McEntee v. Henderson, No. C-1-00-769.
| Decision Date | 27 June 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. C-1-00-769. |
| Citation | 154 F.Supp.2d 1286 |
| Parties | Theodore E. McENTEE, Plaintiff, v. William J. HENDERSON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Geoffrey Parker Damon, Damon Law Office, Cincinnati, OH, for Theodore E. McEntee, plaintiffs.
Gerald Francis Kaminski, U.S. Attorney, Cincinnati, OH, for William J Henderson, in his official capacity as Postmaster General of the United States of America, United States of America, defendants.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and the Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (doc. 5); Plaintiff's Response (doc. 9); Defendants' Reply (doc. 12); Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Demand for a Jury Trial (doc. 6); Plaintiff's Response (doc. 10); Defendants' Reply (doc. 13); Plaintiff's Affidavit in Support of and Motion for a Continuance Regarding the Court's Ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Pending Completion of Discovery (doc. 11); and Defendant's Response (doc. 12) to which Plaintiff did not file a Reply.
On September 13, 2000, Plaintiff Theodore McEntee filed suit against the Postmaster General of the United States, William Henderson, in his official capacity and the United States Government, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, due to workplace injuries sustained by Plaintiff while he was acting within the course and scope of his employment as an elevator mechanic with the United States Postal Service (doc. 1). See Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680.
For the purpose of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (doc. 5), the following facts are deemed as undisputed and are taken primarily from Plaintiff's Complaint (see doc. 1), as well as the other relevant pleadings that were submitted by the Parties in this case . See also Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) & (6).
Plaintiff Theodore McEntee was employed as an elevator mechanic with the United States Postal Service in Cincinnati, Ohio on June 24, 1999, when he became involved in a workplace accident (doc. 1). On that day, Plaintiff was using an unguarded 10 inch table saw in the carpenter shop in order to cut a piece of plexiglass (Id.). The plexiglass jammed and/or turned, causing Plaintiff's left hand to accidentally hit the saw blade (Id.). The saw blade severed Plaintiff's left index finger at the first joint requiring amputation of that joint (Id.). Additionally, the nail of Plaintiff's left middle finger was permanently destroyed and removed (Id.).
On June 25, 1999, Plaintiff filed a compensation claim under the Federal Employment Compensation Act ("FECA"), pursuant to Title 5 U.S.C. § 8101, et seq., with the United States Department of Labor's Office of Workers Compensation Programs ("OWC") concerning the workplace accident (see doc. 5, Ex. 1). By a letter dated July 12, 1999, Plaintiff was advised by an OWC Claims Examiner that his claim for compensation under FECA was accepted for: "Amputation, tip of left finger" (see doc. 5, Ex. 2).
On January 25, 2000, OWC notified Plaintiff that his scheduled award under FECA was $10,802.71 due to "45% partial impairment to left index finger" (see doc. 5, Ex. 3). This sum was paid to Plaintiff in January of 2000 (Id.). On June 28, 2000, OWC upgraded the degree and nature of Plaintiff's workplace injury to an additional "10% loss of use of left hand" (see doc. 5, Ex. 4). Accordingly, Plaintiff's scheduled award under FECA was increased by an additional $3,522.53 (Id.). The additional compensation was paid to Plaintiff on June 23, 2000 and June 30, 2000 (Id.). Thus, Plaintiff's total scheduled award under FECA, exclusive of medical benefits, was $14,325.24 for an injury described as a "55% partial impairment to left index finger" (Id.).
On February 16, 2000, Plaintiff filed an administrative tort claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq., with the Postal Service concerning his workplace accident of June 24, 1999 (see doc. 5, Ex. 9). Defendants allege that the administrative tort claim was virtually identical to Plaintiff's FECA claim (see id., Exs. 1 & 9).
On April 4, 2000, the Postal Service denied Plaintiff's administrative tort claim (Id., Ex. 10). Defendant asserts that the basis for the denial was, because the injuries sustained by Plaintiff occurred while Plaintiff was within the course and scope of his employment with the Postal Service, his exclusive remedy was under FECA, pursuant to which he already requested and received benefits, and not under the FTCA (Id.).
On September 13, 2000, Plaintiff Theodore McEntee filed the present lawsuit pursuant to the FTCA (doc. 1). In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts three claims against Defendants Postmaster General and the United States: (1) an intentional tort, (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress, and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (Id.). All of the claims listed in the Complaint are based upon the workplace accident of June 24, 1999, for which he allegedly previously applied for and obtained compensation under FECA (Id.).
On November 29, 2000, Defendants filed, in lieu of an Answer to the Complaint, a Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (see doc. 5). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed his Response (doc. 9), followed by Defendants' Reply (doc. 12). This matter is now considered ripe for the Court's determination.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss requires a court to determine whether a cognizable claim has been pleaded in the complaint. The basic federal pleading requirement is contained in Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), which states that a pleading "shall contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th Cir.1976). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure operates to provide the defendant with "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
In reviewing a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint. Windsor v.. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155, 158 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826, 105 S.Ct. 105, 83 L.Ed.2d 50 (1984). The motion to dismiss must be denied unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle her to relief. Id. at 158 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99). The Sixth Circuit, in the case of In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir.1993), explained that when a court is evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court:
must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief.
Id., 991 F.2d at 1240; see also Walker v. Colton Trust, 33 F.Supp.2d 585, 589 (E.D.Mich. 1999). The Sixth Circuit further held that the complaint "need only give `fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Id. (quoting Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1199 (6th Cir.1990)).
In addition, the Sixth Circuit stated the proper threshold for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal:
[W]e are not holding the pleader to an impossibly high standard; we recognize the policies behind rule 8 and the concept of notice pleading. A plaintiff will not be thrown out of court for failing to plead facts in support of every arcane element of his claim. But when a complaint omits facts that, if they existed, would clearly dominate the case, it seems fair to assume that those facts do not exist.
Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops. Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir.1988) (quoting O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 n. 3 (1st Cir.1976)).
In their Motion to Dismiss (doc. 5), Defendants present the following arguments in favor of the Court dismissing this action. First, Defendants assert that the United States is the only proper party-defendant to a lawsuit brought under the FTCA. Secondly, Defendants contend that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the workplace accident that constitutes the subject matter of this lawsuit in that Plaintiff's exclusive remedy with respect to the workplace accident lies under FECA. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Thirdly, Defendants further contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims due to the fact that Plaintiff has sought and received compensation under FECA with respect to the workplace accident. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) & (6). Finally, Defendants maintain that this Court cannot grant Plaintiff his requested relief with respect to his claim for punitive damages, because 28 U.S.C. § 2674 precludes the award of punitive damages against the United States under the FTCA. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
In his Response (doc. 9), Plaintiff first asserts that this Court should follow the holding as stated in the case of Sheehan v United States, 896 F.2d 1168, 1169 (9th Cir.1990), in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the FECA does not preclude tort claims brought by federal employees for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress that are workrelated, because FECA only compensates federal employees for physical harm that is work-related. Second, Plaintiff asserts that this Court, pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, should stay a ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss so that he can obtain additional discovery concerning any prior accidents involving the table saw with which he was injured, and further investigate the Postal Service's compliance with federal...
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