McDonald v. GRAND TRAVERSE CTY. ELECTION COMM'N

• Decision Date: 15 May 2003
• Docket Number: Docket No. 237984.
• Citation: McDonald v. GRAND TRAVERSE CTY. ELECTION COMM'N, 662 N.W.2d 804, 255 Mich. App. 674 (Mich. App. 2003)
• Parties: Patrick J. McDONALD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GRAND TRAVERSE COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION, The Honorable John D. Foresman, William Rokos, Linda Coburn, State of Michigan, and Secretary of State, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

662 N.W.2d 804

255 Mich. App. 674

Patrick J. McDONALD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.GRAND TRAVERSE COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION, The Honorable John D. Foresman, William Rokos, Linda Coburn, State of Michigan, and Secretary of State, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 237984.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 5, 2003, at Grand Rapids.

Decided March 18, 2003, at 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication May 15, 2003.

Patrick J. McDonald in propria persona.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Gary P. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Before: WHITBECK, C.J., and MARK J. CAVANAGH and BANDSTRA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

PlaintiffPatrick J. McDonald appeals as of right the trial court's order granting summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) to defendantsGrand Traverse County Election Commission, the Honorable John D. Foresman, William Rokos, Linda Coburn, the state of Michigan, and the Secretary of State, and denying McDonald's motion for summary disposition.We affirm.

I.Basic Facts And Procedural History

In August of 2000, McDonald filed a complaint against defendants.The complaint challenged the constitutionality of M.C.L. § 168.737, which provides for straight-ticket voting on voting ballots in the state of Michigan.¹The complaint alleged that McDonald was an independent candidate for Green Lake Township Trustee in Grand Traverse County.McDonald alleged that the straight-ticket ballot option gave candidates affiliated with a political party an advantage over candidates who were not affiliated with a political party; that the straight-ticket ballot option violated his constitutional right to equal protection under the Michigan and United States Constitutions; that the straight-ticket ballot option unduly burdened his federal constitutional right of free association; and that the straight-ticket ballot option violated the Michigan Constitution's guarantee of pure elections.

Accordingly, McDonald sought a declaratory judgment that Michigan's straight-ticket ballot option is unconstitutional, an injunction preventing the Grand Traverse County Board of Elections from putting the straight-ticket ballot option on the ballots for Green Lake Township, and a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary of State to promulgate new rules to eliminate the straight-ticket ballot option on any ballot on which there are candidates who are not affiliated with a political party and directing the Grand Traverse County Election Commission not to include the straight-ticket ballot option on the ballots for Green Lake Township.Shortly thereafter, McDonald sought a preliminary injunction that the trial court denied.

In June of 2001, the trial court ordered the parties to submit a joint stipulation of facts (JSOF) and to file cross-motions for summary disposition.The parties' JSOF asserted that McDonald was an independent candidate for trustee in Green Lake Township on November 7, 2000.According to the JSOF, there were two Green Lake Township trustee positions to be filled for which there were two Republican candidates, no Democratic candidates, and one independent candidate, McDonald.The two Republican candidates were elected as Green Lake Township trustees.One Republican candidate received 1,185 votes and the other received 1,175 votes.McDonald received 966 votes and therefore received 209 less votes than the second Republican who was elected.

According to the JSOF, 487 people voted the Republican straight-party ticket and 255 voted the Democratic straight-party ticket in the Green Lake Township elections on November 7, 2000.The JSOF further asserted that 106 voters voted the "No Party Affiliation" option in the straight-party-ticket section of the ballot.The JSOF also stated that candidates affiliated with a political party could receive votes either by a straight-party-ticket vote or by an individual vote, while candidates who were not affiliated with a political party listed on the ballot could not receive votes by a straight-party-ticket vote.Individuals who voted straight-party could split their ticket, however, and vote for candidates of another political party or independent candidates for any individual office.The JSOF further asserted that straight-party-ticket voting takes less time than voting for each office separately.

