McGill v. Parsons

• Decision Date: 01 June 1976
• Docket Number: No. 75-2942,75-2942
• Citation: 532 F.2d 484
• Parties: Frederick McGILL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. James C. PARSONS et al., Defendants-Appellees. Summary Calendar. *
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 484

532 F.2d 484

Frederick McGILL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. James C. PARSONS et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 75-2942

Summary Calendar. ^*

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

June 1, 1976.

William M. Dawson, Jr., Edward Still, Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Charles H. Wyatt, Jr., Birmingham, Ala., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before BROWN, Chief Judge, GEWIN and MORGAN, Circuit Judges.

JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge:

This is an appeal from an order entered by the Trial Court on June 6, 1975 which vacated a previous order entered March 28, 1975 which certified the suit as a class action and set definite guidelines on how long a person arrested by Birmingham, Alabama police without a warrant may be held before he is accorded a probable cause hearing before a state magistrate. While we share the Trial Court's reluctance to establish definite time limits beyond which a prisoner cannot be held without being accorded a probable cause hearing, we must nevertheless reverse and remand for we cannot accept the five enumerated reasons which the Trial Court gave for rendering the order (App. 60-62). We further believe the plaintiffs' class should be entitled to appropriate relief because their complaint falls well within Gerstein v. Pugh, 1975, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 and our recent decision in Moss v. Weaver, 5 Cir., 1976, 525 F.2d 1258. ¹

Facts

Plaintiff-class representative, McGill, was arrested by Birmingham City police without a warrant on a possible charge of assault with intent to murder on July 13, 1974. He was placed in the city jail since the county jail normally does not receive city arrestees until a warrant is filed. He was not accorded a probable cause hearing before a state magistrate until about noon of July 16, 1974 at which time a warrant did issue and he was subsequently released on $500 bond on July 17, 1974. However, at 8:40 a. m. on July 16, during the time when plaintiff remained incarcerated without a warrant, he instituted suit on behalf of himself and others similarly situated under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1988 alleging that this detainment infringed upon various constitutional rights. As mentioned above, on March 28, 1975 the Court entered an order ² granting the plaintiff the equitable relief sought but on June 6, 1975 vacated that order and it is from the June 6 order that this appeal is taken. ³

Mootness

It is evident from the five enumerated reasons ⁴ which the trial court gave for vacating its previous order and dismissing the plaintiff's law suit, that this determination was based on the Trial Court's belief that the law suit was moot. This was an erroneous conclusion.

Reasons (1) through (3) of the order indicate that the Trial Court believed that dismissal was appropriate since no further complaints of unreasonable detention of prisoners had come to his attention since he had ordered the county to implement a system of timely probable cause hearings. But this sua sponte conclusion of the Trial Court was unwarranted because the March 28 order (see note 2, supra ) did not require the plaintiff to continue to present additional evidence of subsequent infringements of prisoners' constitutional rights once the injunction was entered. Moreover, there was no opportunity to do so and no request was made by the Court for the presentment of additional evidence. Also there was not an ongoing obligation on the part of the plaintiff to show the continued existence of the class.

The Court went too far too fast. This is not a sufficient basis for the Trial Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's law suit without according them a hearing to determine whether the new procedures whatever they may or may not be met the Gerstein requirements. Apparently the Trial Judge was influenced by some new administrative practices initiated by the county (not city) authorities as a result of his initial order (note 2, supra ). Just what the practice is, how official or how sufficient it might be is a complete unknown for there is not a stitch of actual facts about it in this record.

