McGee v. Inch
| Decision Date | 16 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO.: 1:19-cv-23934-GAYLES/REID |
| Parties | MICHAEL MCGEE, Petitioner, v. MARK INCH, Secretary of the Department of Corrections, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Petitioner Michael McGee's pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the "Petition") brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [ECF No. 1].1 Pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings, the Court "must promptly examine" the Petition upon receipt from the Clerk of Court. Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings, R. 4. The Court has reviewed the Petition and the record and is otherwise full advised. For the reasons that follow, the Petition is denied.
Petitioner Michael McGee is currently incarcerated at Sumter Correctional Institution in Bushnell, Florida, and serving a term of imprisonment pursuant to his jury conviction of two counts of sexual battery in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida in Case No. F11-1911. [ECF No. 1 at 1].
In this federal habeas matter, Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his state court conviction, claiming that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) his right to due process was violated when he was denied counsel for an evidentiary hearing in his state court collateral challenge; (3) the prosecution committed discovery violations; (4) the state court was prejudiced and biased against him; and (5) the state court erred in admitting Williams2 Rule evidence against him, and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge its use. [ECF No. 1 at 5, 7, 8, 10, 12].
On November 25, 2019, Respondent filed a Response in opposition to the Petition. [ECF No. 11]. Respondent argues that while Claims 1, 2, 3, and 5 are timely and properly exhausted, they should be denied on the merits. Id. Respondent also argues that Claim 4 should be dismissed because Petitioner never filed an appeal of the claim in state court, and it is thus procedurally defaulted. Id. On January 7, 2020, Petitioner filed his Reply. [ECF No. 21].
This Court may only entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus from a "person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Further, a federal habeas petition may not be granted unless "the applicant has exhausted the remedies available" in state court prior to filing the federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Even then, "the availability of federal habeas relief is limited with respect to claims previously 'adjudicated on the merits' in state-court proceedings." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 92 (2011) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). "By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2)." Id. at 98. As for the statecourt's factual findings, they "shall be presumed to be correct" and a petitioner seeking to rebut this presumption must do so "by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Prevatte v. French, 547 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2008).
Under § 2254(d), the Court may grant habeas relief from the state court judgment only if the state court's decision on the merits of the federal claim was: (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented" in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The burden of proof lies with the petitioner, who must show entitlement to relief. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam)).
"A decision is 'contrary to' clearly established federal law if the state court applied a rule that contradicts governing Supreme Court precedent, or if it reached a different conclusion than the Supreme Court did in a case involving materially indistinguishable facts." James v. Warden, 957 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)). "A state court decision involves an 'unreasonable application' of clearly established federal law if the court identifies the correct legal principle but applies it unreasonably to the facts before it." Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13). "Deciding whether a state court's decision involved an unreasonable application of federal law . . . requires the federal habeas court to train its attention on the particular reasons—both legal and factual—why state courts rejected a state prisoner's federal claims, . . . and to give appropriate deference to that decision . . . ." Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1191-92 (2018) (quotation marks and citations omitted). This standard is "highly deferential" and "demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt . . . ." Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181 (quoting Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24).
"The question under AEDPA [Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996] is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold." James, 957 F.3d at 1190-91 (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)). "A state court's application of clearly established federal law or its determination of the facts is unreasonable only if no 'fairminded jurist' could agree with the state court's determination or conclusion." Id. at 1191 (internal citations omitted) (quoting McNabb v. Comm'r Ala. Dep't of Corr., 727 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2013)).
Liberally construed, Petitioner argues in Claim 1 that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney: (1) failed to investigate potential defense evidence and eyewitnesses; (2) did not present evidence Petitioner gave him; (3) did not present defense eyewitnesses at trial; (4) failed to impeach state witnesses; and (5) "committed perjury at 3 hearings." [ECF No. 1 at 5]. Whether the Court treats Claim 1 as a single ineffective assistance of counsel claim or as five separate, but related, subclaims, it should be denied.
As stated above, this Court may grant relief from the state court judgment only if the state court's denial of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims were: (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law;" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As for the state court's factual determinations, they "shall be presumed to be correct" and Petitioner has the burdento rebut this presumption of correctness "by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Here, even liberally construed, Petitioner does not provide any argument as to how the state court's decisions denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claims were contrary to clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. Further, Petitioner does nothing to rebut the presumption of correctness of the state court's factual findings. On this basis alone, his claims should be denied. In his Reply, Petitioner attempts to remedy these deficiencies by stating the Court "only needs to view [Respondent's Exhibit N, which is Petitioner's Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 motion] to get a complete view of the totality of facts and details of these grounds." [ECF No. 21 at 2]. However, this is insufficient to meet Petitioner's burden to prove that the state court's decision denying his Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 motion was an unreasonable application of federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Here, Petitioner does neither, only stating in conclusory fashion that the state court's determination at the evidentiary hearing that his attorney's testimony was more credible than Petitioner's testimony was incorrect. [ECF No. 21 at 2]. This deficiency is fatal to Petitioner's claim because the standard under § 2254(d) "is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold." James, 957 F.3d at 1190-91 (quoting Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474).
Furthermore, if Petitioner seeks to challenge the state court's credibility determinations, he must rebut the presumption of correctness of those findings by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner does nothing to meet this substantially higher threshold required by § 2254(d), nor does he provide clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness in the state court's factual determinations. Even looking to the merits de novo,Petitioner's claim should be denied because he fails to demonstrate that both: (1) his counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984).3 In order to satisfy the prejudice requirement, Petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for his counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See id. at 694. The Petition does not discuss either of the required Strickland prongs, and all of Petitioner's allegations are at best bare and conclusory, which is insufficient to satisfy Strickland. See Boyd v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 697 F.3d 1320, 1333-34 (11th Cir. 2012).
For example, Petitioner does not identify any of the evidence or witnesses that his counsel should have called, nor does he...
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