McFadden v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.

• Decision Date: 02 September 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 12-940 (RBW)
• Parties: Corey MCFADDEN, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

204 F.Supp.3d 134

Corey MCFADDEN, Plaintiff,

v.WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 12-940 (RBW)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed September 02, 2016

Corey L. McFadden, Germantown, MD, pro se.

Gerard Joseph Stief, Janice Lynn Cole, Nicholas Stephen Nunzio, Jr., Michael Kelly Guss, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, United States District Judge

The plaintiff, Corey McFadden, proceeding pro se , brings this action against his former employer, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA"), and three WMATA employees, Lisa Cooper Lucas, Ron A. Kelley, and John Coleman (the "individual defendants"), asserting claims for disability discrimination, retaliation, defamation, and civil conspiracy. See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("Am. Compl.") ¶¶ 175-243. Currently before the Court are the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defs.' Mot."); the Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Jud[g]ment ("Pl.'s Opp'n and Mot."); the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the defendants' memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment and his Motion for Sanctions ("Pl.'s. 1st Mot.); and the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike certain transcripts from the record and his Motion for Sanctions ("Pl.'s. 2nd Mot.). Upon careful consideration of the parties' submissions, the Court concludes for the following reasons that the plaintiff's motions to strike must be denied; the defendants' motion for summary judgment must be granted in part and denied in part; and the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment must be denied.¹

I. BACKGROUND

Much of the factual background of this case has been previously set forth by the Court, see Order at 2 (Jan. 16, 2015), ECF No. 60; see also McFadden v. Wash. Metro Area Transit Auth., 949 F.Supp.2d 214, 218–19, 225 (D.D.C.2013), and the amended complaint contains the following allegations pertinent to the defendants' motion. WMATA hired the plaintiff as a bus mechanic in October 2008. Am. Compl. ¶ 11. In June 2009, the plaintiff was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder

("ADHD") and prescribed the drug Adderall "to increase his focus and concentration." Id. ¶¶ 16-17. Pursuant to a WMATA policy forbidding employees in "safety-sensitive positions" from using amphetamines, the defendants prohibited the plaintiff from working as a bus mechanic while taking Adderall, and suspended his employment after he tested positive for use of the drug. See id. ¶¶ 33-40, 65-90. Subsequently, at a grievance hearing before WMATA's Joint Labor Management Committee in March 2011, the individual defendants made statements, prior to the plaintiff's arrival at the hearing, indicating that the plaintiff was a drug addict who was abusing Adderall. See id. ¶¶ 72-74. WMATA later fired the plaintiff for violating the authority's substance abuse policy, but then reinstated his employment pursuant to an agreement with the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 689, of which the plaintiff was a member. Id. ¶¶ 75, 77, 16.

On June 8, 2012, the plaintiff instituted this action, asserting multiple claims against all defendants under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2012), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (2012), as well as a defamation claim against the individual defendants. See Order at 2 (Jan. 16, 2015), ECF No. 60. The Court earlier dismissed the ADA claims against WMATA on the basis of sovereign immunity afforded WMATA under the Eleventh Amendment, and the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act claims against the individual defendants on the basis that there is no individual liability under either statute. McFadden , 949 F.Supp.2d at 219–20, 225. Accordingly, only the plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claims against WMATA and the defamation claim against the individual defendants remained alive. See id. at 225.

Following the issuance of the Court's dismissal ruling, the plaintiff sought leave to file an amended complaint to add an additional defendant, Dr. Desmond Johnson ("Dr. Johnson"), and claims of both intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy based on the underlying tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the individual defendants and proposed defendant Dr. Johnson. See Order at 5 (Apr. 11, 2014), ECF No. 38. The Court denied the plaintiff's motion in its entirety, finding that "allowing the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint ... would be futile," id. at 6, because the plaintiff relied wholly on "allegations of intra-workplace conduct," id. ; see also Kassem v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr. , 513 F.3d 251, 256 (D.C.Cir.2008) (holding that the plaintiff stated facts sufficient to withstand the dismissal of his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because he "does not merely plead intra-workplace mistreatment" but also pleads facts that suggest that his employer's actions have "subjected him to criminal penalties"), which are insufficient to sustain a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and because the plaintiff based his conspiracy claim on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the conspiracy claim also failed as a matter of law due to the legal requirement that a viable underlying tortious act be a condition precedent to the sustainability of a civil conspiracy claim. See Order at 3 (Jan. 16, 2015), ECF No. 60.

Notwithstanding the Court's reasoning in its April 11, 2014 Order, the plaintiff again moved to file an amended complaint to once again add Dr. Johnson as an individual defendant and to include and reassert claims of (1) negligent infliction of emotional distress against Dr. Johnson; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress against Dr. Johnson and the other individual defendants; and (3) a civil conspiracy claim based on the torts of defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Order at 4 (Jan. 16, 2015), ECF No. 60. In partially denying and granting the plaintiff's second motion to amend, the Court concluded that allowing the plaintiff to amend the complaint to add Dr. Johnson as an individual defendant would cause "[t]he legal landscape of this action ... [to] expand and become more complex, resulting in both undue delay and prejudice to the defendants" and "would essentially create a case within a case" and re-start the litigation from the beginning. Id. at 7-8. The Court also precluded the plaintiff from asserting a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against either Dr. Johnson because the plaintiff had "knowledge of the allegations that purportedly support his claim against Dr. Johnson for nearly two years, and [did not] argu[e] that only through discovery did the facts come to light that support the claim," id. at 7, or the individual defendants because the plaintiff's allegations "only theoretically implicate potential criminal repercussions from the defendants' actions based on conduct that has never actually occurred," id. at 9.

The Court further denied the plaintiff's second motion to amend the complaint to include a civil conspiracy claim based on the torts of negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as the Court previously dismissed those claims, prohibiting the survival of the civil conspiracy claims predicated on these torts. Id. at 10. The Court, however, "in light of the record currently before the Court," id. did grant the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to include a civil conspiracy claim based on the tort of defamation because "the defendants will experience little prejudice, if any, as [the civil conspiracy] claim only spreads liability among the alleged wrongdoers for the underlying tort and will not necessarily require additional discovery that has not already been taken by the parties," id. at 10-11.

The defendants have now moved for summary judgment on all counts, which the plaintiff simultaneously opposes and cross moves for summary judgment.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Motions to Strike

Motions to strike are "drastic remed[ies] that courts disfavor," Riddick v. Holland , 134 F.Supp.3d 281, 285 (D.D.C.2015) (citation omitted), and the trial judge has discretion to either grant or deny the motion, see id. A court, either on its own volition or by a moving party, may strike from a pleading² any "insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Rule 12(f) itself does not require the striking of prejudicial matters, and although courts disfavor motions to strike, courts have granted such motions, but only upon a showing that parts of a pleading are prejudicial or scandalous. Therefore, "absent a ‘strong reason for so doing,’ courts will generally ‘not tamper with pleadings.’ " Nwachukwu v. Rooney , 362 F.Supp.2d 183, 190 (D.D.C.2005) (quoting Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir.1976) ).

B. Motions for Summary Judgment

Courts will grant a motion for summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,’ and a dispute about a material fact is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ " Steele v. Schafer , 535 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C.Cir.2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct....