McGee v. Kuchenbaker
| Decision Date | 29 November 1966 |
| Citation | 32 Wis.2d 668,146 N.W.2d 387 |
| Parties | Lyle McGEE and Great Northern Insurance Company, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Aaron KUCHENBAKER and Heritage Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Robert R. Gavic, Spring Valley, for appellants.
Doar & Knowles, New Richarmond, for respondents.
The only issue raised is whether there is sufficient credible evidence to sustain the jury's finding that McGee was negligent in respect to speed. If McGee was negligent as to speed he forfeited his directional right-of-way as he approached the intersection. Sec. 346.18(1), Stats. 1965. In reviewing this question of the sufficiency of the evidence, we must accept the view of the evidence most favorable to the support of the verdict. Zartner v. Scopp (1965), 28 Wis.2d 205, 209, 137 N.W.2d 107; Heibel v. Voth (1955), 271 Wis. 350, 353, 73 N.W.2d 421; and Olson v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co. (1954), 266 Wis. 106, 109, 62 N.W.2d 549, 63 N.W.2d 740.
We think there is sufficient credible evidence to sustain the finding of the verdict that McGee was negligent in respect to speed. Both drivers lived in the area and were familiar with the hazards of this blind intersection. Although the speed limit on the crossroads was 65 miles per hour both drivers, because they were approaching an intersection and because of the inherent hazards existing, were required to limit their speed under subs. 346.57(2) and (3) Stats. Under sub. (2) no person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard for the actual and potential hazard then existing. Subsection (3) provides an operator of a vehicle, consistent with the requirements in sub. (2), shall drive at an appropriate reduced speed when approaching and corssing an intersection or when approaching a hillcrest or when special hazards exist in regard to other traffic. In Drake v. Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. (1963), 22 Wis.2d 56, 66a, 125 N.W.2d 391, 128 N.W.2d 41, we stated whether the standard for determining speed under sub. 346.57(3) was violated was to be determined on the facts of each case. While this section provides an operator must drive at an appropriate reduced speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, 'appropriate reduced speed' as used in this subsection is a relative standard and means less than the otherwise lawful speed. A person driving less than the posted speed might not be required to reduce his speed because he is already traveling at a reduced speed. Certainly a driver traveling five or ten miles an hour could hardly be expected to reduce his speed. What reduced speed is appropriate depends upon the particular facts in light of the speed a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would drive under the circumstances, so as to not subject himself or others or his or their property to an unreasonable risk of injury or damage.
Commencing at the bottom of the hill some 600 feet cast of the intersection and coming up the hill, McGee could not see the crossroad until he was almost at the intersection. The exact distance east of the intersection from which one can first see a vehicle on the crossroad coming from the south is not in the record. He testified that when he was 200 to 300 feet from the intersection coming up the incline he started gently braking from a speed of 40 miles per hour and entered the intersection at about 30 miles per hour. He stated he did not see Kuchenbaker coming from his left because he was looking to his right. This testimony of McGee as to his speed, of course, is not the most favorable to support the verdict and was rejected by the jury because approximately the same rate of speed on the part of Kuchenbaker was found by the jury not to be negligent. Kuchenbaker testified he took his foot off the accelerator some 300 to 500 feet from the intersection and had slowed down to 25 to 30 miles per hour when he entered the intersection.
The evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict lies not in the testimony of McGee but in the reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the damage to the vehicles, from their location in the intersection area after the accident, and from skid marks attributable to McGee's car. In Pagel v. Kees (1964), 23 Wis.2d 462, 467, 127 N.W.2d 816, we said a jury could consider physical facts after the accident including the position of the vehicles and their damage as a basis for...
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Millonig v. Bakken, 81-2158
...struck by another vehicle even at a low speed barely in excess of five miles an hour may be substantial. See, McGee v. Kuchenbaker, 32 Wis.2d 668, 673, 146 N.W.2d 387 (1966). Hence, the jury, viewing the physical facts, including the damage to the cars--Bakken's car sustained a cracked gril......
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