McFarland v. Sikes

• Decision Date: 02 April 1886
• Citation: 7 A. 408,54 Conn. 250
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MCFARLAND v. SIKES.

7 A. 408

54 Conn. 250

MCFARLAND

v. SIKES.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 2, 1886.

Action on promissory note. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict rendered for plaintiff. The defendant appealed, on the ground of certain instructions alleged to have been erroneously given by the court. The facts are stated in the opinion.

C. H. Briscoe and J. P. Andreios, (with whom was D. Marcy,) for appellant.

J. L. Hunter and B. H. Bill, for appellee.

PARK, C. J. This is a suit upon a note of $300. On the trial in the court below the defendant offered evidence to prove, and claimed to have proved, that, previously to the execution and delivery of the note, the plaintiff, who was a grand juror of the town of Ellington, where the defendant resided, and was acting as the attorney of one Mary Quinn, accused the defendant of having made an assault upon the person of the said Mary, and threatened him with a criminal prosecution unless he settled with her for the injury; that the defendant thereupon admitted that he had done wrong in the matter, and offered $100 to settle it; that the plaintiff demanded $300, which the defendant was unwilling to pay; that the defendant was without counsel, and asked to be allowed till the following Tuesday to consider the matter, and offered to give his note for $300, to be held by the plaintiff till then, and, if he did not then appear, to be held by the plaintiff as a settlement for the injury to the said Mary, but, if he should appear, to be returned to him to be canceled; that thereupon the plaintiff wrote the note in suit, which the defendant executed and delivered to the plaintiff, to be held by him upon the conditions stated; and that the defendant at the same time declared that he should appear and demand a return of the note. The defendant also offered evidence that on the following Tuesday he appeared before the parties, and demanded the return of the note, but that the plaintiff refused to surrender it.

With reference to this evidence the defendant requested the court to charge the jury "that if the note was delivered to the plaintiff with the understanding between him and the defendant that it was to be delivered up to the latter on his demand on the Tuesday following, and the defendant demanded its return on that day, the plaintiff cannot recover, and the verdict must be for the defendant." The court did not so charge the jury, but substantially that, if they should find all the facts claimed by the defendant to be proved, they did not constitute a defense to the action.

We think the court erred in refusing to charge as requested, and in charging as it did. The error was in applying to the case the familiar and well-established rule that parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary a written contract. A written contract must be in force as a binding obligation to make it subject to this rule. Such a contract cannot become a binding obligation until it has been delivered. Its delivery may be absolute or conditional. If the latter, then it does not become a binding obligation until the condition upon...