McFarland v. Kempthorne
| Decision Date | 17 November 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 00-20-M-DWM.,CV 00-20-M-DWM. |
| Citation | 464 F.Supp.2d 1014 |
| Parties | John James McFARLAND, Plaintiff, v. Dirk KEMPTHORNE, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior; Suzanne Lewis, in her capacity as Superintendent of Glacier National Park, Defendants, and National Parks Conservation Association, Defendant-Intervenor. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Montana |
Ronald W. Opsahl, William P. Pendley, Mountain States Legal Foundation, Lakewood, CO, Stephen C. Berg, Johnson Berg McEvoy & Bostock, Kalispell, MT, for Plaintiff.
Mark Steger Smith, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Billings, MT, for Defendants.
Alan A. Pemberton, Charles H.P. Vance, David E. Finkelson, Emily S. Williams Vijay Shanker, Kelly M. Jaske, William J. Friedman, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC, Jack R. Tuholske, Tuholske Law Office, Missoula, MT, for Defendant-Intervenor.
Plaintiff, John McFarland, owns a tract of land completely surrounded by Glacier National Park. McFarland brought suit against the United States to quiet title to an easement along Glacier Route 7, the road McFarland uses to access his property. Specifically, McFarland's suit alleges the National Park Service's closure of Glacier Route 7 to motorized vehicles during winter months interferes with his vested property rights. The suit also challenges the Park Service's denial of McFarland's request for a special use permit to drive and snowmobile on Glacier Route 7 during the winter. Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.
McFarland owns a 2.75 acre plot of land located within the boundaries of Glacier National Park, in an area commonly referred to as Big Prairie (the "Property"). Stipulation of Facts ¶ 1; Defs.' Undisp. Facts ¶ 1. The Property was originally granted to Charles F.W. Schoenberger. Defs.' Undisp. Facts Ex. 4. Prior to 1916, Schoenberger staked a claim to the Property pursuant to the Homestead Act of 1862, which permitted individuals "to enter upon ... unappropriated public lands" to establish homesteads. Act of May 20, 1862, 12 Stat. 392-93; Pl.'s Undisp. Facts ¶ 11. The Property was granted to Schoenberger in a 1916 land patent issued by President Woodrow Wilson. Defs.' Undisp. Facts Ex. 4. The land patent granted: "TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said tract of Land, with the appurtenances thereof unto the said claimant and to the heirs and assigns of the said claimant, forever." Defs.' Undisp. Facts Ex. 4.
A gravel road, variously known as the North Fork Road, the inner North Fork Road, and Glacier Route 7 (hereinafter "Glacier Route 7"), exists generally running north and south adjacent to the Property. Stipulation of Facts ¶ 2; Defs.' Undisp. Facts ¶ 6. Glacier Route 7 was originally constructed in 1901 by the Butte Oil Company to permit access to a mining claim at Kintla Lake. Pl.'s Undisp. Facts ¶ 5; Defs.' Undisp. Facts ¶ 7. It extends nearly to the Canadian border approximately 15 miles north of the Property and to the Village of Apgar approximately 30 miles south of the Property. Stipulation of Facts ¶ 2. Approximately 3.2 miles south of the Property, a spur road branches off of Glacier Route 7 at the Polebridge Ranger Station and exits Glacier National Park. Stipulation of Facts ¶ 2. Glacier Route 7 is, and always has been, the only road over which McFarland and his predecessors in title have been able to drive a motorized vehicle between the Property and the Polebridge Ranger Station to exit Glacier National Park. Stipulation of Facts ¶ 3.
