimony requiring a trial court to take a case from the jury under the physical facts rule 'must be (1) inherent in the rejected testimony, so that it contradicts itself or (2) irreconcilable with facts of which, under recognized rules, the court takes judicial knowledge or (3) is obviously inconsistent with, contradicted by, undisputed physical facts.' Duling v. Burnett (1938), 22 Tenn.App. 522, 124 S.W.2d 294. Each of these formulations strikes a balance between, on the one hand, the common sense notion that physical facts and evidence can be so conclusive and demonstrative that no reasonable person could accept the truth of contrary testimony, and, on the other hand, the need for courts to be wary of treating a party's theory of a...