McGill v. Koros, LLC
| Decision Date | 14 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL JKB-20-03191 |
| Parties | DARIN MCGILL, et al. Plaintiffs, v. KOROS, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
In this case, Plaintiffs Darin McGill, Sally McGill, Nicholas McGill Thomas Marks, Sylvia Bimbo, F.M., H.M., Bobby Petro, Fernanda Wandemberg, - Priscilla Petro, N.M., and Michael Demetro bring claims against Defendants Koros, LLC d/b/a Double T Diner, Koros, Inc., Tie Mortos, Inc., and TJL, Inc. for allegedly discriminatory conduct in violation of federal and state law. Now pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16) and Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Surreply (ECF No. 28). Both motions are fully briefed, and no hearing is required. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons set forth below Defendants' Motion will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART and Plaintiffs' Motion will be DENIED.
J. Background[1]
Plaintiffs are Gypsies and congregants of the God is Able Ministries church, a member of the God's Gypsy Christian Church Assembly. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-22, ECF No. 10.) Plaintiffs have dined at the Double T Diner in Pasadena Maryland ("Diner") "for years, without issue" and, during that time have "discussed their heritage and congregation with the staff through general conversation." (Id. ¶¶ 24, 34.)
On November 5, 2017, Darin McGill, Sally McGill, Nicholas McGill, Thomas Marks, Sylvia Bimbo, F.M., H.M., Bobby Petro Fernanda Wandemberg, Priscilla Petro, and N.M. (collectively, the "November 5 Plaintiffs") entered the Diner and requested to be seated. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 25.) The November 5 Plaintiffs allege that the Diner manager informed them that "they were not allowed to be seated at the restaurant, served and enjoy the Defendants' dining services." (Id. K 27.) They further allege that the manager stated that "they were being denied service because a member or members of Plaintiffs' congregation-a congregation based on the Gypsy race and religion-had disrespected the Diner which caused the ban of all congregation members to be placed into effect," although none of the Plaintiffs were "a part of the group that caused the ban, as confirmed by the manager." (Id. ffl 28-29.) The November 5 Plaintiffs then left the Diner. (Id. ¶ 32.)
On January 28, 2018, Plaintiff Michael Demetro and his family entered the Diner. (Id. ¶ 33.) Demetro alleges that the manager explained that he and his family were "not allowed to be seated at the restaurant, served, and enjoy the Defendants' dining services" and that "they were being denied service because they are Gypsies and they attend the God is Able Ministries church." (Id. ¶¶ 36, 38.) Demetro and his family then left the Diner. (Id. ¶ 40.) Demetro informed the November 5 Plaintiffs of the "continued ban." (Id. ¶ 41.) Plaintiffs allege that only members of their congregation were subject to this ban and that there was "no distinction between Plaintiffs who were denied service and the other patrons who were permitted to enter the restaurant, other than Plaintiff[s'] race and/or religion." (Id. ¶ 44.)
In May 2018, Plaintiffs "each filed" charges with the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights ("MCCR") against "Koros, LLC d/b/a/ Double T Diner" detailing the alleged discrimination ("MCCR Charges").[2] (Id., ¶ 50.) On or around May 27, 2018, Defendant TJL, Inc. filed a letter with the MCCR responding to the charges ("May 27 Letter"). (Id. ¶ 52.) In the May 27 Letter, TJL, Inc. explained that it was the owner of the Diner and that Plaintiffs had been banned because they were a part of "a 30-person group who were unruly and disturbed other patrons." (Id. ¶¶ 52-53.) Plaintiffs allege that they did not receive the May 27 Letter and that, instead, Plaintiffs' counsel received an email from the MCCR summarizing it. (Id. ¶ 55.) On or about May 3, 2019, Plaintiffs' counsel also received an email from the MCCR explaining that the Diner had offered the Plaintiffs a $200 gift card to use at the Diner. (Id. ¶ 57.) On or about August 19, 2019, the MCCR issued its findings ("MCCR Findings").[3] (Id. ¶ 58.)
On November 4, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Koros, LLC d/b/a Double T Diner, Koros, Inc., and Tie Mortos, Inc. (Compl., ECF No. 1.), which was subsequently amended on January 12, 2021 to add TJL, Inc. as a defendant and to make certain substantive changes. (See Am. Compl.). The four-count Amended Complaint brings claims for: violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count I); violation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. ("Title II") (Count II); negligent hiring and retention (Count III); and respondeat superior (Count IV), (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59-107.) Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees. (Id.)
II. Legal Standard[4]
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) governs motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). The Court may properly grant a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction "where a claim fails to allege facts upon which the court may base jurisdiction." Davis v. Thompson, 367 F.Supp.2d 792, 799 (D. Md. 2005).
When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must "accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Venkatraman v. REISys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005). To survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 446 U.S. at 662. A Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
III. Analysis
Defendants make several threshold arguments in support of their Motion to Dismiss: that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction as to Plaintiffs' Title II claims; that Koros, Inc., Koros, LLC, and Tie Mortos, Inc. are not the correct defendants; and that the November 5 Plaintiffs' claims against TJL, Inc. are untimely. Defendants also attack the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, arguing that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim with respect to their Title II and § 1981 claims. Finally, Defendants argue that, because the Court should dismiss all federal law claims, the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims.
This Court finds that the November 5 Plaintiffs' claims against TJL, Inc. are untimely and thus will be dismissed. However, Plaintiffs' remaining claims will not be dismissed.
As to Defendants' threshold arguments, the Court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction with respect to Plaintiffs' Title II claims and that it is premature to dismiss claims as to Koros, Inc., Koros, LLC, or Tie Mortos, Inc. at this stage. However, the November 5 Plaintiffs' claims against TJL, Inc. are untimely and will be dismissed.
The Court's subject matter jurisdiction in this case is facially straightforward. Plaintiffs' federal claims (Counts I and II) are based on § 1981 and Title II; the Court therefore has federal question jurisdiction over those claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Title II also independently grants the Court jurisdiction. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6. Jurisdiction over the state law claims (Counts III and IV) is predicated on the Court's supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Defendants do not dispute any of these jurisdictional predicates.
Defendants, however, argue that Plaintiffs' Title II claims should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs did not provide adequate notice of their claims against Defendants to the MCCR. (Mot. Dismiss Mem. Supp. at 16-18.) Title II contains a notice requirement, which provides that "no civil action may be brought... before the expiration of thirty days after written notice of such alleged act or practice has been given to the appropriate State or local authority." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(c). However, this notice requirement constitutes a mandatory claim-processing rule, rather than a jurisdictional bar to Plaintiffs' Title II claims.
Interpreting similar statutory text and structure, the United States Supreme Court has held that exhaustion for purposes of Title VII is more properly considered a "mandatory claim-processing rule," rather than a jurisdictional requirement. Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S.Ct 1843, 1851-52 (2019) (abrogating Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd, 551 F.3d 297 (4th. Cir. 2009)). In concluding that exhaustion in a Title VII case is not a jurisdictional requirement, the Supreme Court explained that "[f]ederal courts exercise jurisdiction over Title VII actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331's grant of general federal-question jurisdiction" and that "Title VIFs own jurisdictional provision" gives federal courts jurisdiction over Title VII cases. Id. at 1850, The Court further explained that "[s]eparate provisions of Title VII... contain the Act's charge-filing requirement" and that those "provisions do not speak to a court's authority ... or...
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