McFarland v. English
| Decision Date | 16 August 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 99-378.,CIV.A. 99-378. |
| Citation | 111 F.Supp.2d 591 |
| Parties | Peter J. McFARLAND, III v. Timothy ENGLISH, Superintendent, and The District Attorney of the County of Bucks, and The Attorney General of The State of Pennsylvania. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Peter Goldberger, Law Office of Peter Goldberger, Ardmore, PA, for Peter J. McFarland, III.
Peter J. McFarland, III, Greensburg, PA, pro se.
Heather A. Castellino, Superintendent Respondent Dist. Attorney's Office, Doylestown, PA, for Timothy English.
Pending before this court is a Report and Recommendation in which the Magistrate Judge has recommended the denial of a habeas corpus petition, filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2254, in which Peter J. McFarland, III, challenges his 1992 conviction on drug charges in the Common Pleas Court of Bucks County, Pennsylvania.
In petitioning for habeas corpus, Mr. McFarland alleges five grounds for setting aside his conviction. The Magistrate Judge, in his opinion recommending denial of habeas corpus, has found two of the five grounds deficient on the merits,1 and has concluded that the other three grounds are procedurally defaulted — two because they were not properly raised in the state courts,2 and the third because it "was deemed to have been waived by the Pennsylvania Courts."
This opinion will begin by addressing the provenance of the ground "deemed to have been waived" — namely, Mr. McFarland's contention that his right to a fair trial was fatally compromised by the state's failure, in contravention of Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), to fulfill its constitutional obligation to insure that Mr. McFarland, an accused in custody, would, at his jury trial, be provided with civilian clothes in substitution for his prison garb. This opinion will also refer to a closely related ground, which the state courts also deemed to have been waived: Mr. McFarland's contention that his due process rights were violated when he was seen by the jury in handcuffs.
The constitutional principle chiefly relied on by Mr. McFarland is the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, twenty-five years ago, speaking through Chief Justice Burger, that "the State cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes." Id. at 512, 96 S.Ct. 1691. The Court's due process concern in Estelle v. Williams was that, when a jury sees the accused as one who has already been committed to prison, the presumption of innocence is undermined.
A. Pretrial and Trial Proceedings
The circumstances under which the wearing of prison clothes at trial became an issue were these. On January 29, 1992 — a few days before trial was scheduled to commence — a pre-trial motion to suppress, submitted on behalf of Mr. McFarland and his co-defendant Francis Kelly, was considered by Judge Edward G. Biester, Jr. After a hearing, the motion was denied. Peter Hall, Esquire, counsel for Mr. McFarland, then moved for a continuance of the trial. After explaining the reasons for not being prepared to go forward as scheduled, Mr. Hall noted a further problem:
Obviously, my client does not have appropriate clothing for a jury trial.
THE COURT: Clothing will be supplied. Clothing will be supplied.
Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 1/29/92, p. 3.
After Judge Biester observed that any application for a continuance should be taken up with his senior colleague, Judge Isaac Garb, S. Kip Portman, Esquire, counsel for Mr. Kelly, stated:
Your Honor, I would like to join in Mr. Hall's request for a continuance. My client is not appropriately clothed.
THE COURT: We'll take care of the clothing.
On February 3, 1992, the trial got under way before Judge Ward F. Clark. At the close of the first day, the following colloquy took place:
Miss Muldoon,3 I will keep you overnight. You are testifying in the morning. That is my decision.
So, you are still in the custody of the sheriff.
All right, recessed until 10:00 am tomorrow morning.
The next day, February 4, a police officer, called as a witness for the prosecution, gave testimony with respect to the arrest of Mr. McFarland in a motel room. A portion of the officer's direct testimony follows:
Q. Okay. Did you secure Mr. McFarland?
A. Yes.
Q. What do you mean "secure?"
A. Everyone that was in the room, the suite I would call it, was taken into the living room area and searched for weapons and handcuffed.
* * * * * *
Q. Who was in the room?
A. Peter McFarland who is seated at defendant's table between the two attorneys in prison greens. Francis Kelly seated on the end of the table with prison greens on and Mary Jane Muldoon.
Q. Indicating for the record both defendants Your Honor.
On February 5, at the commencement of the third day of trial, the following colloquy took place:
MR. HALL: It came to my attention that after the evening recess yesterday, Mr. McFarland and Mr. Kelly were being escorted back to the holding cell and waiting for an elevator while handcuffed to one another, obviously, being escorted by several sheriffs. And at that time, the entire jury panel of fourteen came out. And there was not a confrontation, they all saw each other although it's already made a part of the record that my client, I'm sure, and Mr. Kelly are wearing a prison uniform was made a part of the record, that is not their choice. They don't wish to be here or to be in prison and referred to as prisoners. But being seen actually handcuffed I think changes the situation.
I would, number one, move for a mistrial based upon that; and number two, if that request is denied, I ask the Judge, the Court to voir dire the jurors to ascertain whether anything they observed yesterday adversely effected [sic] their ability to impartially decide this case.
* * * * * *
(Whereupon there was a side bar discussion off the record.)
On February 6, the prosecution rested. The first defense witness was Mr. McFarland. He testified at length with respect to the events that led up to his being taken into custody. In the course of his direct testimony Mr. McFarland stated:
A..... I was very polite. After that he [Officer Barry] took me back out to another room helped me back down and took me to jail.
Q. And you have been in jail since?
The trial judge charged the jury on February 7. In the course of the charge, the jury was instructed as follows:
Now, you will note the defendants have been clothed in prison clothing here. You also I think noted and it has been put in the record, that you had seen them handcuffed; they're in custody in reference to this case. You heard that from the witness stand. You heard some references in this case to bail. You heard some references to Ms. Muldoon and what her bail situation was. The fact that these men have prison uniforms on and the fact that you saw them handcuffed, and the fact that they're in custody, because of the bail situation, you're not to infer anything against them. For these reasons they're presumed innocent.
On February 10, 1992, the jury returned a verdict finding Mr. McFarland guilty of possession of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, possession of drug paraphernalia, and conspiracy. Thereafter, following the denial, in 1994, of his post-verdict motions, Mr. McFarland was sentenced to a term of incarceration of eight to sixteen years.
(1) In the Courts of Pennsylvania
Mr. McFarland appealed to the Superior Court, raising numerous issues. On October 12, 1995, the judgment of the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas was affirmed. Commonwealth v. McFarland, 449 Pa.Super. 698, 673 A.2d 403 (1995). Among the claims unsuccessfully advanced by Mr. McFarland were contentions that he had been denied a fair trial by (a) being required to wear prison clothes before the jury and (b) being viewed by the jury in handcuffs. With respect to these contentions, the Superior Court, in its opinion, said the following:
The next issue concerns a continuance which appellant allegedly sought at a preliminary hearing just before trial. This claim is predicated upon a statement appellant's counsel made at his preliminary hearing that appellant desired civilian clothing. The court responded, N.T., 01/29/92, at 3. Appellant claims this led his counsel to conclude the court thereby took responsibility for providing him with appropriate civilian clothing so that counsel neglected to make other arrangements. Despite this statement by the court, clothing never was provided when trial commenced on February 3, 1992. Appellan...
To continue reading
Request your trial