McFarlane v. Harry's Nurses Registry
| Decision Date | 07 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | 17-CV-6350 (PKC) (PK) |
| Parties | MARJORIE MCFARLANE, VELMA PALMER, and CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Plaintiffs, v. HARRY'S NURSES REGISTRY, HARRY'S HOMECARE, INC., and HARRY DORVILIER, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Plaintiffs Marjorie McFarlane, Velma Palmer, and Claire Williams brought this action against Defendants Harry's Nurses Registry and Harry's HomeCare, Inc. (collectively, the "Corporate Defendants") and pro se Defendant Harry Dorvilier for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and New York Labor Law ("NYLL"). On April 2, 2020, the Court granted judgment in favor of Plaintiffs as to Defendants' liability on some of Plaintiffs' claims—namely, their claims for unpaid wages, overtime pay, and liquidated damages under the FLSA and NYLL. McFarlane v. Harry's Nurses Registry, 2020 WL 1643781, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2020) ("Liability Decision"). Plaintiffs now move for summary judgment as to damages with respect to those claims. Defendants have not opposed the motion.1 As discussed below, Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment as to damages in a total amount of $59,587, representing $29,793.50 in unpaid wages and overtime pay and $29,793.50 in liquidated damages.
Harry's Nurses Registry ("Harry's Nurses"), which also does business as Harry's HomeCare, Inc. ("Harry's HomeCare"), is a corporation with its principal place of business in Jamaica, New York. McFarlane, 2020 WL 1643781, at *1. Defendant Dorvilier is the sole owner of Harry's Nurses and has worked there since its incorporation in 1991. Id. Harry's Nurses refers temporary healthcare personnel, including Licensed Practical Nurses ("LPNs"), to work in patients' private homes in and around New York City. Id.
Plaintiffs are LPNs who were employed by Harry's Nurses during the period from February 2016 to mid-November 2017 (in addition to other times not at issue here). Id. at *2. Between February 2016 and mid-November 2017, Plaintiffs were normally paid an hourly rate of $19.00 when they worked under 40 hours per week. (Plaintiffs' Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts2 ( ), Dkt. 66-2, ¶¶ 1, 13, 63.) When they worked more than 40 hours in a week, however, Plaintiffs were paid at a rate lower than $19.00 for the first 40 hours, and then at a rate 1.5 times the lower rate for any hours thereafter, such that their overall wages generally equaled $19.00 per hour despite working overtime. (See McFarlane Paystubs, Dkt. 66-8; PalmerPaystubs, Dkt. 66-9; Williams Paystubs, Dkt. 66-10.) See generally McFarlane, 2020 WL 1643781, at *2-3. For example, in weeks where Plaintiff McFarlane worked 48 hours, she was typically paid $17.54 per hour for the first 40 hours and $26.31 per hour (equal to $17.54 x 150%) for the next 8 hours, for a total of $912.08 in gross pay (or approximately $19.00 per hour). (See, e.g., McFarlane Paystubs, Dkt. 66-8, at ECF3 22-23, 28, 42, 63-64, 73-74.) Similarly, in weeks where McFarlane worked 60 hours, she was typically paid $16.29 per hour for the first 40 hours and $24.44 per hour ($16.29 x 150%) for the next 20 hours, for a total of $1,140.20 in gross pay (or approximately $19.00 per hour). (See, e.g., id. at ECF 60, 62, 71-72.) Plaintiffs Palmer's and Williams's wages exhibit the same pattern. (See, e.g., Palmer Paystubs,4 Dkt. 66-9, at ECF 30-31, 55-56, 67-68; Williams Paystubs, Dkt. 66-10, at ECF 10-11, 33-34, 47-48.)
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants on November 1, 2017. McFarlane, 2020 WL 1643781, at *4. Defendants were initially represented by counsel, but Defendants' counsel eventually was allowed to withdraw after "a breakdown in communication and understanding" between counsel and Defendant Dorvilier. Id. (quoting Affidavit of Michael K. Chong, Esq., Dkt. 16-1, ¶ 2). Thereafter, Dorvilier continued to proceed pro se, and the Corporate Defendants failed to appear, plead, or otherwise respond to the Complaint. Id. After the Clerk of Court entered a Certificate of Default as to the Corporate Defendants, Plaintiffs moved for default judgment, which the Corporate Defendants did not oppose. Id. Plaintiffs also moved for summary judgment as to Dorvilier. Id. Briefing on the summary judgment motion finished on September 25, 2019. Id.
