McDonald v. State

• Decision Date: 29 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. 19963,19963
• Citation: 124 Idaho 103,856 P.2d 893
• Parties: Brian C. McDONALD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 893

856 P.2d 893

124 Idaho 103

Brian C. McDONALD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.

No. 19963.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Dec. 29, 1992.

Petition for Review Denied May 24, 1993.

Stewart A. Morris, Boise, for appellant.

Larry EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., Thomas P. Watkins, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for respondent.

WALTERS, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court summarily dismissing an application for post-conviction relief. The applicant sought relief for alleged violation of the due process requirements for prisoner evaluations under the retained jurisdiction program at the North Idaho Correctional Institute. The sole issue presented is whether the allegations in the application framed any genuine issue of material fact. ¹ For the reasons explained below, we conclude that they do not and the summary dismissal was proper.

In October, 1989, Brian McDonald was convicted in two separate cases, before different judges, of driving under the influence of alcohol. For these offenses he received concurrent, unified sentences of five years with a one-year minimum period of confinement. In each case, the sentencing court decided to retain jurisdiction for 120 days to permit a further evaluation of McDonald's potential for rehabilitation and his suitability for probation. McDonald was then placed in the North Idaho Correctional Institute (NICI) at Cottonwood. The committee initially decided to recommend a sixty-day extension of McDonald's retained jurisdiction program, but after holding a hearing on that matter, changed its position and issued a final report and recommendation concluding that McDonald was unfit for probation and recommending that jurisdiction be relinquished. Jurisdiction subsequently was relinquished in both cases and McDonald was left to serve out his sentences in the custody of the Board of Correction.

Nearly two years later, McDonald filed a verified application for post-conviction relief alleging that the procedures employed by the NICI review committee violated his due process rights, and seeking to set aside the order relinquishing jurisdiction. In his application he asserted that the only notice and hearing provided him was on the committee's intended recommendation for an extension of jurisdiction. He contended that he was not advised of the committee's subsequent recommendation against probation until after the hearing, and that his request for a hearing on this new recommendation was denied. The effect of these procedures, McDonald submitted, was to deny him his right to call witnesses on his behalf. In response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss, McDonald filed an affidavit naming five witnesses he would have called if given the opportunity, along with a brief description of the testimony he expected from each one of them. No answer or other responsive pleadings were filed by the state. After reviewing the record, but without holding a hearing, the district court entered an order dismissing the application. This appeal followed.

Due Process

The purpose of an evaluation under the retained jurisdiction procedure is to provide the court with additional information so that it can determine a convicted defendant's potential for rehabilitation and suitability for probation. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 582 P.2d 728 (1978); State v. Boswell, 118 Idaho 725, 800 P.2d 121 (Ct.App.1990). A good report indicating rehabilitative potential may result in a suspended sentence and probation. Wolfe, 99 Idaho at 385, 582 P.2d at 731. In Wolfe, our Supreme Court recognized that a prisoner's liberty interest in the fairness of his evaluation is sufficient to invoke the protections of the state and federal due process clauses, and held that the Board of Correction must afford certain minimum procedural safeguards. The Court said:

Before a report is sent back to the sentencing judge (pursuant to the retained jurisdiction of I.C. § 19-2601), certain procedures must be followed. The prisoner must be given adequate notice before the hearing, including notice of the substance of all matters that will be considered. The prisoner must be given an opportunity to explain or rebut any testimony or recommendations. In addition, the prisoner must be free to call witnesses in his behalf from among the employees and other prisoners at NICI. This information should be included in the report sent back to the sentencing judge.

99 Idaho at 389, 582 P.2d at 735.

Given that a prisoner has a right to these procedural safeguards, he or she must also have a right to judicial review of the procedures used to prepare the report. See Wolfe, 99 Idaho at 393, 582 P.2d at 739 (Bakes, J., dissenting). Generally, the prisoner must request this review, at least in the first instance, from the sentencing judge, for whose benefit and at whose request the report has been prepared. See State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 808 P.2d 1322 (1991); State v. Cortez, 122 Idaho 439, 835 P.2d 674 (Ct.App.1992); State v. Denny, 122 Idaho 563, 835 P.2d 1374 (Ct.App.1992). Where, as in this case, the district court is not apprised of a procedural defect until years after its occurrence, it has all but lost any opportunity to meaningfully reconsider the option of probation. This is so because, even if constitutional violations required that the original order relinquishing jurisdiction be vacated, on remand the evidence of a prisoner's rehabilitative potential will be limited by the 120-day jurisdiction restriction imposed by I.C. § 19-2401. See Brandt v. State, 118 Idaho 350, 796 P.2d 1023 (1990). An inmate's efforts at rehabilitation, or his lack thereof, while under the jurisdiction of the Board of Correction would fall outside the scope of a new probation hearing. Id. 118 Idaho at 352, 796 P.2d at 1025. Thus, where the district court's retained jurisdiction has long since terminated, the value of the admissible information would have become outdated and less reliable, and a sentencing court generally would not be inclined to rely on it. For this reason, and for reasons of judicial efficiency, we believe the more effective procedure for redress of the evaluation committee's noncompliance with Wolfe's requirements would be immediately to bring the issue to the attention of the sentencing judge, who then could promptly address the matter. ²

In this case, however, McDonald has raised the claim in an application for post-conviction relief, nearly two years after the Board of Correction prepared its report. Nonetheless we note that our Supreme Court has expressly indicated that review of the procedures used to prepare the report is available under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. ³ See Wolfe, 99 Idaho at 390, 582 P.2d at 736. Accordingly, we will review the application under the standards for post-conviction relief.

Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

An order summarily dismissing an application for post-conviction relief is functionally equivalent to a summary judgment in a civil case under I.R.C.P. 56. Dyer v. State, 115 Idaho 773, 769 P.2d 1145 (Ct.App.1989); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 741 P.2d 374 (Ct.App.1987). Where it appears from the pleadings that no genuine issue of fact exists, the trial court may summarily dispose of the application; however, where genuine issues of material fact exist, an evidentiary hearing must be held as provided in Idaho Code § 19-4906. See I.C. § 19-4906(b); Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 373, 825 P.2d 94, 96 (Ct.App.1992); Whitehawk v. State, 116 Idaho 831, 780 P.2d 153 (Ct.App.1989). For purposes of appellate review, the allegations in the post-conviction relief application are deemed to be true. Summary dismissal of the application will be upheld, however, if the allegations would...