McDougall v. Sheridan

• Citation: 23 Idaho 191,128 P. 954
• Parties: D. C. McDOUGALL, Attorney General of the State of Idaho, Plaintiff, v. R. S. SHERIDAN, C. O. BROXON and A. R. CRUZEN, Defendants
• Decision Date: 02 January 1913
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

128 P. 954

23 Idaho 191

D. C. McDOUGALL, Attorney General of the State of Idaho, Plaintiff, v. R. S. SHERIDAN, C. O. BROXON and A. R. CRUZEN, Defendants

Supreme Court of Idaho

January 2, 1913

CONTEMPT-INFORMATION-SUFFICIENCY OF-DEMURRER TO-STATE AS A PARTY-CAUSE PENDING-INHERENT POWER OF THE COURT-JURY NOT REQUIRED-DUE PROCESS OF LAW-ANSWER OF CRUZEN-ANSWER OF SHERIDAN AND BROXON-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

(Syllabus by the court.)

1. Held, that the information states facts sufficient to charge contempt.

2. The editorials and articles on which this proceeding is based directly charge that the court corruptly rendered the decision in the Spofford-Gifford case, and that it was rendered by reason of a political trade or bargain and not on the law and facts. By such publications there was an attempt by wanton defamation and falsehood to insult and intimidate the judges, degrade the court and destroy its power and influence and inflame and prejudice the people.

3. Held, that said publications were a direct attack upon the court as a court, and that the court, as a court, could not bring a private action to protect itself, and that its only means of maintaining its authority is by contempt proceedings.

4. The "liberty of the press" is not guaranteed by the constitution against the publication of deliberate falsehood and misrepresentation in regard to decisions of courts, even though the publishers may think that public and political interests would be subserved by such falsehood and misrepresentation.

5. The public press has no more license or right to publish falsehood and defamation than has a private individual.

6. The liberty of the press is only the liberty which every man has to utter his sentiments, and can be enjoyed only in subjection to that precept both of law and morals, "So use your own in order that you may not injure another's."

7. This proceeding is not criminal action, and the statutes of the state do not require that such a proceeding be brought in the name of the state.

8. Held, that the Spofford-Gifford case was pending until the 23d day of October, 1912, when the petition for rehearing was denied, and that many of said editorials and articles were published prior to that date, and that those published after said date were attached to said information simply to show the malicious and vicious intent of the defendants.

9. A person charged with contempt is not entitled to a jury trial and the statutes regarding informations, indictments and the trial of criminal cases are not applicable to contempt proceedings.

10. The power of the court to punish summarily for contempt is essential to its very existence, and that right exists without the interposition of a jury.

11. The inherent power of the court to punish for contempt was not derived from the legislature, and such power does not depend upon the legislative will.

12. The legislature has not the authority to restrict the inherent power of the court to punish for contempts, and it cannot abridge such power, so far as courts of record are concerned.

13. "Due process of law" does not require a jury in contempt proceedings, and there is no necessity for calling upon a jury to assist the court in the exercise of that power.

14. The legislature may prescribe any reasonable procedure to be followed in contempt prosecutions, but it has failed to provide any procedure, and under the provisions of sec. 3925 Rev. Codes, when the procedure is not provided by the legislature, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of the code.

15. Under the provisions of sec. 5168, Rev. Codes, the judgments and orders of the court or judges in cases of contempt are made final and conclusive.

16. Where certain acts of contempt are made a crime under our statute, the making of such acts punishable as crimes does not affect any power conferred on the court to impose or inflict punishment for contempt. (Sec. 6305, Rev. Codes.)

17 Sec. 6529, Rev. Codes, provides that certain contempts are misdemeanors, and sec. 7231 provides that a criminal act is not the less punishable as a crime because it is also declared to be punishable as a contempt.

18. The freest criticism of all decisions of the court is allowed and invited, but criticism ceases and contempt begins when malicious slander, vilification and defamation bring the courts and the administration of the law into dishonor and disrepute among the people.

19 Art. 1, sec. 9, of the state constitution, provides that "Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." While certain liberty is there guaranteed, in the last clause of said section the responsibility for the abuse of that liberty is fixed.

20. Said section is not and cannot be made a refuge for malicious slanderers and libelers.

21. Held, that the evidence is sufficient to show that the defendants are guilty of wilful contempt of this court.

(AILSHIE J., concurs in part and dissents in part.)

Original contempt proceedings. Defendants found guilty of contempt.

