McGinn v. Burlington Northern R. Co.

• Decision Date: 12 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 96-1685,96-1685
• Citation: 102 F.3d 295
• Parties: Michael P. McGINN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 295

102 F.3d 295

Michael P. McGINN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a Delaware

Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 96-1685.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 18, 1996.

Decided Dec. 12, 1996.

John J. Kiely, Chicago, IL, Don C. Aldrich (argued), James K. Vucinovich, Yaeger, Jungbauer, Barczak & Roe, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

John Newell (argued), Kenneth J. Wysoglad, Michael L. Sazdanoff, Robert J. Prendergast, Wysoglad & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before CUMMINGS, BAUER and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant, Michael McGinn ("McGinn") filed suit against Defendant-Appellee, Burlington Northern Railroad Company ("Burlington"), alleging that Burlington violated the Boiler Inspection Act ("BIA"), 45 U.S.C. § 23; the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60; and Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA") regulation 49 C.F.R. § 229.119(c). The district court granted Burlington's motions for summary judgment. We affirm.

I. Background

McGinn worked as a brakeman for Burlington. On January 23, 1990, McGinn was working on a train en route from Cicero, Illinois to LaCrosse, Wisconsin. The engine cab was equipped with seating for a crew of four; on this particular trip, the staff also included a student engineer, who had to bring along a folding lawn chair for himself. The engine was not equipped with a luggage rack; the crew brought their luggage with them into the engine cab. McGinn placed his suitcase on the floor in front of his seat. During the course of the trip, McGinn got up to stretch on at least two different occasions. He did not look to see where his luggage was located during any of these occasions. At about 6:15 p.m., McGinn arose to use the restroom. It was dark outside by this time, and the cabin's lights were turned off so that the engineer could see the track ahead. As he walked down the stairs to the restroom, McGinn tripped when his feet became entangled in his luggage strap. The luggage lay on the floor in the same spot where McGinn initially left it. McGinn fell down the stairs, struck his back against the restroom door, and landed on the floor between the steps and the restroom. He injured his back, ribs, buttocks, and shin.

In his initial complaint, McGinn alleged that his injuries were caused by Burlington's failure to provide McGinn with a generally safe workplace as required by the FELA. More specifically, McGinn alleged that Burlington was negligent under the FELA in that: (1) it failed to provide sufficient seating and storage; (2) it assigned too many people to a locomotive not designed to carry five people; (3) it failed to adequately light the passageway to the locomotive's restroom; and (4) it failed to provide safeguards against tripping. However, when he filed a motion for summary judgment, McGinn alleged that Burlington's actions or inaction constituted a violation of the BIA. Burlington objected because McGinn had not alleged a BIA violation in his complaint. McGinn was granted leave to amend his complaint.

In his amended complaint, McGinn reiterated his negligence claim under the FELA and additionally alleged that Burlington was strictly liable under the BIA for failure to maintain its locomotive engine, parts and appurtenances in proper and safe operating condition. In particular, McGinn alleged that Burlington failed to keep the cab floor clear of "tripping hazards," which created "unnecessary peril to Plaintiff's life and limb." In response, Burlington also filed a motion for summary judgment. Burlington did not contest the accuracy of the facts surrounding the accident, but, rather, questioned their materiality. On April 14, 1994, the district court granted Burlington's motion for summary judgment on the BIA strict liability claim. However, the court allowed McGinn leave to amend his complaint "to allege an appropriate FELA claim if such a claim exists."

McGinn then filed his third amended complaint. To support his FELA claim, McGinn alleged that Burlington was negligent because: (1) it failed to provide adequate seating for the five people on board the engine cab; (2) it assigned too many people to a locomotive not designed to transport five people; (3) it failed to adequately light the passageway to the cab's restroom; (4) it failed to provide adequate safeguards against tripping; and (5) it generally failed to provide a safe workplace as required by the FELA. Burlington did not contest the accuracy of these facts, but it again questioned whether they were material as to the cause of McGinn's injuries. The district court agreed with Burlington. It noted that McGinn essentially reiterated the negligence charges and facts from his first complaint and deleted references to the BIA. On August 14, 1994, the court granted Burlington's motion for summary judgment. McGinn appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to both his BIA and FELA claims.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Although the moving party must initially identify the basis for its contention that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmoving party cannot rest on his pleadings, but must produce his own evidence. Hughes v. Joliet Correctional Ctr., 931 F.2d 425, 428 (7th Cir.1991). Rule 56(e) requires that the nonmoving party who bears the burden of proof on an issue for trial allege specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial by his own affidavits or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Brennan v. Daley, 929 F.2d 346, 348 (7th Cir.1991). In considering whether any genuine issues of material fact exist, we view the record and extract all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. However, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there exists some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The applicable substantive law will dictate which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Only disputes that could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Id.

B. The BIA Claim

In this case, the applicable laws are the BIA and the FELA. The BIA and the FELA are interrelated. The BIA is one of the Safety Appliance Acts ("SAA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-43. Strict liability under the FELA results when a rail carrier violates the SAA. Vaillancourt v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 791 F.Supp. 734, 738 (N.D.Ill.1992). Thus, railroads whose employees are injured as a result of violations of the BIA will incur strict liability under the FELA. Id. There are two ways a rail carrier can violate the BIA. A rail carrier may breach the broad duty to keep all parts and appurtenances of its locomotives in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary peril to life or limb, in violation of 45 U.S.C. § 23, or a rail carrier may fail to comply with the regulations issued by the FRA. Mosco v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 817 F.2d 1088, 1091 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 851, 108 S.Ct. 152, 98 L.Ed.2d 108 (1987). We will address the applicability of each possible area of liability to the present case.

First, the BIA imposes upon rail carriers an absolute duty to maintain the parts and appurtenances of their locomotives in safe and proper condition. Lilly v. Grand Trunk W.R.R. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 485, 63 S.Ct. 347, 350-51, 87 L.Ed. 411 (1943). However, this does not mean that the BIA demands that liability ensue in every case in which a plaintiff alleges that a carrier's failure to install some piece of equipment on a locomotive rendered the locomotive unsafe. Mosco, 817 F.2d at 1091. "Parts and appurtenances" does not encompass every device that conceivably could be installed. Id. The BIA does not hold carriers liable for failure to install equipment on a locomotive unless the overlooked equipment (1) is required by applicable federal regulations or (2) constitutes an "integral or essential part of a completed locomotive." Id. (citing Southern Ry. Co. v. Lunsford, 297 U.S. 398, 402, 56 S.Ct. 504, 506, 80 L.Ed. 740 (1936)).

In this case, we have neither of the aforementioned situations. First, there is no applicable federal regulation which would have required that the railroad install luggage racks. Second, a luggage rack does not constitute an integral or essential part of a locomotive. Generally, the "essential or integral" argument has failed in other circuits addressing a plaintiff's "failure to install" claim. See, e.g., King v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 855 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir.1988) (holding that armrests are not an integral or essential part of locomotive, even though they were uniformly installed on the defendant's other locomotives and the defendant agreed to install them); Mosco, 817 F.2d at 1091 (holding that bars, grates or other protective window devices are not integral or essential devices); Marshall v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 720 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that strobe and oscillating lights are not integral or essential warning devices); cf. Herold v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 761 F.2d 1241 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 888, 106 S.Ct. 208, 88 L.Ed.2d 177 (1985) (agreeing with Marshall,...