McDonald v. Union Camp Corp.

Decision Date15 June 1990
Docket NumberNo. 89-1253,89-1253
Citation898 F.2d 1155
Parties52 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 817, 53 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,738, 115 Lab.Cas. P 56,254, 5 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 578 Robert V. McDONALD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNION CAMP CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Martin R. Strum, Kalamazoo, Mich., Angela J. Nicita, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff-appellant.

Jeffrey K. Ross, John T. Murray, Chicago, Ill., Barry R. Smith, Miller, Johnson, Snell & Cummiskey, Kalamazoo, Mich., for defendant-appellee.

Before JONES and RYAN, Circuit Judges; and CELEBREZZE, Senior Circuit Judge.

CELEBREZZE, Senior Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff-appellant Robert McDonald brought this action against his former employer, the defendant-appellee Union Camp Corporation (hereinafter Union Camp) alleging in Count I, that his termination from Union Camp's employ was a breach of employment contract, and in Count II, that he was discriminatorily discharged because of his age in violation of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. Sec. 37.2101 et seq. (1985 & Supp.1988). The complaint was originally filed in the Circuit Court for the County of Kalamazoo. However, on February 24, 1987, the defendant removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Title 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1441. McDonald now appeals the judgment of the district court which directed a verdict for Union Camp on the breach of contract claim, and the order which granted summary judgment in favor of Union Camp on the age discrimination claim. We affirm.

I.

Union Camp's Container Division manufactures corrugated containers, commonly known as cardboard boxes, at various plants located across the United States. Union Camp hired McDonald on January 25, 1960 at the Chicago box plant as a line supervisor. Thereafter, McDonald held various staff and supervisory positions with Union Camp, and in 1969, became the manufacturing manager for the Lapeer, Michigan box plant. In 1977, McDonald became the manufacturing manager for the Kalamazoo, Michigan plant as well as the Lapeer plant. He performed in this dual capacity until December 1980, when the Lapeer plant closed. McDonald remained as the manufacturing manager of the Kalamazoo plant until his employment was terminated in June 1986. As the plant manufacturing manager, McDonald had overall responsibility for the plant's actual manufacturing operations. The manufacturing supervisors reported to him, and he reported to the plant general manager, who had responsibility for the entire plant operation.

Union Camp reviewed the performance of its employees on an annual basis. The review was performed by the employee's immediate supervisor (in McDonald's case, the general manager). The evaluation was never shown to the employee, but was discussed with the employee to the extent the reviewer chose to do so. In addition, raises were based upon job performance; the better an employee's evaluation, the higher the raise would be. There was also a bonus system in effect for supervisory personnel called the Management Incentive System Bonus Plan. The employee was given bonus points at the end of the year based upon the extent to which he achieved the goals set; the more points received, the higher the bonus.

It is undisputed that throughout many years at Union Camp, McDonald received excellent performance assessments and received various raises and bonuses recognizing his performance. However, personnel records show that McDonald had been criticized over the years for his inability to communicate and get along with his superiors and subordinates. In fact, on several occasions, intermediate management officials recommended to the regional manager that McDonald be transferred or terminated. However, despite these recommendations, McDonald remained at the Kalamazoo plant since production and performance figures were good.

In 1985, Chris Bakaitis took over the position of General Manager of the Kalamazoo plant. At that time, personnel records showed that production was declining and that McDonald continued to have communication difficulties. In August 1985, Regional Manager Sutlive and General Manager Bakaitis placed McDonald on a sixty-day probation which called for "immediate and sustained improvement." McDonald objected to these evaluations and claimed that he was being subjected to age discrimination by his plant manager, Bakaitis.

Later, in March 1986, the new Regional Manager Carl Raglin, General Manager Bakaitis, and another executive met with McDonald to again discuss his performance. During this meeting, McDonald refused to acknowledge any unsatisfactory conduct on his part and claimed that his alleged communication difficulties were immaterial since his plant's production performance was excellent, and that any recent decline in production should not be held against him since production was down in all plants. Thereafter, McDonald was removed from the manufacturing manager's position and offered two other positions within the company, one as a Superintendent of Maintenance and Engineering, and one as a Second Shift Finishing Supervisor. Although Union Camp offered to continue McDonald at his former salary, both positions were considered demotions. McDonald refused both offers, and his termination became effective on July 11, 1986. 1

As a result, McDonald filed his complaint bringing claims of age discrimination and breach of employment contract. On January 4, 1989, the district court granted Union Camp's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to McDonald's age discrimination claim. The court held that there was no material factual dispute with respect to McDonald's prima facie case of unlawful age discrimination since McDonald admitted that his superiors were dissatisfied with his job performance. The court further opined that even if McDonald had established a prima facie case of age discrimination, Union Camp had articulated legitimate business reasons for its decision, and McDonald had failed to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Union Camp's reasons were pretextual.

At trial on the breach of employment contract claim, the district court utilized the provisions of Michigan implied contract law and found that based on representations made to McDonald, a reasonable juror could find that Union Camp had made a contract with McDonald under which McDonald could be discharged from Union Camp only for just cause. The court further found, however, that there was no evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that McDonald was promised continued tenure in any particular position. Consequently, the court reasoned that since Union Camp offered McDonald two other positions which McDonald rejected, no reasonable juror could find that the agreement was breached. Therefore, the court directed a verdict in favor of Union Camp. This timely appeal ensued.

II.

According to the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. Sec. 37.2202(1)(a), an employer shall not discharge an employee because of age. This provision is similar to the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in that the same evidentiary burdens prevail. See Simpson v. Midland-Ross Corp., 823 F.2d 937 (6th Cir.1987); Gallaway v. Chrysler Corp., 105 Mich.App. 1, 306 N.W.2d 368, 370-71 (1981) (adopting Sixth Circuit analysis in Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.1975)). A Michigan plaintiff who alleges unlawful employment discrimination generally has three approaches at his disposal. First, he may proceed under the approach enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in the landmark case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The second approach is one delineated by the Michigan courts which generally examines whether age was a determinative factor in the plaintiff's discharge. Finally, a plaintiff may proceed by showing through circumstantial, statistical or direct evidence that he has been discriminated against.

A. McDonnell Douglas Approach

The traditional approach for proceeding under an employment discrimination claim was established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 441 U.S. 792, 99 S.Ct. 2400, 60 L.Ed.2d 646 (1973), and has been routinely employed in this circuit. See, e.g., Simpson v. Midland-Ross Corp., 823 F.2d 937 (6th Cir.1987); Wilkins v. Eaton Corp., 790 F.2d 515 (6th Cir.), reh'g denied, 797 F.2d 342 (1986); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.1975). A plaintiff making such a claim carries the initial burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of age discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. This requires a showing that:

(1) he was a member of a protected class (age 40 to 70);

(2) he was subjected to adverse employment action;

(3) he was qualified for the position; [and]

(4) he was replaced by a younger person.

Simpson, 823 F.2d at 940 (application of McDonnell Douglas to the age discrimination context). Proof of all four criteria raises a presumption of age discrimination. Id. If the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's [discharge]." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. Finally, should the employer carry this burden, the plaintiff then must prove by a preponderance of the evidence "that the legitimate reasons offered by the [employer] were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). This essentially amounts to a showing that the "presumptively valid reasons for his [discharge] were in fact a cover-up for a...

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