Mcgill v. Ben Fish

Decision Date29 October 2010
Docket NumberNo. 08-1890.,08-1890.
Citation790 N.W.2d 113
PartiesCasey MCGILL; Ginger L. McGill; Ashlea D. McGill; and Casey McGill, as Parent and Next Best Friend of Amanda R. McGill, Alicia C. McGill, and Allison C. McGill, Minors, Appellees, v. Ben FISH, Thomas Vine, Mark Newton, Robert Selby, and Steven Shaffer, Appellants.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Joanne Moeller, Assistant Attorney General, for appellants.

Donald G. Beattie and Ryan T. Beattie of Beattie Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.

CADY, Justice.

In this appeal, we must decide whether a personal injury claim based on gross negligence brought by a state employee against coemployees is a common law action subject to the administrative provisions of the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA) or whether it is an action under Iowa Code section 85.20 (2009) 1 not subject to the requirements of the Act. The district court found the plaintiffs were not required to comply with the exhaustion requirements of the ITCA and denied the motion to dismiss filed by the State for failing to exhaust administrative remedies. The State sought, and we granted, interlocutory review. On our review, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand the case for dismissal of the claims against the state employees.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Casey McGill was employed by the water works department of the University of Iowa in 2006. He filed a lawsuit in the Iowa district court for personal injuries allegedly suffered while performing maintenance at the physical plant on August 31, 2006. His wife and minor children joined him as plaintiffs in the lawsuit. McGill and his family asserted a negligence claim against the manufacturer of the treatment system at the plant, as well as other known and unknown defendants associated with the treatment process of the plant. The McGills also included a gross negligence claim against five coemployees of the University of Iowa. The McGills claimed the coemployees were supervisors who failed to properly train McGill on working with hazardous materials and to provide him with protective clothing and equipment.

The State filed a motion to dismiss the claims against the five coemployees. It asserted the petition against the coemployees constituted a claim against the State under the ITCA. Consequently, the State argued the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction over the gross negligence claim against the coemployees because the McGills failed to exhaust the administrative procedures under the Act by filing a claim with the State prior to filing their claim for gross negligence in district court against the five state employees.

The McGills responded to the motion by arguing that their coemployee gross negligence claim was expressly authorized by Iowa Code section 85.20(2) and constituted an exception to the requirements of the ITCA as a claim brought by an employee under the workers' compensation law. See Iowa Code § 669.14(5). They also argued that a requirement that a state employee choosing to sue a coemployee must first file an administrative claim with the state pursuant to the tort claims act would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. The McGills did not dispute the absence of an administrative claim filed with the State. They also did not contest the authority of the State to file the motion to dismiss on the ground that the district court lacked jurisdiction.

The district court denied the motion to dismiss. It found the action for gross negligence against the five state employees constituted a claim under Iowa Code section 85.20 and was not subject to the provisions of the ITCA. The State sought, and we granted, interlocutory review.

II. Standard of Review.

The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is reviewed for errors at law. Geisler v. City Council of Cedar Falls, 769 N.W.2d 162, 165 (Iowa 2009). We accept as true the facts alleged in the petition and typically do not consider facts contained in either the motion to dismiss or any of its accompanying attachments. 2 Id. To the extent that we review constitutional claims, our review is de novo. State v. Taeger, 781 N.W.2d 560, 564 (Iowa 2010).

III. Iowa Tort Claims Act.

Generally, the State may be sued for damage caused by the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of state employees while acting within the scope of employment to the same extent that a private person may be sued. Iowa Code § 669.2(3)( a ); see also Magers-Fionof v. State, 555 N.W.2d 672, 674 (Iowa 1996) (recognizing the ITCA permits an injured party to recover damages for the negligent or wrongful acts of state employees ‘where the state, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage’ (quoting Iowa Code § 669.2(3)( a ) (1995))). The state employees who engage in the negligent or wrongful conduct that gives rise to the lawsuit may also be personally sued. See id. § 669.2(3)( b ) (defining claims against coemployees). Yet, as long as the employee was acting within the scope of employment at the time of the incident at the center of the lawsuit, the suit is deemed to be an action against the state. 3 Id. § 669.5(2). Once a lawsuit against a coemployee is deemed to be an action against the state under the ITCA, the state is substituted as a defendant in place of the coemployee in the event the state was not already a named defendant. Id. Furthermore, the state is normally required to indemnify the employee against any claim. Id. § 669.21.

