McGee v. Inman

• Decision Date: 14 April 2022
• Docket Number: 4:22 CV 147 MTS
• Parties: KEVIN D. MCGEE, Plaintiff, v. JULIE INMAN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

KEVIN D. MCGEE, Plaintiff, v. JULIE INMAN, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:22 CV 147 MTS

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

April 14, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MATTHEW T. SCHELP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Kevin D. McGee for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. Doc. [2]. Having reviewed the motion, the Court finds that it should be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8^th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8^th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8^th Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8^th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8^th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

Background

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently in the custody of the Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center in Farmington, Missouri. According to plaintiff, he has been placed there due to a not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect plea entered in 1988. Doc. [1] at 4, 9. During his time in custody, he has been a frequent litigator in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Since 1997, plaintiff has filed at least seventeen petitions for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. All of these petitions have been denied and dismissed, either for a failure to exhaust state remedies, untimeliness, or for failure to comply with a court order.^[1] In addition, plaintiff has filed at least nine other civil actions, all of which have been dismissed pursuant to either 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) or Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).^[2]

The Complaint

On February 7, 2022, plaintiff submitted the instant complaint. He brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming Valerie Huhn, Julie Inman, and Denise Hacker as defendants. Doc. [1] at 1-3. The Court notes that Huhn's name appears only in the caption, while the names of Inman and Hacker appear only in the section of the form complaint for identifying the parties. Inman and Hacker are sued in their official capacities only, while plaintiff does not indicate the capacity in which he is suing Huhn. Id. at 2-3. The complaint appears to set forth allegations regarding a failure to protect.

In the “Statement of Claim, ” plaintiff asserts that three years ago, he woke up at 2:48 a.m. and went to relieve himself. Id. at 4. While doing so, he was attacked, giving him “severe trauma.” Plaintiff alleges that staff “would not let [him] roll back the tape to” identify his attacker. He asserts that since being “attacked, ” he has to sleep with “one eye open so it doesn't happen again.” Id. at 7.

This purported assault left plaintiff “in a state of shock, ” and he states that it took two years for his “left temple to heal up, ” and that there is still a scar. Id. at 5. As a result of this incident, plaintiff seeks “to go home to Vero [Beach], Florida.”

Attached to the complaint is a handwritten exhibit referring to something called “the TriLateral Commission, ” to which he attributes “murder for profit.” Doc. [1-1]. In the exhibit, he refers to Vice President Kamala Harris as a “witch, ” states that the “followers” of Chief Justice Paul C. Wilson “pray to Satan, ” and that the “followers” of President Biden “pray to...the Demon Roman Catholic” church.

On March 24, 2022, plaintiff filed a supplement to his complaint titled “Action on Bonds.” Doc. [3]. In the supplement, plaintiff refers to Missouri criminal procedure statutes regarding proceedings involving mental illness. However, the substance of the document relates to “suits on official bonds, ” and does not have any apparent relevance to his complaint. At the end of the supplement, though, plaintiff asserts that he wants “to sue the Eastern District of Missouri^[3] in the amount of $300, 000.00 for maliciousness, hexing [and] vexing” him for “a period of 14 years.”

Discussion

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, accusing defendants of failing to protect him while in the custody of the Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center. Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court has reviewed his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based on that review, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice.

A. Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff has sued all three defendants in their official capacities only.^[4] In an official capacity claim against an individual, the claim is actually “against the governmental entity itself.” See White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1075 (8^th Cir. 2017). Thus, a “suit against a public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit against the public employer.” Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8^th Cir. 1999). See also Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 800 (8^th Cir. 2018) (explaining that official capacity suit against sheriff and his deputy “must be treated as a suit against the County”); Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb., 813 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8^th Cir.2016) (stating that a “plaintiff who sues public employees in their official, rather than individual, capacities sues only the public employer”); and Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 986 (8^th Cir. 2006) (stating that a “suit against a public official in his official capacity is actually a suit against the entity for which the official is an agent”).

In this case, Huhn is the Director of the Missouri Department of Mental Health, Inman is alleged to be the “Chief Corporate Collective Officer” for the Department of Mental Health, and Hacker is asserted to be the “Chief [Executive] Officer” of the Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center. As such, the official capacity claims against them are treated as being made against the State of Missouri itself, their employer.

To the extent that plaintiff is seeking monetary damages, his claims fail because the State of Missouri is not a “person” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (explaining that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons' under § 1983”); Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 872 (8^th Cir. 2017) (explaining that a “State is not a person under § 1983”); and Kruger v. Nebraska, 820 F.3d 295, 301 (8^th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “a state is not a person for purposes of a claim for money damages under § 1983”). Additionally, such claims would be barred by sovereign immunity. See Andrus ex rel. Andrus v. Arkansas, 197 F.3d 953, 955 (8^th Cir. 1999) (“A claim for damages against a state employee in his official capacity is barred under the Eleventh Amendment”).

To the extent that plaintiff is seeking prospective injunctive relief, plaintiff has not established that the State of Missouri violated his constitutional rights due to an unconstitutional policy, custom, or failure to train. See Mick v. Raines, 883 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8^th Cir. 2018) (explaining that liability may attach to a governmental entity if the violation “resulted from (1) an official ...policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise”).

Furthermore the only injunctive relief plaintiff is seeking is his release from the custody of the Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center. However, plaintiff cannot seek such release pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Preiser v....