McDonough v. City of Homestead

• Decision Date: 15 July 2022
• Docket Number: 1:21-cv-21538-KMM
• Citation: McDonough v. City of Homestead, 1:21-cv-21538-KMM (S.D. Fla. Jul 15, 2022)
• Parties: JAMES MCDONOUGH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

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JAMES MCDONOUGH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF HOMESTEAD, FLORIDA, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:21-cv-21538-KMM

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

July 15, 2022

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

LAUREN F. LOUIS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant George Gretsas's Motion to Determine Entitlement to Attorney's Fees (ECF No. 49) and Defendants City of Homestead (“City”), Chief of Homestead Police Alexander Rolle, Tom Mead, and Ricky Rivera's Motion to Determine Entitlement to Attorney's Fees (ECF No. 50). The matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Magistrate Judge Rules of the Local Rules of the Southern District of Florida, by the Honorable K. Michael Moore United States District Court Judge for the Southern District of Florida, for a Report and Recommendation (ECF Nos. 51; 52). Plaintiffs James E. McDonough and Vanessa Lynn McDonough filed a Response (ECF No. 53), to which Defendants filed replies (ECF Nos. 54; 55). Upon consideration of the Motions Response, Replies, and being otherwise duly advised in the premises, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motions be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed this suit against Defendants for violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving Plaintiffs of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the federal and state Constitutions as well as for supplemental state claims. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1). The complaint generally alleges that Defendants engaged in a discriminatory and retaliatory course of conduct against Plaintiffs following Plaintiffs' attempt to file an Internal Affairs complaint against a Homestead Police Officer in the Spring of 2013. (Id. ¶ 25). In the years since this incident, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have engaged in retaliatory conduct. (Id. ¶ 27).

In June 2020, Plaintiff J. McDonough was made aware of a Dossier that Defendants created on Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 51). Proof of the Dossier was discovered on ten flash-drives left in Defendant Gretsas's office after being fired from his job with Palm Beach County. (Id. ¶¶ 2-3). “On the flash-drives, City Manager Gretsas maintained Dossiers on Plaintiffs with false, defamatory, and/or illegally obtained information concerning Plaintiffs, which he strategically deployed and disclosed to third parties.” (Id. ¶ 3). The Dossiers “were created to perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge within the scope of Defendant Gretsas' employment by the City.” (Id. ¶ 4).

The procedural background of this suit actually derives from an earlier related suit raising identical allegations. See William Rea v. The City of Homestead, 1:21-cv-20488 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2021). Defendants there moved to dismiss the Complaint. (ECF Nos. 15; 16). Defendants argued that Plaintiffs' complaint was a shotgun pleading, it failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, and that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata since they were raised in other cases or were previously dismissed. See generally (Id.). “Without expressing any views as to the Motions' merits” the district court entered an order “afford[ing] Plaintiffs an opportunity to cure the purported pleading defects by granting Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint.” Id. (ECF No. 17).

Following the district court's order in Rea, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in that suit and separately filed the claims that initiated the instant action.^[1] Defendants again moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint on the following grounds: the Amended Complaint was a shotgun pleading; Plaintiffs failed to state a claim; and Plaintiffs' claims were barred under the doctrine of res judicata because they were already litigated and dismissed in prior cases. See generally (ECF Nos. 24; 25).

Following briefing by both parties, this Court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss and dismissed Plaintiffs' federal claims (Counts I-IV) with prejudice. (ECF No. 44 at 8-9). The Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims (Counts V-VII) and dismissed those without prejudice. (Id.). The Court found that Plaintiffs' federal claims were barred under the doctrine of res judicata because they incorporated facts underlying prior cases that were not actionable in this case. (ECF No. 44 at 8). The Court also held that Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims in Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint “would otherwise fail on impermissible shotgun pleading grounds.” (Id. at 7, n.3).

Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the Court's Dismissal Order (ECF No.45). Following briefing by the parties, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion and held that Plaintiffs failed to meet the burden of reconsideration. The Court found “dismissal of Plaintiffs' federal claims (Counts I through IV) [was] appropriate under the doctrine of res judicata.” (ECF No. 44 at 8). Furthermore, “[t]here [was] no basis to seek reconsideration of the observation that the Amended Complaint was a shotgun pleading.” (Id. at 6).

Defendants now move to determine entitlement to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2) and Local Rule 7.3. (ECF Nos. 49; 50).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In the United States, it is the general rule that in the absence of explicit statutory authority, litigants must pay their own attorney's fees. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep't of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602-603 (2001); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 415 (1978). However, Congress has authorized courts to deviate from this background rule in certain cases by shifting fees from one party to another. Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 832 (2011). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections . . . 1983, . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee.” See Beach Blitz Co. v. City of Miami Beach, Fla., 13 F.4th 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2021).

To determine whether the Defendants were the prevailing parties in this action, the Court examines whether the district court's judgment rebuffed Plaintiffs' efforts to effect a material alteration in the legal relationship between the parties. See B.E. Tech., L.L.C. v. Facebook, Inc., 940 F.3d 675, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert denied, 141 S.Ct. 618 (2020). In other words, the Court conducts a practical examination of whether “the case [was] resolved in the defendant's favor.” CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 578 U.S. 419, 432 (2016).

If a defendant is deemed to be a prevailing party, that defendant may only be awarded attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 “upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith,” or “that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412, 415 (1978). “The fact that a plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not in itself a sufficient justification for the assessment of fees.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14, (1980).

It is not necessary for a party to show that the opposing party brought their claims in bad faith when seeking attorney's fees. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 419-21. However, a finding of bad faith-even if not subjective bad faith-constitutes a basis for attorneys' fees regardless of Sullivan's three factors. Turner v. Sungard Bus. Sys., Inc., 91 F.3d 1418, 1422 n. 6 (11th Cir.1996).

The frivolity of a claim must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Sullivan v. Sch. Bd. of Pinellas Cnty., 773 F.2d 1182, 1190 (11th Cir. 1985). In determining whether a suit is frivolous, “a district court must focus on the question [of] whether the case is so lacking in arguable merit as to be groundless or without foundation rather than whether the claim was ultimately successful.” Jones v. Tex. Tech Univ., 656 F.2d 1137, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981).

According to Sullivan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has established three elements for courts to follow when determining frivolity. They are referred to as the Sullivan factors: “(1) whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle; and (3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or had a full-blown trial on the merits.” 773 F.2d at 1189. Although foundational in making the determination, “[t]he Sullivan factors . . are general guidelines only, not hard and fast rules.” Id. (citing Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1177 (11th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Additionally, “even if the other three Sullivan guidelines are present in favor of a defendant, this court may not award fees if the claims asserted warranted close attention.” Steffens v. Nocco, No. 8:19-CV-1940-KKM-AAS, 2022 WL 1467353, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:19-CV-1940-KKM-AAS, 2022 WL 1459551 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2022) (citing Beach Blitz Co., 13 F.4th at 1302).

III. DISCUSSION

Here, Defendants are the prevailing parties. The Court dismissed each of Plaintiffs' claims on all counts, thereby rebuffing Plaintiffs' opportunity to litigate the claims and resolving the case in Defendants' favor. See CRST, 578 U.S. at 432. Plaintiffs do not even contest in their Response Defendants' status as prevailing parties. Accordingly, the analysis moves to the application of the Sullivan factors. Because the Court disposed of Plaintiffs' Federal and State law claims on different grounds, they are analyzed separately below.

a Plaintiff...