Lawsuits against the state were first authorized in 1965 when the legislature waived its sovereign immunity by enacting the Iowa Tort Claims Act. See 1965 Iowa Acts, ch. 79 (codified at Iowa Code ch. 25A (1966)). The Act gives the district court exclusive jurisdiction over such lawsuits. Iowa Code § 669.4. As a condition to waiving its immunity, the legislature established an administrative procedure for litigants to follow prior to commencing an action in the district court. Id. § 669.5. Although some portions of this procedure have been amended since the date of its enactment, the Act has always required a claim to be filed with an agency or department of the state before the lawsuit could be filed in district court. See Iowa Code §§ 25A.3, .5 (1966); id. § 669.5 (2009). The ITCA now requires a claim first be filed with the director of the department of management. Id. § 669.3(2). Among other things, the administrative process allows the state attorney general an opportunity to dispose of the claim through payment, settlement, or other disposition. Id. § 669.3(1). A lawsuit may not be filed in district court before a final disposition by the attorney general, unless the attorney general fails to dispose of the claim within six months and the claimant provides notice to the attorney general of the intent to withdraw the claim from further consideration. Id. § 669.5(1).

The procedural requirements of the ITCA are jurisdictional. Swanger v. State, 445 N.W.2d 344, 349-50 (Iowa 1989). The district court does not acquire subject matter jurisdiction over a claim unless the administrative procedures have been exhausted. Id. A claim must be dismissed if the district court has no subject matter jurisdiction. Feltes v. State, 385 N.W.2d 544, 549 (Iowa 1986).

The claim brought by the McGills against the five state employees falls within the definition of a “claim” under the ITCA. See Iowa Code § 669.2(3)( b ) (including in the definition of a claim against the state [a]ny claim against an employee of the state for money ... on account of personal injury ... caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission [of the state employee] ... while acting within the scope of ... employment”); see also Unertl v. Bezanson, 414 N.W.2d 321, 326-27 (Iowa 1987) (recognizing gross negligence is not a distinct cause of action but a measure of conduct in a cause of action for negligence). Thus, the McGills' claim is subject to the administrative exhaustion requirements of the ITCA unless it falls under an enumerated exception within the Act.

The ITCA provides numerous exceptions from its provisions. Iowa Code § 669.14. One type of claim excepted from the provisions of the Act is: “Any claim by an employee of the state which is covered by the Iowa workers' compensation law or the Iowa occupational disease law, chapter 85A.” Id. § 669.14(5).

Without directly interpreting the operative language of section 669.14(5), the district court took the position that coemployee gross negligence claims are excepted from the ITCA as claims under the workers' compensation laws. The McGills argue this same point on appeal. They claim gross negligence claims fall under the workers' compensation law because section 85.20 excludes coemployee gross negligence claims from the exclusivity provisions of the workers' compensation law over claims by injured workers. See id. § 85.20(2).

As asserted by the State, the issue on appeal involves statutory interpretation. As such, the statute in dispute is our starting point in the resolution of the issue. The question is whether the legislature intended to exclude state employee claims based on gross negligence of coemployees from the ITCA by excepting claims by state employees “covered by the Iowa workers' compensation law.”

We do not search for legislative intent beyond the express language of a statute when that language is plain and the meaning is clear. Voss v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 621 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Iowa 2001). When the language is unambiguous, it expresses the intent of the legislature that can otherwise be obscured by ambiguous language in a statute. Consequently, our starting point in statutory interpretation is to determine if the language has a plain and clear meaning within the context of the circumstances presented by the dispute. State v. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Iowa 2006). We only apply the...

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