On April 2, 2020, the Court partially granted Plaintiffs' motions for default judgment and for summary judgment. See id. at *18. In particular, the Court granted Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion as to Defendant Dorvilier's liability under the FLSA and NYLL for unpaid wages, overtime pay, and liquidated damages. Id. The Court also granted Plaintiffs' motion for default judgment against the Corporate Defendants with respect to liability for unpaid wages, overtime pay, and liquidated damages under the FLSA and NYLL. Id. at *18. The Court, however, denied summary judgment on the issue of damages as to Defendant Dorvilier, and deferred awarding damages as to the Corporate Defendants, because Plaintiffs had based their damages claim on a regular hourly pay rate of $25.00, and the Court found that there was a genuine factual dispute regarding whether Plaintiffs were entitled to be paid at such a rate. Id. at *12, *18. Nevertheless, finding "no dispute that [Plaintiffs] were, in fact, regularly paid at the hourly rate of $19.00 starting in February 2016," id. at *9, the Court "encourage[d] Plaintiffs to consider pursuing, via a supplemental summary judgment motion, damages using a regular rate of pay of $19.00/hour and overtime rate of $28.50/hour, rather than proceeding to trial on damages," id. at *19.
Plaintiffs have now filed a supplemental motion for summary judgment, requesting damages based on a regular pay rate of $19.00/hour and overtime rate of $28.50/hour. (Plaintiffs' Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment ( ), Dkt. 66; see also Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law ( ), Dkt. 66-1 Accordingly, they request $29,983.42 in total unpaid wages and overtime pay; $29,983.42 in liquidated damages; and an unspecified amount in statutory interest, penalties, and attorney's fees and expenses. ( Defendant Dorvilier has not responded to Plaintiffs' motion, despite a sua sponte extension of time in which to do so. (See 7/8/2020 Docket Order.)
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986) (). A dispute of fact is "genuine" if "the [record] evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The moving party bears the initial burden of "establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact." Zalaski v. City of Bridgeport Police Dep't, 613 F.3d 336, 340 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). Once this initial burden is met, the nonmoving party then must put forward some evidence showing there is a dispute of fact that requires a trial. Spinelli v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 160, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. Even where a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, the court must still "examin[e] the moving party's submission to determine if it has met its burden of demonstrating that no material issue of fact remains for trial," and that it "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotations omitted); accord Amaker v. Foley, 274 F.3d 677, 680-81 (2d Cir. 2001).
Under the FLSA, an employer must pay employees at least the statutory minimum wage and, for non-exempt employees, a premium of 150% of the regular rate of pay for hours worked above 40 hours per week. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)(1); accord McFarlane, 2020 WL 1643781,at *5. For all intents and purposes in this case, the provisions of the NYLL mirror the FLSA's. See McFarlane, 2020 WL 1643781, at *8. The Court has already determined that Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs under the FLSA and NYLL for unpaid wages and overtime pay. Id. at *15, *18. Moreover, "there is no dispute that [Plaintiffs] were . . . regularly paid at the hourly rate of $19.00 starting in February 2016." Id. at *9. Accordingly, the only remaining issue is the amount of Plaintiffs' damages. Plaintiffs "need only present sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of the uncompensated work as a matter of just and reasonable inference." Kuebel v. Black & Decker, Inc., 643 F.3d 352, 362 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation omitted). Indeed, it is "well settled" that Plaintiffs may meet their burden "through estimates based on [their] own recollection." Id. (citations omitted).
Each Plaintiff has submitted her paystubs and timesheets for the period between February 2016 and October 2017, along with a declaration to fill in any gaps and describe work from the end of October 2017 to the middle of November 2017 for which none of the Plaintiffs were paid at all. (Declaration of Marjorie McFarlane ("McFarlane Decl."), Dkt. 66-5; McFarlane Paystubs, Dkt. 66-8; Declaration of Velma Palmer ("Palmer Decl."), Dkt. 66-6; Palmer Paystubs, Dkt. 66-9; Declaration of Claire Williams ("Williams Decl."), Dkt. 66-7; Williams Paystubs, Dkt. 66-10.) Based on these paystubs, timesheets, and declarations, Plaintiffs claim unpaid wages and overtime pay totaling $29,983.42—broken...
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