McFarland v. Barba
| Decision Date | 30 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:22-cv-00720-SRC |
| Parties | DEMARCO L. MCFARLAND, Plaintiff(s), v. KYLE BARBA, et al., Defendant(s). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of Plaintiff DeMarco L. McFarland for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. Doc. 2. Having reviewed the motion, the Court finds that it should be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses this action without prejudice.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016).
When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983[1] on July 7, 2022. The complaint names Kyle Barba, a Missouri Highway Patrolman, as the sole defendant. Doc. 1 at p. 2. Barba is sued in his official capacity only. Id. at p. 1. The complaint contains allegations of constitutional violations stemming from a traffic stop. Id. at p. 3.
In the “Statement of Claim,” Plaintiff asserts that on June 17, 2022, he “was unlawfully detained, assaulted with pepper spray, falsely arrested, and placed in detention for [approximately] 19 hours.” Id. at p. 5. He states that this occurred on “interstate I-64 west at the Maryville Center Drive,” when Officer Barba allegedly broke his driver's side window and deployed “a pepper spray substance in [his] eyes.” Officer Barba “then placed [him] in handcuffs, took [him] to [the] hospital, and then took [him] to St. Louis County [jail].” Plaintiff was “placed on [a] 24 hour hold” and was released on June 18, 2022.
Due to this experience, Plaintiff states that he has “anxiety issues,” and that “this event only heightened an already preexisting issue that is not under control.” He seeks total damages in the amount of $2,025,000. Id. at p. 4.
On July 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed five exhibits relating to the June 17, 2022 incident. (Docket No. 4). First, there is an unsigned summons dated June 18, 2022, which does not provide the date and time plaintiff is to appear in court. Doc. 4 at p. 1.
Second, there is a probable cause statement authored by Officer Barba.[2] Id. at p. 2. According to the statement, Officer Barba conducted a traffic stop when he observed Plaintiff's vehicle exceeding the speed limit. When Officer Barba approached the vehicle, Plaintiff refused an instruction to roll down the window and refused to exit the car when informed he was under arrest. Even after using a “window punch,” Plaintiff refused Officer Barba's demands to exit, and “grabbed onto the vehicle interior” to prevent Barba from pulling him out. Eventually, after giving plaintiff a warning, Officer Barba deployed “OC aerosol,” whereupon plaintiff exited the vehicle.
Third, there is an information charging Plaintiff with misdemeanor resisting arrest. Id. at p. 4. The information is signed by Prosecutor Godsy, who is named as a defendant in the amended complaint.
Fourth, Plaintiff has attached copies of six uniform citations he received from Officer Barba. Id. at pp. 6-11.
Finally, there is a Missouri Department of Revenue form indicating that plaintiff refused to submit to an alcohol or drug test during the June 17, 2022 traffic stop. Id. at p. 12. The form is signed by Officer Barba.
On July 12, 2022, the Court received from Plaintiff an amended complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the “deprivation of [plaintiff's] civil rights” under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Doc. 5 at p. 3. He also purports to bring this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1455, seeking to remove his criminal prosecution. Plaintiff names Officer Barba, Prosecutor Godsy, and St. Louis County Circuit Clerk Joan M. Gilmer as defendants. Id. at p. 2. He does not indicate the capacity in which Defendants are sued.
In the “Statement of Claim of his amended complaint, Plaintiff again asserts that Officer Barba “violated [his] civil rights and unlawfully arrested [and] detained [him] without [his] consent” on June 17, 2022. Id. at p. 5. He accuses Officer Barba of excessive force due to injuries sustained after “glass was busted out and [he] was sprayed with pepper spray” during a traffic stop. Plaintiff contends that he requested “a supervisor come to [the] traffic stop,” but that he was told he “was under arrest before [he] could even identify [himself].” He states that he is “on record for Type I diabetes,” and that he has PTSD, chronic depression, and anxiety, which have been “heightened” by this incident. Based on these facts, Plaintiff concludes that Officer Barba “used excessive force and unlawfully arrested and imprisoned [him].”
Regarding the other two defendants, Plaintiff states only that Prosecutor Godsy “summoned [him] to court,” and that Court Clerk Gilmer “filed” his criminal case.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages of $2,025,000 for pain, suffering, and emotional distress. Id. at p. 6. He also requests “that [his] state court case be removed to this said venue [and] jurisdiction.” Id. at p. 5.
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations during a June 17, 2022 traffic stop. Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review his pleadings under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. For the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses this case without prejudice.
In the amended complaint, Plaintiff fails to indicate the capacity in which Defendants are sued. Plaintiff can bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against a public official acting in his or her official capacity, his or her individual capacity, or both. See Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2007). However, if his complaint is silent about the capacity in which the defendants are being sued, the complaint is interpreted as including only official capacity claims. See Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995).
Because Plaintiff has not indicated the capacities in which Defendants are sued, the Court must treat his claims as being made against Defendants in their official capacities only. In an official capacity claim against an individual, the claim is actually “against the governmental entity itself.” See White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1075 (8th Cir. 2017). Thus, a “suit against a public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit against the public employer.” Johnson, 172 F.3d at 535.
Here, defendants Godsy and Gilmer are alleged to be employees of St. Louis County, while defendant Barba is alleged to be an employee of the State of Missouri. To prevail on his official capacity claims, Plaintiff must establish the liability of these respective governmental employers for the alleged conduct. See Kelly v. City of Omaha, 813 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2016).
Both Prosecutor Godsy and Court Clerk Gilmer are alleged to be employed by St. Louis County. Thus, as explained above, the official capacity claims against them are treated as claims against the county itself, their employer.
A local governing body such as St. Louis County can be sued directly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To prevail on this type of claim, the plaintiff must establish the governmental entity's liability for the alleged conduct. Kelly, 813 F.3d at 1075. Such liability may attach if the constitutional violation “resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Mick v. Raines, 883 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2018). Thus, there are three ways in...
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