D. C. McDougall, Attorney General, and J. H. Peterson, Assistant, for Plaintiff.

A publication pending a suit, reflecting on the court, the parties to the suit, the witnesses, the jurors or the counsel, is a contempt of the court. (Hollingsworth v. Duane, Wall. Sr. 77, 102, F. Cas. Nos. 1616-1618; In re Bronson, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 460; Respublica v. Passmore, 3 Yeates (Pa.), 441, 2 Am. Dec. 388.)

A contempt arises by speaking or writing contemptuously of the court or of the judges acting in their judicial capacity (4 Bl. Com. 283.)

And although the defendant declares that no contempt was intended. (In re Hughes, 8 N. M. 225, 43 P. 692.)

Publications concerning a pending cause, trial or judicial investigation, calculated to prejudice or prevent fair and impartial action, which seek to influence judicial action by threats, or other form of intimidation, which reflects upon the court, counsel, parties or witnesses, respecting the cause, or which tend to corrupt or embarrass the due administration of justice, constitute contempt. (9 Cyc. 20; In re Providence Journal Co., 28 R. I. 489, 68 A. 428, 125 Am. St. 755, 17 L. R. A., N. S., 582.)

Independent of authority given by statute, courts of record of superior jurisdiction, whether civil or criminal, possess inherent power to punish for contempt of court. Such power is essential to due administration of justice, and the legislature cannot take it away or abridge it, although it may regulate its use.

Statutes conferring the power are simply declaratory of the common law. (9 Cyc. 26, and cases cited; State v. Howell, 60 Conn. 668, 69 A. 1057, 125 Am. St. 141, 13 Ann. Cas. 501; In re Dunn, 85 Neb. 606, 124 N.W. 120; In re Woolley, 11 Bush (Ky.), 95; State ex rel. Attorney General v. Hildreth, 82 Vt. 382, 74 A. 71, 137 Am. St. 1022, 18 Ann. Cas. 661, 24 L. R. A., N. S., 551.)

In most of the cases holding that courts are limited in punishment to statutory regulations, it is found, upon close examination, that the court had before it contempts of inferior courts. ( Stuart v. People, 4 Ill. 395; State v. Galloway, 5 Cold. (Tenn.) 326, 98 Am. Dec. 404; Ex parte Edwards, 11 Fla. 174; In re Chadwick, 109 Mich. 588, 67 N.W. 1071; Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 45 N.E. 199, 60 Am. St. 691, 36 L. R. A. 254 (see note); Holman v. State, 105 Ind. 513, 5 N.E. 556.)

"The power to punish for contempt is an incident to all courts of justice, independent of statutory provisions." ( People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195, 16 Am. Rep. 528.)

A court has jurisdiction of cases before it on appeal until the remittitur is issued. (Haynes' New Trials and Appeals, sec. 293, and cases cited.)

A contemptuous publication made after the rendition of an opinion and after the time for rehearing has elapsed is, nevertheless, made concerning a pending suit if time still remains for application for modification of the opinion. ( State v. Tugwell, 19 Wash. 238, 52 P. 1056. 43 L. R. A. 717; In re Chadwick, 109 Mich. 588, 67 N.W. 1071; Fishback v. State, 131 Ind. 304, 30 N.E. 1088.)

Criticism of a judge, referring to his official conduct in matters disposed of, is held to be contempt. (State ex rel. Attorney General v. Circuit Court, 97 Wis. 1, 72 N.W. 193, 65 Am. St. 90, 38 L. R. A. 554; Ex parte Steinman, 95 Pa. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637; State v. Kaiser, 20 Ore. 50, 23 P. 964, 8 L. R. A. 584; In re Shannon, 11 Mont. 67, 27 P. 352; Jackson v. State, 21 Tex. 668; Ex parte Cole, 1 McCrary, 405, F. Cas. No. 2973.)

The following cases held that it amounts to contempt of court publicly to criticise and impute to a judge want of integrity because of his official conduct, even with respect to matters then terminated: In re Chadwick, 109 Mich. 588, 67 N.W. 1071; Burdett v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 838, 48 N.E. 878, 106 Am. St. 916, 68 L. R. A. 251; State ex rel. Crow v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 76 S.W. 79, 99 Am. St. 624; Commonwealth v. Danbridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384; United States ex rel. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Gehr, 116 F. 520.

While a newspaper, as well as any citizen, may discuss the opinion of the supreme court and may criticise their reasoning or question by open argument the soundness of their conclusions, a misstatement of such conclusions constitutes a contempt for which the newspaper may be punished. (In re Providence Journal Co., supra.)

Where words are offensive and insulting per se, the offender may be punished, and the disavowal of any intention of disrespect cannot justify. (In re Breen, 30 Nev. 164, 93 P. 1002, 17 L. R. A., N. S., 572; People v. Wilson, supra.)

Criminal intent is not essential to constitute the...