McDonald v. Lattire
| Citation | 844 N.E.2d 206 |
| Decision Date | 23 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 03A01-0505-CV-223.,03A01-0505-CV-223. |
| Parties | Michelle A. McDONALD, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. James D. LATTIRE, Appellee-Defendant. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Scott C. Andrews, Coriden Law Office, LLC, Columbus, for Appellant.
Kyle M. Baker, McNeeley, Stephenson, Thopy & Harrold, Shelbyville, for Appellee.
Michelle McDonald appeals the summary judgment granted in favor of James Lattire. We affirm.
McDonald raises one issue: whether genuine issues of material fact exist such that summary judgment should not have been granted on her negligence claim. In addition to responding to McDonald's substantive issue, Lattire challenges McDonald's memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, asserting problems concerning timeliness and designation. We first examine Lattire's two related issues, then we analyze McDonald's contention.
The undisputed facts reveal that on May 4, 2003, McDonald was driving her black 2001 Jeep Grand Cherokee southbound on U.S. 31. Appellant's App. at 6 (complaint), 9 (answer). At that same time, Lattire was driving his red 1994 Chevy S-10 northbound on U.S. 31. Id. Also at that time, Desmon Elgar was traveling in his blue 1992 Pontiac Bonneville westbound on County Road 600 South. Id. Elgar ran the stop sign at County Road 600 South and U.S. 31. Id. A collision occurred between Elgar's and Lattire's vehicles, and immediately thereafter a collision occurred between Lattire's and McDonald's vehicles.
On September 8, 2004, McDonald filed a complaint against Lattire for damages resulting from the accident. Id. at 6. In her complaint, which was signed only by her counsel, McDonald "state[d] and alleg[ed]" that the accident occurred as follows:
Elgar ran the stop sign at CR 600 S, driving into the path of [Lattire] as he was traveling north on U.S. 31. Upon impact between Elgar and [Lattire], [Lattire] spun around and crossed into the south lane, directly into the path of [McDonald]. Upon impact, [Lattire's] vehicle became airborne and came to rest on it's [sic] passenger side off of the road, against a sign post and wire fence on CR 600 S, just west of U.S. 31, where it caught fire. Simultaneously, [McDonald's] vehicle traveled off of the road into a steep, grassy ditch on the west side of U.S. 31 just south of CR 600 S, where it caught fire.
Id. at 6-7. Lattire moved for an enlargement of time in which to answer. Id. at 3 (chronological case summary, "CCS"). The court granted the enlargement up to and including November 4, 2004.
Lattire filed his answer, defenses, demand for jury trial, a motion for summary judgment, and a brief in support thereof prior to November 4, 2004. Id. In his own affidavit, which he designated and attached to his summary judgment materials, Lattire described the accident slightly differently than McDonald had alleged in her complaint. According to Lattire's sworn affidavit, Lattire Id. at 16 (Lattire affidavit). Further, Lattire was traveling "under the posted speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour" and "had no opportunity to avoid this collision." Id. Moreover, "[a]s a result of [Elgar's] striking of [Lattire's] vehicle, [Lattire's] vehicle was spun around and forced into the southbound lane of travel on U.S. 31, where [Lattire's] vehicle collided with a vehicle driven by [McDonald]." Id.
A summary judgment hearing was originally scheduled for January 19, 2005. Id. at 3(CCS). However, on January 12, 2005, McDonald filed and the trial court granted her motion to continue the hearing to February 16, 2005, and to extend her response date up to and including February 5, 2005. Id. McDonald filed her memorandum in opposition to Lattire's motion for summary judgment on February 14, 2005. Id. at 22-33. On the day of the hearing, Lattire objected to McDonald's memorandum in opposition to Lattire's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 3(CCS), 34-37 (written objection), 42-44 (summary judgment hearing transcript containing oral objection).
