McElhaney v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 30 June 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 20681.,20681. |
| Citation | 598 N.W.2d 203,1999 SD 78 |
| Parties | Leonard McELHANEY, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Russell ANDERSON and City of Edgemont, Defendants and Appellants. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Patrick M. Ginsbach of Farrell, Farrell and Ginsbach, Hot Springs, for plaintiff and appellee.
Ted W. Hinesley, Edgemont, for defendants appellants.
[¶ 1.] Former City official of the City of Edgemont sought and obtained a writ of quo warranto claiming City had unlawfully usurped him from the position of Street and Water Commissioner. The trial court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Fall River County, issued a judgment in favor of the former Commissioner, restoring him to this office. The City appeals. We reverse and remand.
[¶ 2.] Leonard McElhaney (McElhaney) challenges, via a writ of quo warranto, the appointment of Russell Anderson (Anderson) as the Street and Water Commissioner (Commissioner) for the City of Edgemont (City). From 1977 until the spring of 1998 McElhaney held that position. During the spring of 1998, City considered major changes in its municipal ordinances, which would have abolished the position of Water Commissioner held by McElhaney and substitute it with four new managerial positions. In the alternative, City considered retaining the Commissioner position but replacing McElhaney with Anderson.
[¶ 3.] McElhaney challenged the legal right of City to replace him with Anderson as Commissioner, to terminate the Commissioner position in the manner it had done, as well as the procedures engaged in by the City Council in its attempts to amend the applicable ordinances. He did so by filing a grievance with City, which was authorized under City's personnel policy. When personnel policy procedures which involved meetings with various City officials proved unsuccessful, McElhaney appealed his grievance to the South Dakota Department of Labor as is authorized under the personnel policy. This proceeding is still apparently pending at this time.
[¶ 4.] During this same time period, McElhaney also sought a writ of quo warranto from the circuit court declaring him to be entitled to the position of Commissioner rather than Anderson and that the office of Commissioner still legally existed. After a trial on the merits, the circuit court agreed with McElhaney and declared him to be the person legally entitled to the Commissioner office.
[¶ 5.] City appeals the writ of quo warranto raising several issues, one of which is dispositive:
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over this issue through a writ of quo warranto.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 6.] The correctness of McElhaney's claim for a writ of quo warranto is clearly a question of law. We review questions of law de novo, without deference to the decision of the trial court. In re Estate of O'Keefe, 1998 SD 92, ¶ 7, 583 N.W.2d 138, 139.
[¶ 7.] Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over this issue through a writ of quo warranto.
[¶ 8.] The writ of quo warranto is derived from the old English practice of inquiring by what authority the king supported his claim. Black's Law Dictionary 1417 (4th ed. 1957). In more recent times, it has also been used to command a public officer to show "by what warrant he exercises such a franchise, having never had any grant of it, or having forfeited it by neglect or abuse." Id. "[W]e have held that quo warranto is the proper proceeding to determine title to and possession of a public office." Burns v. Kurtenbach, 327 N.W.2d 636, 638 (S.D.1982); see also Cummings v. Mickelson, 495 N.W.2d 493 (S.D. 1993)
. "A judgment in quo warranto shall be rendered upon the right of the defendant, or both upon the right of the defendant and upon the right of the party alleged to be entitled to office, as justice shall require." Burns, 327 N.W.2d at 639.
[¶ 9.] In South Dakota the common-law writ of quo warranto has been statutorily recognized. SDCL ch 21-28 provides for the remedy of writ of quo warranto. Any person may bring a writ of quo warranto:
SDCL 21-28-2.
[¶ 10.] City claims the writ is not proper in this case because McElhaney had other adequate legal remedies, that being his grievance with the Department of Labor. We agree with the City.
[¶ 11.] This Court has never directly considered the question of whether an action for a writ of quo warranto may lie when alternative remedies are available.1 However, a review of persuasive authority from other jurisdictions and South Dakota case law concerning other extraordinary writs leads us to the conclusion that a writ of quo warranto, also being an extraordinary writ, should not be granted when an adequate alternative remedy is available.