Finally, the Court erred in its fact-law conclusion (reason (5)) that the named plaintiff in the class action, Frederick McGill's claim was moot presumably because he had been released. Again we rely on Gerstein which held that this sort of claim was an exception to the general rule that when the class representative's claim is terminated the claim of the class is also moot. The Court made plain that since pretrial detention is by its nature temporary, it was unreasonable to require the named plaintiff's claim to survive until the time of trial or appeal. Since the pretrial detention which antedates a probable cause hearing will normally be terminated before the litigation process is begun the representative as well as the members of the class suffer repeated deprivations and therefore it would be unjust to deny review. ⁵

Thus we are at a loss to find any additional record support for the Trial Court's sua sponte conclusion that the class action should be dismissed and the Plaintiff had somehow become an improper representative in the time period between the Court's March 28 and June 6 orders. ⁶

Likewise, we have held that the disposition of the representative's Title VII claim after the institution of the class action does not moot the class suit. Jenkins v. United Gas Corporation, 5 Cir., 1968, 400 F.2d 28, 29-30. Here, as in Jenkins, we hold that the appropriateness of the class action should be judged at the time the suit is instituted, for as in Goode v. Rizzo, 3 Cir., 1974, 506 F.2d 542, 547 reversed on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, ----, 96 S.Ct. 598, 605, 46 L.Ed.2d 561, 565 (44 L.W. 4095, 4098 n. 7) the constitutional violations are likely to recur and in any event the named Plaintiff has suffered a wrong arising from his pre-hearing confinement and this claim is not extinguished by his release. See note 5, supra.

Similar mootness issues have arisen in other contexts. For instance, in Dunn v. Blumstein, 1972, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 the plaintiff challenged the Tennessee durational residency requirements for voting under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found no mootness problem even though the plaintiff had become eligible to vote by the time the District Court reached his challenge to the durational residency requirements. Similarly, in Roe v. Wade, 1973, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 the Supreme Court allowed a woman to challenge a state anti-abortion law although this challenge occurred after her own pregnancy had been terminated.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

* Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York et al., 5 Cir. 1970, 431 F.2d 409. Part I.

1 By its order of February 24, 1975 the Court granted partial summary judgment for the defendants on all claims of monetary damages as to defendant Parsons and all claims of monetary and injunctive relief as to defendant Holcomb. App. at 53-54. The Supreme Court has recently spoken concerning the appealability of partial summary judgments. Said the Court:

The order, viewed apart from its discussion of Rule 54(b), constitutes a grant of partial summary judgment limited to the issue of petitioner's liability. Such judgments are by their terms interlocutory, see Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56(c), and where assessment of damages or awarding of other relief remain to be resolved have never been considered to be "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See, e. g., Borges v. Art Steel Co., 243 F.2d 350 (CA2 1957), Leonidakis v. International Telecoin, 208 F.2d 934 (CA2 1953), Tye v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, 173 F.2d 317 (CA3 1949), Russell v. Barnes Foundation, 136 F.2d 654 (CA3 1943). Thus the only possible authorization for an appeal from the District Court's order would be pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1292. (Footnotes omitted).

Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, 1976, --- U.S. ----, ----, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 1206, 47 L.Ed.2d 435, ---- (1976). Consequently, the damage claim against the officials is still before the District Court for such action as is appropriate notwithstanding the entry of orders which may appear to finally terminate them.

In addition, the Court in this order severed the claims for injunctive relief from those for monetary relief and only those concerning injunctive relief are considered on this appeal. The effective denial of an injunction, however, gives us jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(a)(1).

Thus, our recent decisions en banc in Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, et al., 5 Cir., 1976, 528 F.2d 499 (panel opinion reported at 520 F.2d 993) and Warner v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, etc., 5 Cir., 1976, 528 F.2d 505 (panel opinion reported at 522 F.2d 1384) do not stand in the way. In those cases we decided that monetary damages or awards could not be granted against persons acting as the instrumentality of government entities which are concededly "non-persons" for § 1983 purposes under City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 1973, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109; Moor v. County of Alameda, 1973, 411 U.S. 693, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 36 L.Ed.2d 596; Monroe v. Pape, 1961, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, if the effect of such an award would be to indirectly extract funds from the public coffers to pay it. Clearly, the injunctive relief requested in this suit would not result in the kind of monetary burden to the state which we proscribed in Muzquiz and accordingly we surmount the initial jurisdictional barrier of § 1983.

At this juncture, since the claims for monetary damages are not considered in this appeal we need not reach the issue of whether § 1983 and § 1985 require personal involvement of a particular defendant or whether liability may be imposed upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. Accordingly, since...