McDowell v. Fed. Tea Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 December 1941
• Citation: McDowell v. Fed. Tea Co., Inc., 128 Conn. 437, 23 A.2d 512 (Conn. 1941)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Mcdowell v. FEDERAL TEA CO., Inc., et al. RUFF v. SAME.

23 A.2d 512

Mcdowell

v. FEDERAL TEA CO., Inc., et al.

RUFF

v. SAME.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 17, 1941.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Cornell, Judge.

Actions by Gordon E. McDowell and Robert Ruff, respectively, against the Federal Tea Company, Inc., and others, to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by defendants' negligence. From judgments on a jury's verdicts for plaintiffs, named defendant appeals.

Error, judgment set aside, and new trial ordered.

Argued before MALTBIE, C. J, and AVERY, BROWN, JENNINGS, and ELLS, JJ.

DeLancey Pelgrift, of Hartford, for appellant.

John F. McGowan, of Bridgeport (Samuel G. Payne, of Bridgeport, on the brief), for appellees.

JENNINGS, Judge.

These cases were tried together and resulted in plaintiffs' verdicts. The named defendant appealed from the refusal of the trial court to set them aside and from the judgments, claiming error in the omission to charge as requested.

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts: Two cars were involved, a Dodge panel delivery truck owned by the Federal Tea Company and driven by Norman Whitney and a Chevrolet pleasure car owned by Anna T. O'Connell and driven by Richard J. O'Connell. Agency was admitted. Both cars were proceeding south at about twenty-five miles per hour on Noble Avenue in Bridgeport, a straight paved street, the truck being ahead. As the truck approached Maple Street, which intersects Noble Avenue at right angles, it slowed down and turned to its left until its left front wheel was one foot east of the white line marking the center of Noble Avenue. Assuming that it would complete its left turn, the Chevrolet moved up to pass the truck on the latter's right. As the cars came to the intersection, the truck turned to its right to enter Maple Street and the right front fender of the truck collided with the left front fender of the Chevrolet. The Chevrolet, deflected from its course, augmented its speed, mounted the curb at the southwest corner of the intersection and went out of control. It traveled along the sidewalk about thirty feet, struck both plaintiffs who were standing there, turned left and crossed Noble Avenue, leaving a brake mark on the pavement about eighty feet long, and stopped on the east side. The point of impact between the two automobiles was approximately seven feet east of the west curb line of Noble Avenue and eight feet south of the north curb line of Maple Street, if both lines were extended across the intersection. The truck stopped at once. Its driver gave no signal of his intention to stop or turn although he had seen the Chevrolet following him when he looked in his rear view mirror.

The jury could have found both drivers negligent. The principal claim of the Tea Company on its appeal from the refusal of the trial court to set aside the verdict was that no negligence of its driver could be found to have been a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Since he did not strike the plaintiffs, it is a so-called non-contact case. In the recent case of DeMunda v. Loomis, 127 Conn. 313, at page 315, 16 A.2d 578, involving a somewhat similar state of facts, we said: "The doctrine of proximate cause has been frequently examined in this state as is indicated by the recent review and analysis of the cases in Kinderavich v. Palmer, 127 Conn. 85, 15 A.2d 83. The rule is that this issue presents a question of fact unless no causal relation between the negligence of the defendant and the plaintiff's injuries can reasonably be found. Mahoney v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 184, 195, 196, 147 A. 762, 66 A.L.R. 1121. Applying this rule, the court might infer that the sudden stop of the defendant caused Marti to turn right and, with the defendant, block the west lane, and that Fenn, unable to stop without running into one of them turned left in the hope of passing in the east lane. This recital discloses no such break in the chain of causation as to render unreasonable the conclusion that the negligence of the defendant was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs' injuries." So here, the failure of the driver of the truck to signal his intention either to slow down or make a right turn could reasonably have been found to be a substantial factor in causing the accident. While the negligence of O'Connell in passing the truck on its right might defeat an action by him against the Tea Company, it does not follow that the...