McFarland v. City of Clovis

• Citation: 163 F.Supp.3d 798
• Decision Date: 16 February 2016
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 1:15-CV-1530 AWI SMS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: Lyle S. McFarland, Plaintiff v. City of Clovis, City of Clovis Police Department, Jacob Rios, and Does 1-20, Defendants

163 F.Supp.3d 798

Lyle S. McFarland, Plaintiff

v.City of Clovis, City of Clovis Police Department, Jacob Rios, and Does 1-20, Defendants

CASE NO. 1:15-CV-1530 AWI SMS

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed February 16, 2016

Filed February 17, 2016

John Neal Drooyan, Law Office of John Drooyan, San Pedro, CA, for Plaintiff.

Bruce Daniel Praet, Gary Craig Smith, Ferguson Praet and Sherman, Santa Ana, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Anthony W. Ishii, SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

This case arises from an encounter between Plaintiff Lyle McFarland (“McFarland”) and Defendant Officer Jacob Rios (“Rios”) of the City of Clovis Police Department (“Clovis P.D.”). In the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), McFarland brings claims under California law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourth Amendment rights by Rios and an unknown Clovis P.D. officer. The City of Clovis (“the City”) and the Clovis P.D. now move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Fourth Cause of Action for violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 and the Monell claims in the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

RULE 12(b)(6) FRAMEWORK

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff's “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Conservation Force v. Salazar , 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir.2011) ; Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys. , 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.2008). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs. , 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir.2013) ; Johnson , 534 F.3d at 1121. However, complaints that offer no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Dichter–Mad Family Partners. LLP v. United States , 709 F.3d 749, 761 (9th Cir.2013). The Court is not required “to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Wilson v. Hewlett–Packard Co. , 668 F.3d 1136, 1145 n. 4 (9th Cir.2012) ; Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors , 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.2001). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; Faulkner , 706 F.3d at 1019. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; Dichter–Mad , 709 F.3d at 761. “Plausibility” means “more than a sheer possibility,” but less than a probability, and facts that are “merely consistent” with liability fall short of “plausibility.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; Li v. Kerry , 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir.2013). The Ninth Circuit has distilled the following principles from Iqbal and Twombly : (1) to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively; (2) the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation. Starr v. Baca , 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir.2011). In assessing a motion to dismiss, courts may consider documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice. Dichter–Mad , 709 F.3d at 762. If a motion to dismiss is granted, “[the] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made....” Henry A. v. Willden , 678 F.3d 991, 1005 (9th Cir.2012). However, leave to amend need not be granted if amendment would be futile or if the plaintiff has failed to cure deficiencies despite repeated opportunities. See Mueller v. Auker , 700 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir.2012) ; Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power , 623 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir.2010).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

From the FAC, just before 3:30 p.m. on January 25, 2015, Rios and another tall Clovis P.D. officer loudly knocked on McFarland's front door. When McFarland answered the door, the officers asked about McFarland's cell phone and shotgun. The “tall officer” asked if they could come into McFarland's home, and McFarland asked what this was about. The officers then told McFarland to step out of his house. McFarland complied with the officers' request. When he stepped outside, the tall officer grabbed and twisted McFarland's right arm behind McFarland's back, and Rios grabbed McFarland's left arm. The officers then handcuffed McFarland. McFarland, who is 59 years old and disabled due to a serious injury to his right arm, told the officers that he is disabled, repeated to the officers six times that the handcuffs were hurting him, and repeatedly requested that the handcuffs be removed. The officers were unresponsive.

McFarland was arrested for violation of California Penal Code § 422 (criminal threat) based on a text message that he sent to his brother at 3:00 a.m. that morning. The text included a picture of ammunition and the letters “F-U.”

While being taken to the police station, McFarland repeatedly informed the officers that he was disabled, that the handcuffs were hurting him, and that the handcuffs should be removed. The officers ignored McFarland's statements.

At approximately 7:30 p.m., McFarland was booked into jail. Pursuant to a search warrant, Clovis P.D. took possession of McFarland's shotgun, shells, and other possessions. Although McFarland had no previous criminal violations, bail was set at $20,000.00. McFarland spent 4 hours in the Clovis P.D. jail, and another 2 days and 2 nights in the Fresno County jail. McFarland was eventually released from jail on January 27, 2015, at 10:30 p.m., without any charges being filed.

I. DEFENDANTS' MOTION

A. First, Second, & Third Causes of Action—Monell Liability Defendants' Argument

The City argues that McFarland's allegations regarding policies or customs are conclusory. There are no allegations that identify an official policy, or explain how the policy is deficient, or how the policy caused harm, or show that the policy amounts to deliberate indifference. The same is also true with respect to allegations of improper training. Because the allegations are conclusory, there are no plausible claims alleged.

Plaintiff's Opposition

McFarland argues that the FAC expressly alleges that the officers acted pursuant to their training and Clovis P.D. policy when they violently seized and arrested him, ignored his disability and complaints about the handcuffs, and held him for 56 hours in prison before releasing him without charge. The FAC alleges that the officers' training did not adequately deal with probable cause in making an arrest, or in seizing, arresting, handcuffing, and detaining disabled individuals. The involvement of two arresting officers provides support that the officers acted pursuant to a Clovis P.D. policy. These allegations make dismissal improper.

Legal Standard

Municipalities are considered “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore may be liable for causing a constitutional deprivation. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ; Castro v. County of L.A. , 797 F.3d 654, 670 (9th Cir.2015). A municipality, however, “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under [42 U.S.C. § 1983 ] under a respondeat superior theory.” Monell , 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018 ; see Castro , 797 F.3d at 670. Liability only attaches where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation through “execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Monell , 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018 ; Price v. Sery , 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir.Or.2008). Municipal liability may be premised on: (1) conduct pursuant to a formal or expressly adopted official policy; (2) a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the “standard operating procedure” of the local government entity; (3) a decision of a decision-making official who was, as a matter of state law, a final policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy in the area of decision; or (4) an official with final policymaking authority either delegating that authority to, or ratifying the decision of, a subordinate. See Thomas v. County of Riverside , 763 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir.2014) ; Price , 513 F.3d at 966. A failure to train or inadequate training may form the basis for municipal liability under § 1983 where the training or failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of the persons with whom the municipality's employees come into contact. Flores v. County of L.A. , 758 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir.2014) ; Long v. County of L.A. , 442 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir.2006). Under such a theory, the “issue is whether the training program is adequate and, if it is not, whether such inadequate training can justifiably be said to represent municipal policy.” Long , 442 F.3d at 1186. A municipality is deliberately indifferent when the...