McDonald v. Miller
Decision Date | 27 November 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 2,No. 867,867,2 |
Citation | 242 N.E.2d 39,143 Ind.App. 606 |
Parties | Madeline McDONALD, etc., Appellant, v. Lucille M. MILLER, Appellee. A 42 |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
This is an action for the wrongful death of the plaintiff-appellant's husband, Charles McDonald, a pedestrian who died after being struck down by the automobile of the defendant-appellee Lucille M. Miller, at the intersection of Broadway and Parkview, in the City of Fort Wayne, Indiana, on September 23, 1963.
The issues were joined on the question of the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's contributory negligence in the Allen Superior Court No. 3. Then, following a change of venue to the DeKalb Circuit Court, the plaintiff requested trial by jury which request was granted by the court. Later, on defendant's motion to reconsider the order granting a jury trial, the former order granting a jury trial was reviewed and revoked over the plaintiff's objection. Trial was then had before the court which heard the evidence and issued special findings of fact to the effect that the defendant was negligent, which negligence was a proximate cause of said accident, and further, that the plaintiff's decedent was also negligent, which negligence was a contributory cause of the accident. Upon these findings the court entered its judgment for the defendant.
The appellant assigns as error the overruling of her motion for a new trial, setting forth three specific propositions for our review:
1) That the trial court erred in depriving the appellant of trial by jury by granting the appellee's motion to reconsider order granting jury trial only three days before the trial date.
2) That the trial court erred in allowing certain opinion testimony which prejudicially invaded the province of the trier of fact.
3) That the judgment is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law.
On March 11, 1965, plaintiff-appellant filed her amended complaint for damages in the Superior Court No. 3 of Allen County. The defendant-appellee answered on April 2, 1965, and requested a change of venue from Allen County, which request was granted on April 21, 1965, and the matter moved to the DeKalb Circuit Court of DeKalb County. Said court, on June 16, 1965, ordered the case set for trial to the court on November 8, 1965. Trial was, however, delayed for reasons not shown in the record. Thereafter, on January 21, 1966, the plaintiff filed her request for trial to a jury, which request was granted over the defendant's objection on March 15, 1966. Subsequently, the matter was ordered tried to a jury on October 17, 1966. Four days prior to said date of trial, on October 13, 1966, the defendant filed her 'Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Jury Trial'; this motion was granted and the plaintiff's previously granted request for a jury trial was thereby overruled.
It is the contention of the appellee that by her failure to file her request for trial by jury within ten (10) days as required by the Rules of the Supreme Court of Indiana, the appellant waived the right to trial by jury. Rule 1--8A of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Indiana, 1967 Edition, provides as follows:
The applicable provisions of Rule 1--12B are:
* * *'
In support of her waiver argument, appellee cites Hayworth v. Bromwell (1959), 239 Ind. 430, 158 N.E.2d 285. Hayworth involved a jury request filed over six months after the case went to issue. In denying the request for jury trial, the court said:
'It is well settled that the right to a jury trial may be waived.'
The court went on to say:
Similar holdings may be found in State ex rel. Victory Lanes, Inc. v. Blackford Circuit Court (1967), Ind., 231 N.E.2d 140; and Spangler v. Armstrong Rubber Co. (1961), 133 Ind.App. 411, 178 N.E.2d 764.
It is clear that the appellant waived her right to jury trial by her failure to file a request within 10 days after the closing of the issues. Indeed, appellant concedes this to be so. Appellant contends, however, that when the trial court later granted the appellant's request for jury trial on March 15, 1966, the court was acting within the scope of its discretionary powers to grant such a request even though the time for doing so allowed by the Supreme Court Rules had long since passed, citing: Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Acme-Goodrich, Inc. (1959), 130 Ind.App. 432, 159 N.E.2d 310. Appellant further argues that the subsequent reconsideration of the granting of that request to rescind the order for trial by jury, more than six months after it was granted and only three days prior to trial, was prejudicial error.
This appears to be a question of first impression and no cases are cited by either party which have decided whether the reinstatement of the right to trial by jury nullifies a prior waiver and restores the right to its original status.
The appellee contends that the granting of the appellant's motion for a jury trial after the passage of the time allowed by the rules was error, and, that in reversing itself upon the appellee's motion to reconsider the lower court merely corrected that error.
The parties concede that they are unable to find a case as precedent in which the trial court granted a request for a jury trial after the time allowed by the rules and then later reversed itself.
It is our opinion that the trial court was acting within its discretion when it granted the plaintiff-appellant's motion for trial by jury, even though the time for filing such request under Rule 1--8A had passed. Section 2--1204, Burns' Indiana Statutes Annotated, 1967 Replacement, says:
(Our emphasis).
We further hold that once the trial court exercised its discretion in granting a trial by jury that right again fell under the protection of Rule 1--8A which requires that: 'A demand for trial by jury may not be withdrawn without the consent of all parties.' Thus, the discretion granted by Section...
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Shelby Nat. Bank v. Miller
...car from the center lane or if it was coming in the north lane immediately prior to the collision.' More recently in McDonald v. Miller, Ind.App., 242 N.E.2d 39 (1968), and in Briney v. Williams, Ind.App., 242 N.E.2d 132 (1968), reversals were predicated on the admission of similar Our last......
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McClure v. Austin, 372A133
...171, 17 Ind.Dec. 696; Carson v. Assoc. Truck Lines, Inc. (1968), 143 Ind.App. 431, 241 N.E.2d 78 (transfer denied); McDonald v. Miller (1968), 143 Ind.App. 606, 242 N.E.2d 39 (transfer denied); Presser v. Shull (1962), 133 Ind.App. 553, 181 N.E.2d 247 (transfer denied); Lee, etc. v. Dickers......
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Jameson v. McCaffry
...discretion and committed reversible error. Plaintiff-appellant attempts to sustain her position with the case of McDonald v. Miller (1968), 143 Ind.App. 606, 242 N.E.2d 39. In McDonald the former Supreme Court Rule 1--8A controlled, but has now been superceded by Rule TR. 38(B), IC 1971, 34......
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Koch v. Greenwood, 171A4
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