McFadden v. United States

• Citation: 192 L.Ed.2d 260,135 S.Ct. 2298,576 U.S. 186
• Decision Date: 18 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–378.,14–378.
• Parties: Stephen Dominick McFADDEN, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

576 U.S. 186

135 S.Ct. 2298

192 L.Ed.2d 260

Stephen Dominick McFADDEN, Petitioner

v.UNITED STATES.

No. 14–378.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued April 21, 2015.

Decided June 18, 2015.

Kevin K. Russell, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Sarah E. Harrington, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Vijay Shanker, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

J. Lloyd Snook, III, Snook & Haughey, P.C., Charlottesville, VA, Kevin K. Russell, Counsel of Record, Goldstein & Russell, P.C., Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986 (Analogue Act) identifies a category of substances substantially similar to those listed on the federal controlled substance schedules, 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A), and then instructs courts to treat those analogues, if intended for human consumption, as controlled substances listed on schedule I for purposes of federal law, § 813. The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) in turn makes it unlawful knowingly to manufacture, distribute, or possess with intent to distribute controlled substances. § 841(a)(1). The question presented in this case concerns the knowledge necessary for conviction under § 841(a)(1) when the controlled substance at issue is in fact an analogue.

We hold that § 841(a)(1) requires the Government to establish that the defendant knew he was dealing with "a controlled substance." When the substance is an analogue, that knowledge requirement is met if the defendant knew that the substance was controlled under the CSA or the Analogue Act, even if he did not know its identity. The knowledge requirement is also met if the defendant knew the specific features of the substance that make it a " ‘controlled substance analogue.’ " § 802(32)(A). Because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit approved a jury instruction that did not accurately convey this knowledge requirement, we vacate its judgment and remand for that court to determine whether the error was harmless.

I

In 2011, law enforcement officials in Charlottesville, Virginia, began investigating individuals at a Charlottesville video store for suspected distribution of "bath salts"—various recreational drugs used to produce effects similar to those of cocaine, methamphetamine, and other controlled substances. The owner of the store, Lois McDaniel, had been purchasing bath salts from petitioner Stephen McFadden for several months. McFadden had marketed the substances to her as "Alpha," "No Speed," "Speed," "Up," and "The New Up," and had compared them to cocaine and crystal meth. He had often sold those products with labels borrowing language from the Analogue Act, asserting that the contents were "not for human consumption" or stating that a particular product "does not contain any of the following compounds or analogues of the following compounds" and listing controlled substances. McDaniel purchased the bath salts for $15 per gram and resold them for $30 to $70 per gram.

After investigators had conducted two controlled buys from the store and confronted McDaniel, she agreed to cooperate in their investigation by making five controlled buys from McFadden. The Government intercepted the substances McFadden sent when they arrived at the local FedEx store. Like the substances sold in the video store, these substances were white and off-white powders packaged in small plastic bags. Chemical analysis identified the powders as containing, among other substances, 3,4–Methylenedioxypyrovalerone, also known as MDPV; 3,4–Methylenedioxy–N–methylcathinone, also known as Methylone

or MDMC; and 4–Methyl–N–ethylcathinone, also known as 4–MEC. When ingested, each of these substances is capable of producing effects on the central nervous system similar to those that controlled substances (such as cocaine, methamphetamine, and methcathinone) produce.

A federal grand jury indicted McFadden on eight counts of distribution of controlled substance analogues and one count of conspiracy. At trial, McFadden argued that he did not know the substances he was distributing were regulated as controlled substances under the Analogue Act. He and the Government also disagreed about what knowledge was required for a conviction. The Government sought an instruction requiring only "[t]hat the defendant knowingly and intentionally distributed a mixture or substance ... [t]hat ... was a controlled substance analogue ... with the intent that it be consumed by humans." App. 26–27. McFadden sought a more demanding instruction requiring that he "knew that the substances that he was distributing possessed the characteristics of controlled substance analogues," including their chemical structures and effects on the central nervous system. Id., at 29–30. The District Court compromised, instructing the jury that the statute required that "the defendant knowingly and intentionally distributed a mixture or substance that has" substantially similar effects on the nervous system as a controlled substance and "[t]hat the defendant intended for the mixture or substance to be consumed by humans." Id., at 40.

The jury convicted McFadden on all nine counts. On appeal, McFadden insisted that the District Court "erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the government was required to prove that he knew, had a strong suspicion, or deliberately avoided knowledge that the [substances] possessed the characteristics of controlled substance analogues." 753 F.3d 432, 443 (C.A.4 2014). Rejecting that argument, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id., at 444, 446. Stating that it was bound by Circuit precedent, the court concluded that the "intent element [in the Act] requires [only] that the government prove that the defendant meant for the substance at issue to be consumed by humans." Id., at 441 ; see id., at 444.

We granted a writ of certiorari, 574 U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1039, 190 L.Ed.2d 908 (2015), and now vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand.

II

A

The Analogue Act requires a controlled substance analogue, if intended for human consumption, to be treated "as a controlled substance in schedule I" for purposes of federal law. § 1201, 100 Stat. 3207–13, 21 U.S.C. § 813. We therefore must turn first to the statute that addresses controlled substances, the CSA. The CSA makes it "unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally ... to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance."

§ 401(a)(1), 84 Stat. 1260, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Under the most natural reading of this provision, the word "knowingly" applies not just to the statute's verbs but also to the object of those verbs—"a controlled substance." See Flores–Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 650, 129 S.Ct. 1886, 173 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009) ; id., at 657, 129 S.Ct. 1886 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 660–661, 129 S.Ct. 1886 (ALITO, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). When used as an indefinite article, "a" means "[s]ome undetermined or unspecified particular." Webster's New International Dictionary 1 (2d ed. 1954). And the CSA defines "controlled substance" as "a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V." § 802(6) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ordinary meaning of § 841(a)(1) thus requires a defendant to know only that the substance he is dealing with is some unspecified substance listed on the federal drug schedules. The Courts of Appeals have recognized as much. See, e.g., United States v. Andino, 627 F.3d 41, 45–46 (C.A.2 2010) ; United States v. Gamez–Gonzalez, 319 F.3d 695, 699 (C.A.5 2003) ; United States v. Martinez, 301 F.3d 860, 865 (C.A.7 2002).

That knowledge requirement may be met by showing that the defendant knew he possessed a substance listed on the schedules, even if he did not know which substance it was. Take, for example, a defendant whose role in a larger drug organization is to distribute a white powder to customers. The defendant may know that the white powder is listed on the schedules even if he does not know precisely what substance it is. And if so, he would be guilty of knowingly distributing "a controlled substance."

The knowledge requirement may also be met by showing that the defendant knew the identity of the substance he possessed. Take, for example, a defendant who knows he is distributing heroin but does not know that heroin is listed on the schedules, 21 CFR § 1308.11 (2014). Because ignorance of the law is typically no defense to criminal prosecution, Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 196, 118 S.Ct. 1939, 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998), this defendant would also be guilty of knowingly distributing "a controlled substance."¹

The Analogue Act extends the framework of the CSA to analogous substances. 21 U.S.C. § 813. The Act defines a "controlled substance analogue" as a substance:

"(i) the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance in schedule I or II;

"(ii) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in schedule I or II; or

"(iii) with respect to a particular person, which such person represents or intends to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in schedule I or II." § 802(32)(A).

It further provides, "A controlled substance analogue shall, to the extent intended for human consumption, be treated, for the purposes of any...