Snowmobiling has been generally prohibited in Glacier National Park since 1975. Defs.' Undisp. Facts ¶¶ 51-53. Additionally, Glacier Route 7 is closed to automobiles seasonally by snow. Defs.' Undisp. Facts ¶ 33. The closure date and duration varies. Defs.' Undisp. Facts ¶ 33. Historically, however, the portion of Glacier Route 7 from the Polebridge Ranger Station to the Property has been closed from December 1 to May 1. Administrative Record ("AR") at 36. Prior to 1999, Park Service rangers permitted inholders to access their property in winter using motorized means along Glacier Route 7. Pl.'s Undisp. Facts ¶¶ 26-27; Defs.' Undisp Facts ¶ 40-42. When a gate was placed across Glacier Route 7 at Polebridge Ranger Station in 1988, the Park Service implemented a double-lock system to allow inholders motorized access to their properties. Stipulation of Facts ¶ 4; Pl.'s Undisp. Facts ¶¶ 35-36; Defs.' Undisp. Facts ¶ 42. The parties dispute the extent of the inholders' authorized access. McFarland claims access was permitted throughout the winter months. Pl.'s Undisp. Facts ¶¶ 26, 35-36. Defendants assert access was limited to the shoulder season on either end of the winter months. Defs.' Undisp. Facts ¶¶ 41-42. In any event, in December 1999, National Park Ranger Scott Emmerich sent McFarland an email message informing him that "a policy decision ha[d] been made that no one will drive park roads once they are closed to the public." AR at 36. Emmerich indicated the decision was made to protect wildlife and public recreational opportunities. AR at 36.
Prior to the Park Service's policy decision, McFarland had informed the Park Service he intended to live on the Property year-round with his wife and three children. AR at 29, 36. After being informed he could not access the Property by motorized means during the winter, McFarland filed an application with the Park Service for a special use permit. AR at 46-47. Specifically, McFarland requested permission to:
1. Use a vehicle to drive the 3.2 mile distance between our home and the Polebridge Ranger Station at such times as the Park Service has otherwise closed the road to public access by vehicle.
2. The freedom to unlock the gate and gain access to our property at any time without further assistance from Park Service personnel.
3. In the event the road conditions make it unsafe or unpractical to drive, I want to use a snowmobile for the limited purpose of traveling the short distance to my home.
4. Provide access for our guests to come and visit or stay at our home. Such access shall be in the same matter as requested above.
AR at 14-17. The permit request was denied in a January 24, 2000 letter from Acting Superintendent of Glacier National. Park John Shireman. AR at 56. The letter indicated the special use permit was denied in accordance with the Park Service's authority to close park areas to the public when "necessary for the maintenance of public health and safety, protection of environmental or scenic values, protection of natural or cultural resources, aid to scientific research, implementation of management responsibilities, equitable allocation and use of facilities, or the avoidance of conflict among visitor use activities." AR at 56; see also 36 C.F.R. 1.5(a). The letter stated the broad terms outlined in McFarland's request were not acceptable, but authorized McFarland to keep a snowmobile on the Property for use in medical emergencies. AR at 56. McFarland appealed the permit denial to the Deputy Regional Director of the Park Service on March 14, 2000. Pl.'s Undisp. Facts Ex. 23. Deputy Regional Director Mike Snyder subsequently affirmed the denial, approving of Shireman's conclusion that snowmobile use would interfere with winter recreational opportunities and negatively impact wildlife. Pl.'s Undisp. Facts Ex. 24.
McFarland subsequently filed suit, seeking to quiet title to an easement over Glacier Route 7. See Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a. McFarland claimed an easement by necessity, an easement implied from the Homestead Act, and an express easement under the terms of the Schoenberger land patent. McFarland also alleged the Park Service's denial of his request for a special use permit should be set aside under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. This Court originally dismissed McFarland's claims, concluding they were barred by the Quiet Title Act's twelve-year statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case back to this Court. McFarland v. Norton, 425 F.3d 724, 728 (9th Cir.2005) (). Both parties have moved for summary judgment on all of McFarland's claims.
Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If there is no genuine issue of material fact, the court must determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are drawn in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Summary judgement is a particularly appropriate tool for resolving claims challenging agency action under the APA. See Occidental Eng'g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir.1985). When a district court is reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, the administrative agency acts as the fact finder and the district court's role is limited to deciding the legal question of whether the agency could reasonably have found the facts as it did. Id.
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