McDonell v. Hunter

• Decision Date: 09 July 1985
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 84-71-B.
• Citation: 612 F. Supp. 1122
• Parties: Alan F. McDONELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Susan HUNTER, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

612 F. Supp. 1122

Alan F. McDONELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Susan HUNTER, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 84-71-B.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, C.D.

July 9, 1985.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mark W. Bennett, Staff Counsel, Iowa Civil Liberties Union, Des Moines, Iowa, for plaintiffs.

Gordon Allen, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Mark Hunacek, John Parmeter, Asst. Attys. Gen., Des Moines, Iowa, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT

VIETOR, Chief Judge.

This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action brought by three correctional institution employees challenging the constitutionality of an Iowa Department of Corrections policy (hereafter "the Department's policy" or "the policy") which subjects the Department's correctional institution employees to searches of their vehicles and persons, including urinalysis and blood tests, upon the request of Department officials.

The court previously entered an order, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(3), certifying the class consisting of all individuals employed by the Iowa Department of Corrections at its various institutions throughout the state of Iowa who are covered by the Department's policies which may subject employees to searches of their personal motor vehicles and their persons, including strip-searches, and which allows Department of Corrections officials to demand urine, blood or breath specimens for chemical analysis.

Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and the class they represent that the Department's policy (a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A) violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and plaintiffs' constitutional right to privacy.¹ Plaintiff McDonell also seeks back pay for earnings lost during his period of discharge.

Jurisdiction and venue are predicated upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a).

A preliminary injunction was issued in February of 1984, from which appeal was taken. The preliminary injunction order was affirmed. McDonell v. Hunter, 746 F.2d 785 (8th Cir.1984).

On June 6, 1985, the parties reported to the court that they have no further evidence to offer and no further briefing to present, so the case is now submitted for final decision on the evidence and briefs received by the court in conjunction with the preliminary injunction matter.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff McDonell was employed as a correctional officer at the Men's Reformatory at Anamosa (hereinafter "Anamosa") until he was discharged on January 19, 1984. Shortly after that he was reinstated but transferred to a different institution. He lost ten days pay. Plaintiffs Curran and Phipps, at all times material to this action, were and continue to be employed at the Iowa Correctional Institution for Women at Mitchellville (hereinafter "Mitchellville").

There are approximately 1750 correctional institution employees of the Iowa Department of Corrections who are within the certified class.

Defendant Hunter is the Superintendent and chief executive officer of Mitchellville. Defendant Sebek is the Security Director of Mitchellville, and is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Department's policy. Defendant Behrends is the Acting Deputy Warden of Anamosa, and is responsible for the implementation of the Department's policy. Defendant Farrier is Director and chief administrative officer of the Iowa Department of Corrections, and is responsible for the supervision and operations of Anamosa, Mitchellville, and other correctional facilities.

It is, of course, necessary to maintain security at each correctional facility, and a necessary part of security is prevention of distribution of weapons, drugs and other contraband to inmates. The Department's policy challenged in this suit is designed to serve security requirements at the state's correctional facilities.

The motor vehicle parking lot for employees at Mitchellville is within the gates of the facility, that is, within the area where inmates are confined. At all other correctional facilities the employee parking lot is on facility property outside of the confines within which inmates are confined.

When plaintiff McDonell became employed at Anamosa in 1979, he signed a consent to search, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix B. On January 17, 1984, plaintiff McDonell was informed by supervisory personnel at Anamosa that they had received confidential information indicating that he had been seen the previous weekend with individuals who were "being looked at" by law enforcement officials regarding drug related activities. Based on this information, the supervisory personnel requested plaintiff McDonell to undergo urinalysis. He refused and as a result his employment was terminated on January 19. Shortly thereafter he was reinstated with loss of ten days pay and transferred to another institution.

In August of 1983, employees at Mitchellville were presented a search consent form to sign, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix C. Plaintiffs Curran and Phipps refused to sign. There is disputed evidence that they were initially told that they would not receive their paychecks if they did not sign. In any event, they did receive their paychecks and all paychecks since then, and they have not been discharged or disciplined in any way for refusing to sign.

The Department's policy does not identify who has the authority to require an employee to submit to a search or to provide a blood or urine sample, nor does the policy articulate any standards for its implementation. No separate written standards have been promulgated governing implementation of the Department's policy. In his affidavit, defendant Farrier states: "As a practical matter, correctional officers are not asked to submit to a urinalysis or blood test unless there is some articulable reason to believe that there may be a problem."

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISCUSSION

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1361, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949).

The Supreme Court has rejected the notion of "constitutionally protected areas" and has said: "The fourth amendment protects people, not places." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). The Fourth Amendment is intended to protect the privacy of individuals from invasion by unreasonable searches of the person and those places and things wherein the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Only "unreasonable" searches are prohibited. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147, 45 S.Ct. 280, 283, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).

Defendants suggest that Fourth Amendment considerations are not involved in this case because any searches made pursuant to the Department's policy would not be for criminal investigation purposes.² That contention is without merit. "It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1731, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317, 91 S.Ct. 381, 385, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971). All of us are protected by the Fourth Amendment all of the time, not just when police suspect us of criminal conduct.

There is no question that one's person and one's automobile are places where one has a reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy, and that government intrusions into those areas are searches.³ Taking blood from the body is a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1834, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). Urine, unlike blood, is routinely discharged from the body, so no governmental intrusion into the body is required to seize urine. However, urine is discharged and disposed of under circumstances where the person certainly has a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy. One does not reasonably expect to discharge urine under circumstances making it available to others to collect and analyze in order to discover the personal physiological secrets it holds, except as part of a medical examination. It is significant that both blood and urine can be analyzed in a medical laboratory to discover numerous physiological facts about the person from whom it came, including but hardly limited to recent ingestion of alcohol or drugs. One clearly has a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in such personal information contained in his body fluids. Therefore, governmental taking of a urine specimen is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F.Supp. 482, 488-89 (N.D.Ga.1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F.Supp. 1214, 1217-18 (S.D.N.Y.1984); Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74, 81 (C.M.A.1983).

It is this court's conclusion that all of the intrusions authorized by the Department's policy are intrusions into areas where plaintiffs and their class normally have a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. The question then becomes whether the intrusions authorized by the policy are nevertheless reasonable and therefore not violative of the Fourth Amendment.

Whether the authorized intrusions are reasonable must be evaluated in the context of the places of...