McGee v. Baumgartner

• Decision Date: 19 September 1899
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: McGEE v. BAUMGARTNER.

80 N.W. 21

121 Mich. 287

McGEE v. BAUMGARTNER.

Supreme Court of Michigan

September 19, 1899

Error to circuit court, Wayne county; William L. Carpenter, Judge.

Suit by Rosanna McGee against Anthony Baumgartner and others. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant Baumgartner brings error. Affirmed.

This is an action of libel. The libelous article complained of consists of a letter written by defendant Giller to Rev Frederick J. Baumgartner, a brother of defendant Baumgartner and secretary and chancellor of the diocese of the Roman Catholic Church of Detroit. It is unnecessary to state the substance of the article. This is fortunate, for the charges are of too vile a character to put in print, unless absolutely necessary to an understanding of the case. Giller is a son-in-law of defendant Baumgartner, and Sullivan is the brother of the plaintiff. Plaintiff and her husband were, and had been for some time, employed in Mt. Olivet Cemetery by the superintendent, and occupied a house belonging to the cemetery company. Sullivan and Giller had both been discharged by the superintendent of the cemetery. Giller and Sullivan went to defendant B. and made a statement to him of the acts of plaintiff, McGee, and her husband, mentioned in the letter, and requested him to accompany them to the bishop's residence, and introduce them, so that they could bring the misconduct of the plaintiff and her husband before the bishop. The three went together to the bishop's residence, and defendant B. introduced the others to his brother, the chancellor, in the absence of the bishop. Giller and Sullivan then stated to the chancellor the substance of their complaints. He advised them to put it in writing, so that it might be placed before the proper authorities in a proper manner. They went away. Defendant B then wrote the letter to be signed by Giller. Giller and Sullivan could not write, and defendant Baumgartner signed Giller's name to the letter, and, after keeping it some days, took it to the chancellor, and it was laid before the board of trustees. McGee was discharged. Plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment for $1,000, which, upon a motion for a new trial, was reduced to $500.

William Look and Ira G. Humphrey, for appellant.

Edwin Henderson, for appellee.

GRANT C.J. (after stating the facts).

1. The circuit court instructed the jury, at the request of defendant's counsel, that the letter was a privileged communication, presumed to have been written without malice that plaintiff could not recover against defendant B. unless they were satisfied, not only of the falsehoods of the contents of the letter, but that B. was actuated by malice or ill will towards the plaintiff when he wrote the letter; that, unless the statements in the letter were both false and expressly malicious on the part of B., they should acquit him; that if the jury found that B. believed the statements made to him by Giller and Sullivan to be true, and merely acted as a penman to put them in writing to be laid before the chancellor, in order that an investigation might be made, they should acquit him, unless they found that he was actuated at the time by malice towards plaintiff or her husband; and that if they found that he acted in good faith in writing the letter, believing that the statements made to him by Giller and Sullivan were true, and that he had no malice or ill will, they should acquit. They only objection raised to these instructions is that there was no testimony to show malice on the part of B., and therefore the court should, as requested, have directed a verdict for him. There is testimony tending to show that B. knew that Giller and Sullivan were not acting in the interest of good morals, but were taking this course because they attributed their discharges to plaintiff's husband, and desired to 'get even' with him by procuring his discharge. B. lived, and had for some time, a near neighbor to Mr. and Mrs. McGee. He testified that he had heard nothing and knew nothing against their characters until these charges were made by Giller and Sullivan. With his plea he served notice of justification, and 'that the matters alleged as libelous in said declaration were of common report, and that such reports had previously and often come to the knowledge of said defendant, and that said words were and are true as therein set forth.' He also...