McDonald v. Heckler

• Decision Date: 27 June 1985
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 84-2190-G.
• Citation: 612 F. Supp. 293
• Parties: Claire McDONALD et al., Plaintiffs, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

612 F. Supp. 293

Claire McDONALD et al., Plaintiffs, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 84-2190-G.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

June 27, 1985.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Sarah Anderson, Linda L. Landry, Neighborhood Legal Services, Lynn, Mass., Laura Rosenthal, Mass. Law Reform Institute, Boston, Mass., for plaintiffs.

Asst. U.S. Atty. Marianne Bowler, U.S. Atty., Boston, Mass., U.S. Atty. Gen., Washington, D.C., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

GARRITY, District Judge.

Plaintiffs in the instant class action challenge the regulatory policies of the Social Security Administration which are used to deny disability benefits to claimants on the grounds that their impairments are not severe. These policies are found in both the regulations and Social Security rulings. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c); 404.1521; 416.920(c); 416.921; SSR 82-55; and SSR 82-56.¹ Plaintiffs claim that these regulations and rulings violate the definition of disability contained in the Social Security Act ("the Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), as well as plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Defendant Secretary of Health and Human Services has moved to dismiss this action in light of the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794 et seq. ("the 1984 Act"), and for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have moved for class certification. After hearing oral argument and considering the numerous briefs submitted by the parties, the court denies the Secretary's motion to dismiss in part and grants it in part. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is granted.

I. The Secretary's Severity Policies

In the Social Security Act, the term "disability" is defined as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physial or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). This definition was clarified in 1967 with the addition of 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A), which provides:

(2) For purposes of paragraph (1)(A) —

(A) an individual ... shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.

In 1968, the Secretary issued a regulation which provided that "medical consideration alone can justify a finding that the individual is not under a disability when the only impairment is a slight neurosis, slight impairment of sight or hearing or other slight abnormality or combination of slight abnormalities." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a) (1968). This regulation was replaced in 1978 by the current so-called severity test, which was incorporated as step two of the five step sequential analysis for evaluating disability claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The severity test provides:

(c) You must have a severe impairment. If you do not have any impairment(s) which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your age, education, and work experience. However, it is possible for you to have a period of disability for a time in the past even though you do not now have a severe impairment.

"Severe impairment" is defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521, which is set out in the margin.² If a claimant is determined not to have a severe impairment at step two, a finding of not disabled is made without further consideration under steps three through five. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). Finally, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522 states that the Secretary will not combine two or more unrelated impairments to determine whether the claimant is suffering from a severe impairment; each impairment must meet the severity test independently.

Plaintiffs claim that the severity test is inconsistent with the Social Security Act because it allows the Secretary to deny benefits to claimants without considering their functional limitations and vocational capacities. They object to the use of the severity test as an independent test of eligibility instead of as a de minimus or threshold test that screens out frivolous claims. See Brady v. Heckler, 11 Cir.1984, 724 F.2d 914; Stone v. Heckler, 5 Cir.1985, 752 F.2d 1099.³ Plaintiffs also challenge the Secretary's policy of refusing to combine "nonsevere" impairments in determining whether a claimant is disabled.

II. The Secretary's Motion to Dismiss

a. The 1984 Act

The Secretary has moved to dismiss this action as moot in light of the 1984 Act. Section 4(a)(1) of the 1984 Act amended Section 223(d)(2) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2), by adding a new subparagraph (C), which provides as follows:

In determining whether an individual's physical or mental impairment or impairments are of a sufficient medical severity that such impairment or impairments could be the basis of eligibility under this section, the Secretary shall consider the combined effect of all of the individual's impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately, would be of such severity. If the Secretary does find a medically severe combination of impairments, the combined impact of the impairment shall be considered throughout the disability determination process.

See also 1984 Act §§ 4(a)(2), (b). The amendment therefore requires the Secretary to consider the combined effect of all of an individual's impairments in determining whether that individual's condition is of a sufficient medical severity to be entitled to benefits.

This amendment became effective on December 1, 1984 under § 4(c) of the 1984 Act. Therefore, plaintiffs' claim concerning the Secretary's policy of not considering the combined effect of non-severe impairments is moot with respect to proposed class members who had not exhausted their administrative remedies as of that date, but not as to those proposed class members who received a final decision from the Secretary prior to the effective date.⁴

The 1984 Act does not moot plaintiffs' claims regarding the validity of the Secretary's severity policies. We concur with Judge Garcia's decision in Smith v. Heckler, Civ. No. S-83-1609 EJG (E.D.Cal. May 1, 1985), that neither the language of the 1984 Act nor its legislative history indicate that Congress validated the Secretary's regulations and rulings regarding the severity policies. The language of the new subsection added by the 1984 Act does no more than require that the Secretary discontinue her policy of refusing to consider the combined effect of non-severe impairments. Furthermore, the Conference Committee rejected the language of the Senate Finance Committee Report which expressed some support for the Secretary's severity policies. While the Conference Committee Report endorses the Secretary's sequential evaluation process, it does not validate the severity test used by the Secretary.⁵ Therefore, we find that plaintiffs' claims concerning the severity test are not mooted by the 1984 Act. See also Johnson v. Heckler, 607 F.Supp. 875 (N.D.Ill.1984); Stone v. Heckler, 5 Cir.1985, 752 F.2d 1099; but see Hall v. Heckler, N.D.Cal.1985, 602 F.Supp. 1169.

b. Jurisdiction

The Secretary has moved to dismiss this case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of the proposed plaintiff class. Plaintiffs allege jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1361.

Jurisdiction under the Act is granted by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides:

Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Secretary may allow.

The Secretary claims that the court does not have jurisdiction under this statute over four separate groups of potential class members: # 1) those claimants who have not yet exhausted their administrative remedies, i.e., who have not received a final decision of the Secretary; # 2) future claimants of benefits under the Act; # 3) those claimants who have failed to meet the 60 day requirement because they did not exhaust their administrative remedies by applying to the next administrative level within 60 days or because they did not file a court action within 60 days after receiving a final decision of the Secretary; and # 4) those claimants who have received a final court decision.⁶

At the December 28, 1984 hearing, the court dismissed the claims of those proposed class members still in the "administrative pipeline" (group # 1) because those individuals were still in a position to challenge the Secretary's severity policies in light of the statements made by Congress referred to ante in footnote 5 and because the Conference Committee stated that it relied on the Secretary's assurance that she would reevaluate her current criteria for non-severe impairments. The Secretary has not revised her current severity policies since the 1984 Act was passed last October, and there is no suggestion that she intends to do so.⁷ It is no longer appropriate to require these claimants to challenge the severity policies on an individual basis and, therefore, the court reverses its ruling of December 28, 1984.

Furthermore, the...