McGarvey v. Young

• Decision Date: 11 October 1926
• Citation: 134 A. 744
• Parties: McGARVEY v. YOUNG et al.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

134 A. 744

McGARVEY

v. YOUNG et al.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Oct. 11, 1926.

Suit by John M. McGarvey against Charles W. Young and others. On motion to dismiss bill of complaint. Bill dismissed.

See, also, 128 A. 231; 98 N. J. Eq. 343, 129 A. 199.

Cassman & Gottlieb, of Atlantic City, for complainant.

Emerson Richards and John C. Reed, both of Atlantic City, and Ruby R. Vale, of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.

INGERSOLL, Vice Chancellor. On December 27, 1923, John N. McGarvey filed a bill in this court against Charles W. Young and the International Speedway Association, a corporation, in which he alleged that the International Speedway Association had entered into an agreement with the defendant Young by which it agreed to sell certain lands therein described to said Young. This agreement is attached to the bill of complaint as Exhibit A. It alleged that Young was complainant's agent in procuring said agreement, and that Young had acted only as agent and for benefit solely of complainant; that Young had fraudulently repudiated the contract with complainant.

The prayer of the bill, in addition to those praying for answer and subpoenas, was:

"That it be decreed that, in procuring the agreement referred to in the bill, the defendant Young was acting as agent for complainant, that he holds said agreement in trust for complainant, that he has no interest, legal or equitable, in the same or the lands and premises described, that he be commanded to assign, transfer, and set over said agreement to complainant, and that the International Speedway Association be required to execute and deliver a deed to complainant for the lands and premises described in the agreement, upon complainant's complying with the terms and conditions thereof, and that complainant may have such other and general relief as may be agreeable to equity."

Answer and replication were filed, hearing was had, and opinion was filed in which this court held:

"Should the complainant accept a decree for the repayment of the money advanced by him in the enterprise, such decree will be advised, otherwise the bill must be dismissed."

In accordance therewith, a final decree dismissing the bill was advised on October 4, 1924. An appeal was taken, with the result that the decree was affirmed, May 18, 1925. 98 N. J. Eq. 343, 129 A. 199.

On September 4, 1925, the complainant (by other counsel than those who represented him in the former suit) filed a bill in which he, in much greater detail, alleged the facts set forth in the former bill. The same agreement is attached to the bill of complaint and marked Exhibit H.

In said bill it is averred that title of the International Speedway Association has been conveyed to one Safford, and by Safford to Young. The International Speedway Association is therefore not made a party defendant. The bill also alleged that Young and his wife conveyed said premises to Max Grossman and Alfred W. Westney, and that they hold said property in trust for Young. Grossman and Westney and their wives have therefore been made party defendants.

The prayers of the bill, in addition to those for answer and subpoena, are:

"(2) That it may be determined that the said Max Grossman and Shirley, his wife, and Alfred W. Westney and Laura, his wife, hold said property as trustees for complainant under a resulting trust, or, in the alternative, for the said Charles W. Young and the complainant as joint adventurers, and that the rights and interests of the said Charles W. Young and the complainant may be fixed and determined, or, in the alternative, to secure to complainant the repayment, to complainant of the amount of money invested by complainant in said lands and premises and the sum of $25,000 with interest, as the value of complainant's interest in said joint adventure.

"(3) That complainant may have such other and further relief as may be proper."

In the former bill, the complainant, in clause 6, said:

"The action of said Young is a fraud upon complainant and an attempt to deprive complainant of his rights in the agreement, which was procured while said Young was acting solely as agent for complainant."

The defendant moved to dismiss the bill because: (a) That a previous proceeding estops the complainant from proceeding in this cause; (b) that the decree in the former action was res adjudieata as to the present action; (c) that the complainant's case is within the statute of frauds.

After hearing arguments, the motion was denied and the defendants were given time to tile answer. The reason impelling me to deny this motion was that there was nothing before me to prove the facts alleged in the motion; the motion, of course, being upon the facts stated in the bill.

The defendants then filed an answer by way of plea in which they set forth the pleadings in the previous case, the appeal and the opinion of the Court of Errors and Appeals, and alleging res adjudieata, with prayer for dismissal.

Replication is filed admitting the pleadings in the previous case, but denying res adjudicata and alleging new parties. A reply is filed presenting not only the pleadings in, but the testimony in, the previous hearing. Motion is now made to dismiss the bill.

The Court of Errors and Appeals, in Re Walsh Estate, SO N. J. Eq. 565, on page 569, 74 A. 563, 565, said:

"The doctrine of res adjudieata has been clearly defined in this state, and it is the law 'that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction on a question of law or fact, or on a question of mixed law and fact, once litigated and determined, is, so long as it remains unreversed, conclusive upon the parties and their privies, not only as to the particular property involved in the suit in which it is pronounced, but as to all future litigation between the same parties or their privies, touching the subject-matter, though the property involved in the subsequent litigation is different from that which was involved in the first. All that is required in cases where the prior and subsequent litigations involve different things, to render the judgment in the first conclusive upon the parties in the subsequent, is that there shall be substantial identity in the subject-matter of the two, and that must always be the case, as is obvious where the judgment in the first rests on a decision of the same question substantially which is presented for decision by the subsequent.' City of Paterson v. Raker, 51 N. J. Eq. (6 Dick.) 57 (26 A. 327). All that is necessary is that the right to relief in the one suit shall rest upon the same point or question which, in essence and substance, was litigated and determined in the first suit, and in such a case the parties and those in privity with them are concluded, 'not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.' Id., 51 N. J. Eq. (6 Dick.) 53 (26 A. 325); Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S. 351, 352, 24 L. Ed. 195.

"'Where the second action is upon a different claim or demand, but between the same parties, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered. City of Paterson v. Baker, 51 N. J. Eq. (6 Dick.) 54. See, also, Mershon v. Williams, 63 N. J. Law (34 Vroom) 401 (44 A. 211); Clark Thread Co. v. William Clark Co., 55 N. J. Eq. (10 Dick.) 662 (37 A. 599); Mercer County Traction Co. v. U. R. R. & Co., 64 N. J. Eq. (19 Dick.) 594 (54 A. 819). The judgment is final between the parties as to all defenses which were or could have been set up in the earlier suit. Thompson v. Williamson, 67 N. J. Eq. (1 Robb.) 212, 214 (58 A. 602). 'It is not necessary that the action in which the judgment is found, and that in which it is relied on as an estoppel, should be of the...