McDonald v. New York Cent. R. Co.
| Decision Date | 18 June 1924 |
| Docket Number | No. 100.,100. |
| Parties | McDONALD v. NEW YORK CENT. R. CO. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Circuit Court, Kent County; Wm. B. Brown, Judge.
Action by Margaret McDonald against the New York Central Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed by divided court.
Argued before CLARK, C. J., and McDONALD, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE, STEERE, FELLOWS, and WIEST, JJ. Knappen, Uhi & Bryant, of Grand Rapids, for appellant.
Smedley, Linsey & Shivel, of Grand Rapids, for appellee.
On the morning of July 9, 1921, one Peterson, while driving in an automobile, sustained injuries in a collision with one of defendant's trains at a road crossing in the village of Lamar, a few miles distant from Grand Rapids. One of defendant's employees, by telephone, notified Dr. Rolland F. Webb, its local surgeon at Grand Rapids. The doctor testified:
The doctor treated Peterson during the time he was in the hospital without any arrangement with him as to compensation. He further testified that on the day following the injury he told plaintiff, ‘I had no authority to call her for the railroad company; that she would have to look to the man for her pay;’ and that ‘She raised no objection.’ He assumed that he ‘did have authority to hire her for the first 24 hours,’ and that he had authority to ‘send a man to the hospital’ ‘under those conditions.’
Plaintiff denied that Dr. Webb told her she would have to look to the man for her pay. She testified:
‘I was looking for my pay to the railroad company;’ that after 6 weeks of service she spoke about getting her pay to Dr. Webb, and ‘he said he would talk with Mr. Peterson about it;’ that when the doctor did so Peterson said, ‘Doctor, you put this nurse on the case and you will have to see that she is paid.’
Plaintiff here seeks to recover for the service rendered for the 6 weeks. The amount is not in dispute. The defendant put in evidence the contract between it and the doctor and a pamphlet of ‘Suggestions and Instructions to Company Surgeons.’ Its motion for a directed verdict was denied, and the case submitted to the jury, who found for the plaintiff in the sum of $316.89. Defendant reviews the judgment entered thereon by writ of error.
The contract contained the following:
‘Third: The said doctor, accepting the appointment as such local surgeon agrees that he will, during his appointment attend attentatively and professionally at the place of his residence and at a reasonable distance therefrom, any and all persons injured in any way in connection with the operation or business of said rail _____ company, attending said persons as long as they may need attendance and furnishing all dressings that may be needed except where patients are cared for at hospitals.’
Among the suggestions and instructions above referred to were:
On Dr. Webb's being informed of the injury sustained by Peterson (it having occurred ‘in connection with the operation’ of the railroad), it was his duty, under his contract, to ‘attend attentatively and professionally’ to the needs of Peterson and render him such propessional service as his condition required. The quthority conferred on him and the duties imposed upon him under the contract were of a special nature. It cannot be said that any general agency was created by it.
The business conducted by the defendant is a dangerous one. Accidents, not only to employees, but to passengers and travelers upon the highways crossing its line of road, are not infrequent. No legal obligation rests upon it to care for persons injured by its trains, as was Peterson. Entering into this contract with the doctor was, however, the assumption of a moral obligation resting upon it to do what was immediately necessary to save life or alleviate pain and suffering when an accident so occurred. The obligation thus assumed had been fully complied with when the exigency which gave rise to it had passed. The extent to which the defendant should go in so providing was a matter for it to decide. It provided in the contract with the doctor for furnishing ‘first aid,’ for caring for the person injured until opportunity was afforded him or his relatives or friends, or, if none of these were at hand, the public authorities, to take charge and do what was further needed. No obligation, even of a moral nature, rested on it to do more than this. The doctor under his contract was not required to do more.
Plaintiff's right to recover must rest upon the implied or apparent authority which the doctor had to obligate the defendant to pay for her services. She had no knowledge of the contract or its terms. She had no right to assume that the defendant, by rendering ‘first aid’ to Peterson in the emergency created by the accident, intended to obligate itself to care for him and pay the expenses incident thereto until he should fully recover. When the doctor took charge of the injured man she had a right to assume that he had the authority to bind the company for which he was acting to pay the expense incident to those things which a doctor would ordinarily do under the circumstances. She was sent for at his request. She found the injured man under the influence of an anaesthetic. The doctor testified that the service she then rendered was necessary. But, when the emergency had passed, when Peterson had become conscious, and was in a condition to provide for himself, or, if unable to do so, when the public authorities might have been appealed to, the apparent authority of the doctor to bind the company for such service no longer existed. His authority expired with the emergency. The duty then devolved on the doctor and the nurse and the injued man to make suitable arrangements for such further aid as he desired and needed. The lack of apparent authority was evident, we think, when we bear in mind the purpose or object sought to be accomplished by the employment of the doctor by the defendant. No person could have, or at least should have, understood from the fact that the defendant employed a local doctor as its surgeon that it intended to provide, free of charge, the services of the surgeon and such nurses and other expenditures as were necessary in caring for a person injured in the operation of its train, as was Mr. Peterson, during the entire period of his confinement. If authority to hire a nurse was so apparent as to charge the defendant with payment for her services, the same authority would obligate it to pay any other necessary expense incident to his care and treatment while confined in the hospital or other place to which he might have been removed. The doctrine of apparent authority cannot be so far extended. In the absence of proof that the defendant knowingly permitted the doctor to exercise such enlarged powers, we feel constrained to hold that the plaintiff had no right to rely on any such implied or apparent authority, and that, except for the first 24 hours of service by her, during which time the doctor was administering ‘first aid’ treatment to the injured man, she has no right of recovery. The conclusion reached is, we think, supported by the great weight of authority. In fact, our...
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...v. Thomas (Tex. Civ. App.) 47 S.W.(2d) 894;Omaha General Hospital v. Strehlow, 96 Neb. 308, 147 N. W. 846; and McDonald v. New York Central R. Co., 227 Mich. 579, 199 N. W. 375. These decisions, we think, are not controlling of the instant case, but instead are distinguishable therefrom. In......
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