In accordance with the trial court's order, McDonald moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10), and defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10).After a hearing, the trial court denied McDonald's motion for summary disposition and granted defendants' motion for summary disposition based on MCR 2.116(C)(10).In granting defendants' motion, the trial court observed that there is no fundamental right to run for office or to be elected to office.The trial court further asserted that statutes that are nondiscriminatory and content-neutral are reviewed under a lenient standard, whereby the state only has to show some rational justification for the statute.The trial court noted that the state articulated several justifications for straight-ticket voting, including improving the speed and efficiency of elections, reducing the number of precinct personnel necessary, increasing voter turnout, and reducing voter apathy resulting from waiting in long lines to vote.Finally, the trial court concluded that the straight-ticket ballot option is constitutional.Although the trial court did not specifically address each of McDonald's constitutional arguments, McDonald asked the trial court if its ruling applied to all the grounds raised in the briefs, and the trial court responded that it did.McDonald now appeals.

II.Summary Disposition; The Constitutionality Of The Statute

A.Standard Of Review

This Court reviews de novo a trial court's grant or denial of summary disposition.²This Court must review the record in the same manner as the trial court to determine whether the movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.³This Court reviews constitutional questions de novo on appeal.⁴Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and "[e]very reasonable presumption must be made in favor of constitutionality."⁵The party asserting the constitutional challenge has the burden of proof.⁶

B.The History Of The Straight-Ticket Ballot Option

Michigan has traditionally permitted a straight-ticket ballot option, also known as a straight-party option, which permits voters to pull a single lever, punch a single chad, or make a single mark in the partisan section of a ballot to vote for all candidates of a particular party.⁷However, in 2001, the Michigan Legislature enacted Public Act 269, which eliminated the straight-ticket ballot option.The Michigan Constitution gives the people"the power to approve or reject laws enacted by the legislature, called the referendum."⁸Pursuant to this referendum power, the Democratic Party circulated petitions and obtained enough signatures to invoke a referendum on 2001 PA 269.As a result of the referendum, Proposal 1 appeared on the general election ballot on November 5, 2002, and the people of the State of Michigan were permitted to vote on whether 2001 PA 269, which would, among other things, eliminate the straight-ticket ballot option, should go into effect. 1,775,043 voters voted not to approve 2001 PA 269, and 1,199,236 voters voted to approve 2001 PA 269.Because 2001 PA 269 was not approved by a majority of the voters on November 5, 2002, it did not go into effect.The law in effect before 2001 PA 269 was enacted, M.C.L. § 168.737, is thus still in effect today.Therefore, the straight-ticket ballot option is the law in Michigan.The question that McDonald poses is whether that law is constitutional.

C.Freedom Of Association

1.Overview

McDonald asserts that M.C.L. § 168.737 violates his First Amendment rights of freedom of association.Although freedom of association is not explicitly enumerated in the First Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has found it to be a right included within the "penumbra" of the First Amendment.⁹First Amendment guarantees are applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.¹⁰A corollary of the right to associate is the right not to associate.¹¹The freedom of association is not absolute, and the nature and degree of constitutional protection granted to the freedom of association may vary, depending on the extent to which constitutionally protected liberty is at stake in a given case.¹²

McDonald contends that because the straight-ticket ballot option implicates his fundamental right of freedom of association, the state must have a compelling interest to justify the constitutional intrusion.Generally, state action that infringes on First Amendment rights will only be tolerated when such infringement is unavoidably required to further a compelling, paramount, or vital state interest.¹³However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that "to subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest ... would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently."¹⁴Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has held that a less stringent level of review applies to state election laws that exact a "lesser burden" on an individual's right to freedom of association.¹⁵The United States Supreme Court explained the less stringent level of review, as well as the analytical process that a court should utilize in considering a First Amendment challenge to a state election law, in Timmons:

When deciding whether a state election law violates First and Fourteenth Amendment associational rights, we weigh the "`character and magnitude'" of the burden the State's rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State contends...