McFadden v. U.S. And
| Decision Date | 11 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civ. Action No. 13-5756 (FLW) |
| Parties | PATRICIA E. MCFADDEN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and, BASKING RIDGE GLASS & MIRROR, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
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Plaintiff Patricia McFadden ("Plaintiff") filed this negligence suit against the Basking Ridge Post Office ("the Post Office") and Basking Ridge Glass and Mirror ("BRG") (collectively "Defendants") for negligently maintaining the outside premises of a post office where she fell. Now, Defendants separately move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim. In their motions, the Post Office argues that Plaintiff has failed to establish causation and that Plaintiff was not an invitee at the time of her fall, while BRG contends that Plaintiff's claim is time barred under N.J.S.A. 2A: 12-2, because this suit was not filed within two years after Plaintiff's accident. Additionally, the Post Office asserts cross-claims against BRG for indemnification and contribution; BRG also moves for summary judgment on those claims. For the reasons set forth below, the Post Office's motion for summary judgment is DENIED and BRG's motion is GRANTED in its entirety.
Patricia McFadden is a 79-year-old woman who sustained a neck and shoulder injury as a result of an alleged slip and fall on ice while on the premises of the Basking Ridge Post Officeon February 5, 2011. United States' Statement of Material Facts ¶ 1, 7. ("Def's Statement of Facts"). The Post Office's premises includes two parking lots: a customer lot that reserves a space for handicapped persons located in front of the building, and an employee lot located to the right side of the building. Def's Statement of Facts ¶ 35; Counter Statement of Material Facts By Patricia McFadden ¶¶ 6-7 ("Pl's Counter Statement of Facts"). An L-shaped sidewalk used by the Post Office's customers runs from the main entrance of the Post Office to the customer lot; the same sidewalk sits between the customer lot and the employee lot, such that both employees and customers use the same sidewalk to gain entrance to the building. Pl's Counter Statement of Facts ¶ 7.
The employee lot has an ungated access driveway from Brownlee Place, and, although a "DO NOT ENTER" sign is posted at the entrance, an "in-arrow" is also painted on the driveway's entrance pavement. Pl's Counter Statement of Facts ¶¶ 2-3. Moreover, within the employee lot are two signs that restrict its use, reading: "RESERVED FOR EMPLOYEES" and "UNAUTHORIZED VEHICLES WILL BE TOWED AT OWNER'S EXPENSE." Pl's Counter Statement of Facts ¶ 4. However, these signs are only visible once inside the parking lot, and not from its entrance or Brownlee Place. Pl's Counter Statement of Facts ¶ 4.
On the date of her accident, late afternoon on a Saturday, Plaintiff's husband, now deceased, drove Plaintiff to the Post Office. Pl's Counter Statement of Facts ¶ 8; Def's Statement of Facts ¶ 7. Despite having a valid handicapped placard for her vehicle, for reasons unknown, Plaintiff's husband entered the Post Office's premises through the entrance driveway of the employee lot. Def's Statement of Facts ¶ 35. Subsequently, Plaintiff exited the vehicle and walked on the sidewalk—shared by the customer lot—to the Post Office's main entrance, which remained open after the Post Office's retail hours had ended, in order for customers, likePlaintiff, to access its lobby and mail letters. Pl's Counter Statement of Facts ¶ 9. Her husband waited in the car until Plaintiff finished her affairs, which took approximately six to eight minutes. Pl's Counter Statement of Facts ¶¶ 8, 10. Upon her return to the vehicle, Plaintiff once again walked on the same sidewalk towards the employee lot and, after taking "maybe one or two" steps from the curb into the employee lot, Plaintiff slipped and fell. Def's Statement of Facts ¶ 33; Deposition transcript of Patricia McFadden at P. 26:6 ("Pl's Deposition"). Although Plaintiff could not identify the exact source of her fall, during her deposition, she indicated that, after stepping onto the surface of the parking lot, "I went—my feet went right out from under me and I fell flat on my back." Pl's Deposition at 13:18-19. Upon further questioning, she stated: Pl's Deposition at 28:3, 13-14; 29:1-2. And, after falling to the ground, Plaintiff recalled feeling "pretty wet." Pl's Deposition at 28:21. Furthermore, Carol Ewing, an employee of the Post Office, described the weather conditions as having snowed earlier in the week, and snow was on the ground around the time of Plaintiff's accident. Deposition transcript of Carol Ewing at P. 28:20-29:11 ("Ewing's Deposition").
After her accident, Plaintiff submitted two separate Claims for Damage, Injury, or Death to the United States Postal Service describing her alleged slip and fall and the injuries she sustained. Def's Statement of Facts ¶¶ 4-7. Subsequently, on September 19, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the United States1 for negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). Def's Statement of Facts ¶ 10. Approximately seven months later, Plaintiff amended her complaint and alleged that the United States "negligently and carelessly [maintained] the [Basking Ridge Post Office] so as to cause a dangerous condition to exist thereon." Def'sStatement of Facts ¶ 11. On October 15, 2014, after learning that the Post Office used an independent contractor for snow and ice removal, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, wherein BRG was named as a defendant. Def's Statement of Facts ¶ 12; Plaintiff's Counter Statement of Facts Pursuant to Rule 4:46-2(b) ¶¶ 9, 11. Subsequently, in its answer to Plaintiff's second amended complaint, the Post Office asserted cross-claims for indemnification and contribution against BRG.
In the present matter, both Defendants move for summary judgment. The Post Office primarily argues that Plaintiff is unable to establish the cause-in-fact of her injuries, since she could not identify the condition that caused her to fall, and that Plaintiff exceeded the scope of her invitation by utilizing the Post Office's employee parking lot without authorization. Brief of the United States in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment at 1. (Def's Brief for Summary Judgment). Moreover, BRG contends that Plaintiff's claim against it is time barred, and that the Post Office has no contractual basis for indemnification. Brief of Basking Ridge Glass in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment at 1. Plaintiff opposes both motions and the Post Office opposes the motion of BRG.
A court may grant a motion for summary judgment when the record "show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In making this determination, "the Court must view the evidence in favor of the non-moving party by extending any reasonable favorable inference to that party." Roth v. Marina Assocs., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70952, at *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2009). In other words, "the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party's] favor." Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (quotingAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). The inquiry, therefore, is whether there are "any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 259 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Nevertheless, "the nonmoving party may not, in the face of a showing of a lack of a genuine issue, withstand summary judgment by resting on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings; rather, that party must set forth 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,' else summary judgment, 'if appropriate,' will be entered." United States v. Premises Known as 717 South Woodward Street, Allentown, Pa., 2 F.3d 529, 533 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff asserts her negligence claim against the Post Office under the FTCA, which provides individuals with a remedy for injuries that arise from "the negligent or wrongful act or omission of" federal employees. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2671-80, 2679. A plaintiff is entitled to recover only "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b). In that regard, New Jersey law governs Plaintiff's negligence claim against the Post Office. See, e.g., Starkey v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4801 (D.N.J. Jan. 18, 2011) ().
A plaintiff, under New Jersey law, is required to establish the following to prove a negligence claim: (1) that the defendant owed that plaintiff a duty; (2) that the defendant breached that duty; and (3) that the defendant's breach of duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm. Brown v. Racquet Club of Bricktown, 95 N.J. 280, 288 (1984). In premise liability cases, like the one here, the extent of the duty owed is typically governed by the classification of the plaintiff. Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 433 (1993). Generally, these classifications include invitees, licensees, and trespassers. Atakora v. McAuley, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2680, at *5 (App. Div. Oct. 1, 2010).
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