[¶ 12.] Other jurisdictions have noted that a writ of quo warranto is an extraordinary writ. State v. Talikka, 71 Ohio St.3d 109, 642 N.E.2d 353 (Ohio 1994). "Extraordinary writs like quo warranto provide extraordinary, not alternative remedies, and they will not lie where there exists an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law." Id. at 354 (citations omitted); see also State v. Village of Mound, 234 Minn. 531, 48 N.W.2d 855, 861 (Minn 1951) (); Stenberg v. Murphy, 247 Neb. 358, 527 N.W.2d 185, 190 (Neb 1995) (); State v. Allen, 65 Ohio St.3d 37, 599 N.E.2d 696, 697 (Ohio 1992) ().
[¶ 13.] We have said in administrative law cases any judicial relief will require the exhaustion of administrative remedies, such as an appeal from a final agency decision, before an extraordinary writ may be issued. Rapid City Area Sch. Dist. v. de Hueck, 324 N.W.2d 421, 422-23 (S.D.1982)
. This is because any claim for judicial relief, concerning a cause over which an administrative agency has jurisdiction, constitutes a jurisdictional defect to the claim for judicial relief. Jansen v. Lemmon Federal Credit Union, 1997 SD 44, ¶ 7, 562 N.W.2d 122, 124 (citing Matter of Notice & Demand to Quash, Etc., 339 N.W.2d 785, 786 (S.D.1983)). In addition, any claim over which an administrative agency had jurisdiction that is raised and rejected by the agency, is subsequently barred from being retried on the merits in the courts under the doctrine of res judicata. Johnson v. Kolman, 412 N.W.2d 109, 113 (S.D.1987).
[¶ 14.] In Sorenson v. Rickman, 486 N.W.2d 259, 261 (S.D.1992), we held that SDCL 15-6-52(a) requires findings of fact before extraordinary relief may issue that a person seeking an extraordinary writ is without any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. However, here the trial court did exactly the opposite by entering detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law concluding that McElhaney had enforceable rights under the City grievance policy and he had not waived them.
[¶ 15.] In South Dakota Bd. of Regents v. Heege, 428 N.W.2d 535 (S.D.1988), we were faced with a similar question as is now before us.2 There the circuit court issued a writ of prohibition against the Board of Regents based on a claim by a teachers' union that the Regents were guilty of unfair labor practices. Id. at 536. We reversed, holding a writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy reserved for situations where the applicant has no other remedy in the ordinary course of law. Id. at 539. We held that jurisdiction would ordinarily initially rest with the Department of Labor under the Administrative Procedures Act except in certain instances which were not applicable. Id. Those exceptions are no more applicable in the case now before us than they were in Heege.3 We concluded in Heege that the writ of prohibition should be quashed and any disputes considered by the Department of Labor. Id. Allowing the case to proceed through administrative avenues conserves judicial resources and is in accord with our duty to harmonize relations with executive branch agencies operating under legislative authority. Id.4
[¶ 16.] In this case an adequate, alternative remedy exists. McElhaney has already initiated a grievance that is now under the jurisdiction of the South Dakota Department of Labor. It clearly is an unwise waste of judicial resources to allow two independent proceedings to simultaneously go forward where the relief sought in both is the same. There is further the possibility of inconsistent results in the two proceedings. Therefore, we hold, as this writ is extraordinary and adequate alternative remedies are available in this case, McElhaney should pursue his grievance through the Department of Labor and not with a writ of quo warranto. We reverse and...
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...Murphy, 527 N.W.2d at 190; State ex rel. Johnson v. Talikka, 71 Ohio St.3d 109, 642 N.E.2d 353, 354 (1994); McElhaney v. Anderson, 598 N.W.2d 203, 206 (S.D.1999). 10. Blackjack Bonding v. Las Vegas Mun. Ct., 116 Nev. 1213, 1218, 14 P.3d 1275, 1279 (2000); see also State v. Sargent, 122 Nev.......