On March 22, 2005, the trial court granted Lattire's motion for summary judgment in an order that reads in relevant part as follows:
The parties having appeared in person and by counsel, and the Court having heard argument on [Lattire's] Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Court now being duly advised in the premises hereby finds as follows:
1) [McDonald] failed to present any affidavits or sworn testimony to refute the allegations contained in [Lattire's] Motion for Summary Judgment.
2) Further [McDonald's] complaint is not verified and can not be taken as an affidavit in opposition to [Lattire's] Motion.
3) The Court is therefore left to make a determination of the existence of material factual disputes from the submission of evidence presented by [Lattire]. Ind. Tr. Rule 56(E).
4) It is the expressed desire of the Courts to resolve all disputes on the merits rather than dismissing an action based on a technicality.
5) It is clear from the facts presented to the Court, that no reasonable jury could determine that [Lattire] acted negligently because:
(a) [Lattire] violated no traffic laws;
(b) [Lattire] legally crossed into an intersection;
(c) [Lattire's] vehicle was struck by a vehicle that was acting outside the norms of proper traffic safety;
(d) That the third party caused the collision and [Lattire] had no duty, nor even an opportunity to avoid the collision.
A reiteration of the often-quoted summary judgment standard of review is particularly helpful in this case.
Pursuant to Rule 56(C) of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On review of a trial court's decision to grant or deny summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard as the trial court. We must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial, and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Neither the trial court nor the reviewing court may look beyond the evidence specifically designated to the trial court.
A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden to make a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Once the moving party satisfies this burden through evidence designated to the trial court pursuant to Trial Rule 56, the nonmoving party may not rest on its pleadings, but must designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial. The court must accept as true those facts alleged by the nonmoving party, construe the evidence in favor of the nonmovant, and resolve all doubts against the moving party. For a defendant in a negligence action to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the defendant must show that the undisputed material facts negate at least one of the elements essential to the negligence claim, or that the claim is barred by an affirmative defense. On appeal, we will assess the trial court's decision to ensure that the parties were not improperly denied their day in court. A genuine issue of material fact exists where facts concerning an issue that would dispose of the litigation are in dispute or where the undisputed material facts are capable of supporting conflicting inferences on such an issue.
Coffman v. PSI Energy, Inc., 815 N.E.2d 522, 526 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (citations omitted) (emphasis added), trans. denied. "Because issues of reasonable care, causation, and comparative fault are more appropriately left for determination by the trier of fact, summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases." Daisy v. Roach, 811 N.E.2d 862, 864 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004).
The trial court's findings and conclusions are not binding upon this court, but do facilitate appellate review and offer insight into the trial court's rationale for its decision. Unincorporated Operating Div. of Ind. Newspapers, Inc. v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 787 N.E.2d 893, 900 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003), trans. denied. On review, we will affirm the summary judgment if it is sustainable upon any theory or basis found in the record. Id.; see also Cox v. Paul, 828 N.E.2d 907, 910-11 (Ind.2005). The trial court's order granting or denying a motion for summary judgment is cloaked with a presumption of validity. Sizemore v. Erie Ins. Exch., 789 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ind.Ct. App.2003). A party appealing from an order granting summary judgment has the burden of persuading us that the decision was erroneous. Id.
In his motion for summary judgment, Lattire "designated" (via listing) McDonald's complaint and his own verified affidavit, which he attached as evidence. Appellant's App. at 13-16. Within his memorandum in support of his motion, Lattire cited to particular paragraphs of both the complaint and his affidavit, hence specifically designating those portions. Id. at 17-18. McDonald did not file her memorandum in opposition to Lattire's motion for summary judgment until February 14, 2005, which was nine days after the court-ordered extension and just two days before the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. Id. at 3. Along with her memorandum, McDonald included her designation, which consisted of: "Paragraphs 1 through 10 of [McDonald's] Complaint for Damages and all exhibits attached thereto[.]" Id. No exhibits were attached to McDonald's complaint or to her memorandum in opposition to summary judgment. Stated otherwise, McDonald's response to Lattire's ...
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