McErlain v. Taylor

Decision Date12 October 1934
Docket Number25809
Citation192 N.E. 260,207 Ind. 240
PartiesMcERLAIN v. TAYLOR
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW---Special Privileges and Immunities---Reasonable Classification.---Constitutional provisions forbidding grant of special privileges and immunities to persons which upon same terms are not granted to all citizens does not forbid classification for legislative purposes, but classification must be reasonable and based upon substantial distinctions germane to the subject-matter and must not be capricious or arbitrary. p 242.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW---Special Privileges and Immunities---Classification.---In determining the validity of a classification for legislative purposes, the characteristics of the class as a whole must be considered p. 243.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW---Special Privileges and Immunities---Classification.---A classification for legislative purposes violates constitutional provisions against special privilege and immunities if there are other general classes situate in all respects like the class benefited, with the same inherent needs and qualities which indicate the necessity or expediency of protection for the favored class. p. 243.

4. RECEIVERS---Claims---Wages---"Manual and Mechanical Laborers."---"Manual and mechanical laborers," as regards statute allowing preferred claims for such labor are generally considered to be those who work with their hands, with or without the aid of mechanical contrivances tools. or machines, p. 244.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW---Special Privileges and Immunities---Statute Preferring Claims of "Manual and Mechanical" Laborers---Held Unconstitutional.---Section 3, Acts 1885, p. 36, 9342, Burns 1926, preferring claims of "manual and mechanical laborers" for wages against an assignee or receiver of their employer, held violative of the constitutional provisions forbidding grant of special privileges and immunities. p. 244.

Claim by William Taylor against E. J. McErlain as trustee of John C. Rummel & Son, a failing debtor, for wages as a "manual and mechanical laborer," wherein claimant sought preference under 9342, Burns 1926, 40--110, Burns 1933. From a declaratory judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed. Reversed.

Shively, Gilmer & Arnold, of South Bend, for appellant.

Jackson & Jackson, of South Bend, for appellee.

OPINION

FANSLER, Judge.

John C. Rummel & Son made an assignment to E. J. McErlain, as trustee for the benefit of their creditors. Appellee was an employee and creditor for his services as a 'manual and mechanical laborer.' He filed a claim under section 3 of the Acts of 1885, p. 36, c. 21, section 9342, Burns' 1926, which provides for a preference against other creditors in favor of 'manual or mechanical laborers' for the full amount due. Other employees of the assignors filed claims, claiming a preference in their favor as employees to the extent of $ 50, under the Act of 1879 (Sp. Sess.) c. 62, p. 153 (section 1), as amended by the Acts 1885 (Sp. Sess.) c. 3, and Acts 1917, c. 109, section 9343, Burns' 1926.

Appellant took the position that the act of 1885, section 9342, Burns' 1926, is unconstitutional, and allowed appellee's claim only a the extent of $ 50, as provided by the act of 1879. Appellee filed his complaint asking for a declaratory judgment, declaring his rights in the premises, and that the act in question is constitutional. Appellant answered that he had paid $ 50 of appellee's claim of $ 190, and that the act of 1885 is unconstitutional, and in violation of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and of section 23 of article 1 of the Constitution of Indiana, in that it grants special privileges and immunities which upon the same terms are not granted to all citizens.

There was a finding and judgment for plaintiff that the statute in question is constitutional, and upon this appeal, as in the case below, the only question presented or involved is the constitutionality of section 9342, Burns' 1926.

It is said in the briefs that, if appellee and those in like circumstances are preferred in full, it will be in part at the expense of other wage-earning employees who will receive a smaller part of the amounts due, and therefore, if the statute is constitutional, it in fact creates a preference in favor of 'manual and mechanical laborers' as against all other types of wage-earning employees. The question is, Can such a preference be sustained under the Constitution?

It is well settled that the constitutional provisions involved do not forbid a classification of persons for legislative purposes.

'But in such cases the classification must not be capricious or arbitrary, but must be just and reasonable, and based upon substantial distinctions germane to the subject-matter and the object to be obtained. The distinctions must involve something more than mere characteristics which will serve to divide to identify the class. There must be inherent differences in situation related to the subject-matter of the legislation which require, necessitate or make expedient different or exclusive legislation with respect to the members of the class. The classification must embrace all who possess the attributes or characteristics which are the basis of the classification, and their difference from those excluded must be substantial and related to the purpose of the legislation.' Henry Heckler v. Herman L. Conter, Treas. et al. (1933) 205 Ind. -- , 187 N.E. 878.

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