McDonough v. Gage

Decision Date24 October 1934
Docket NumberNo. 22370.,22370.
Citation192 N.E. 417,357 Ill. 466
PartiesMcDONOUGH, County Collector, v. GAGE.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Petition by Joseph B. McDonough, county collector, to be appointed receiver of real property owned by Stanley K. Gage, for the purpose of collecting delinquent taxes out of the rents, etc. From an order granting the petition, the property owner appeals.

Order vacated, and judgment reversed.

STONE, ORR, and HERRICK, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Cook County Court; Edmund K. Jarecki, Judge.

Enoch J. Price, Lawrence C. Mills, and Owen N. Price, all of Chicago, for appellant.

Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen., and Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago (Hayden N. Bell, James G. Skinner, Robert S. Cushman, Jacob Shamberg, and Brendan Q. O'Brien, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

FARTHING, Justice.

The appellee, as county treasurer and ex officio county collector, was appointed receiver of certain real estate of appellant under ‘An Act to add sections 253a, 253b and 253c to ‘An Act for the assessment of property and for the levy and collection of taxes,’ approved March 30, 1872,' as amended April 28, 1933 (Laws of 1933, pp. 873-876 [Smith-Hurd Ann. St. c. 120, §§ 238a, 238b, 238c]). This is an appeal from the order of the county court of Cook county granting the prayer of the appellee's petition for such appointment.

Upon the filing of the petition a summons returnable to the October, 1933, term of the county court was issued and duly served upon the appellant, Stanley K. Gage. Appellee's sworn petition named Gage as the sole defendant, and stated that certain taxes for 1929 and 1930 on lots 30 [357 Ill. 468]and 31, etc., amounting to $2,567.45, were delinquent for more than six months; that Gage was the owner of the property; and that the petitioner believed these taxes could be collected out of the rents, issues, and profits of the premises. The petition prayed that the petitioner be appointed receiver to collect the rents, etc., to be applied to the payment of the delinquent taxes. Gage filed a demurrer to the petition. The grounds of demurrer are covered by the assignments of error.

The first assignment of error is, the county court had no jurisdiction to hear or decide this case since there is no statute creating such proceeding in that court. The amendment, which is called the Skarda Act, only purports to give jurisdiction to circuit courts and courts of like jurisdiction. Various other assignments or error are made which question the constitutionality of the amendatory act.

The appellee contends that section 18 of article 6 of the State Constitution is an express grant of general jurisdiction to county courts over all proceedings to collect taxes and assessments. He contends that this section has the same effect on jurisdiction of county courts in proceedings to collect taxes that section 12 of the same article has on the jurisdiction of circuit courts over all cases at law and in equity, and that therefore the following language found in section 253a of the act in question includes county courts: ‘That at any time after any taxes or any installments thereof heretofore or hereafter levied and assessed upon real property shall have been delinquent for more than six months and remain due and unpaid in any county, the county collector may make application to any court of competent jurisdiction, by bill or by petition.’ etc.

Appellee relies upon People v. Miller, 339 Ill. 573, 171 N. E. 672, and Bowers v. Glos, 346 Ill. 623, 179 N. E. 80, in support of his contention that section 18 of article 6 of the Constitution is an all-embracing grant of jurisdiction in proceedings for collection or taxes and special assessments, and that county courts are courts of record and have general and unlimited jurisdictionin all such proceedings. All that can be said to be established in this connection by the decisions in the Miller and Bowers Cases is, that in such proceedings as the Legislature authorizes to be brought in county courts for the collection of taxes and special assessments those courts have beneral jurisdiction.

The original jurisdiction given to county courts by the Constitution does not authorize the bringing of such statutory proceedings in those courts as are attempted to be created by the Legislature and directed to be brought in other courts having officers and facilities that have never been known to the county courts, without an express provision that such proceedings may be had in the county courts and without providing such officers and facilities for those courts.

It must be conceded that statutes with relation to the collection of taxes and assessments are binding upon the officers in charge of such collection, and that the statutory procedure must be followed. In People v.Biggins, 96 Ill. 481, the people of the state of Illinois filed a bill to foreclose the lien for taxes. The people contended that inasmuch as the statute provided no method for foreclosing the lien a court of equity would therefore take jurisdiction to do so, and relied upon the general principle that where a statute creates a lien and provides no method for its enforcement the same may be enforced by a proceeding in equity. The court held, however, that taxation was wholly a matter of statute, and taxes could be collected only in the manner that the statutes provided.

The situation with reference to the Skarda Act is analogous to that which was created by the amendment of 1881 to section 253 of the Revenue Act of 1872 (Smith-Hurd Ann. St. c. 120, § 238; Cahill's Rev. St. 1933, c. 120, § 268, p. 2348), which provided for foreclosure of tax liens upon real property. In passing upon that amendment we said in People v. Cant, 260 Ill. 497, 103 N. E. 232, 233: ‘The Revenue Act of 1872 * * * originally provided, by sections 191 to 208, for an application to the...

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9 cases
  • Herb v. Pitcairn
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • January 17, 1946
  • Nash v. Park Castles Apartment Bldg. Corp.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • September 24, 1943
    ...On June 20, 1934, this court held that the act did not confer jurisdiction on county courts to appoint such receivers. McDonough v. Gage, 357 Ill. 466, 192 N.E. 417. Thomas D. Nash, who had then succeeded McDonough as county treasurer and ex officio county collector, was appointed tax recei......
  • People ex rel. Nordlund v. Association of Winnebago Home for Aged
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • May 29, 1968
    ...only by express grant from the legislature. The requirement of 'express grant' was well illustrated in the decisions in McDonough v. Gage, 357 Ill. 466, 192 N.E. 417, and Gill v. Lynch, 367 Ill. 203, 10 N.E.2d 812. Both cases involved the question of the power of the county court to appoint......
  • In re Proceedings to Enforce Payment of Taxes Delinquent, Washington County
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • May 1, 1936
    ... ... intended to produce somewhat the same results as were ... achieved under the Illinois tax receivership law, ... supra. See also McDonough v. Gage, 357 Ill ... 466, 192 N.E. 417; People ex rel. First of Englewood B. & M. Corp. v. Jarecki, 357 Ill. 475, 192 N.E. 419; ... People v ... ...
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