McGlathery v. Ala. Agric. & Mech. Univ.

• Decision Date: 03 August 2012
• Docket Number: 2101017.
• Citation: 105 So.3d 437
• Parties: Vannessa McGLATHERY v. ALABAMA AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL UNIVERSITY et al.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

105 So.3d 437

Vannessa McGLATHERY

v.ALABAMA AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL UNIVERSITY et al.

2101017.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

Aug. 3, 2012.

Robert C. Lockwood and Christopher L. Lockwood of Wilmer & Lee, P.A., Huntsville; and Walter S. Turner, Montgomery, for appellant.

William R. Lunsford and Stephen D. Davis II of Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Huntsville; and Angela Redmond Debro, gen. counsel, Agricultural & Mechanical University, Normal, for appellees Alabama Agricultural & Mechanical University, Dr. Andrew Hugine, and Nancy Washington Vaughn.

Roderic G. Steakley and Matthew B. Reeves of Sirote & Permutt, P.C., Huntsville, for appellees the Board of Trustees of Alabama Agricultural & Mechanical University and the Individual trustees.

On Application for Rehearing

BRYAN, Judge.

This court's opinion of April 13, 2012, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor.

Vannessa McGlathery appeals from a judgment granting the Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., motions to dismiss of Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical University (“the university”); the Board of Trustees of the university (“the board”); the individual members of the board (“the board members”), in their official capacities; ¹ Dr. Andrew Hugine, Jr. (“the president”), the president of the university, in his official capacity; and Nancy Washington Vaughn, the university's director of human resources, in her individual capacity. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Procedural History

On December 16, 2010, McGlathery sued the university, the board, the board members, the president, Vaughn, and Dr. Tommy Coleman, a member of the university's faculty.² McGlathery's complaint contained the following pertinent factual allegations:

“7. Plaintiff, Vannessa McGlathery commenced employment with the University as a Technical Assistant in approximately 1998.

“8. In approximately 2006, Ms. McGlathery was assigned to serve as Administrative Support Coordinator at the AAMU Research Institute (‘AAMURI’).

“9. AAMURI's facilities are located on the University's campus, but AAMURI is not a state agency and is not a subsidiary of the University. Rather, AAMURI is a Section 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation and is a private entity independent of the University.

“....

“11. While working at AAMURI, Ms. McGlathery served as a dual employee of both the University and AAMURI.

“....

“22. On or about July 20, 2010, Nancy Washington Vaughn issued a letter stating that Ms. McGlathery's employment with the University would end on August 6, 2010.

“23. Ms. Vaughn has no authority to terminate any employee of the University.

“24. On or about August 6, 2010, Ms. McGlathery instituted a grievance alleging that her employment with the University had been improperly terminated.

“25. On or about August 11, 2010, Ms. Vaughn issued a letter to Ms. McGlathery stating that Ms. McGlathery was not eligible to file a grievance because she had not been an employee of the University. Ms. Vaughn's letter to Ms. McGlathery stated in pertinent part as follows:

“ ‘The Office of Human Resources has determined that the matter for which you seek redress is not subject to the [university] grievance procedure because you are an employee of the AAMURI.... As an employee of the AAMURI, your employment rights have not [sic] adversely affected due to a violation of [the university's] policies and procedures. Therefore, [the university] is constrained from approving your recent request for a grievance hearing.’

“26. The Defendants are legally bound to follow the policies set forth in the University's Staff Handbook, adopted by the Board of Trustees on October 29, 1993.

“27. The Staff Handbook is applicable to Ms. McGlathery's employment with the University.

“28. On or about September 1, 2010, Ms. McGlathery filed an amended and supplemental grievance alleging that she was indeed an employee of the University and that the University had not abided by its adopted policies in attempting to terminate her employment.

“29. The Defendants have failed or refused to respond to Ms. McGlathery's amended and supplemental grievance.”

Based on those factual allegations, McGlathery stated five claims against the university, the board, the board members, and the president (collectively referred to as “the university defendants”) and one claim against Vaughn. The first claim against the university defendants asserted that McGlathery's dismissal violated § 16–49–23, Ala.Code 1975, because, she asserted, that Code section granted the board the exclusive and nondelegable power to dismiss university employees. That claim sought a judgment declaring that § 16–49–23 granted the board the exclusive and nondelegable power to dismiss university employees, that her dismissal violated § 16–49–23, that she was entitled to reinstatement, and that she was entitled to wages and benefits she had lost as a result of her dismissal.

McGlathery's second claim against the university defendants also asserted that her dismissal violated § 16–49–23 because, she asserted, that Code section granted the board the exclusive and nondelegable power to dismiss university employees; however, the second claim sought a writ of mandamus directing the university defendants to reinstate McGlathery and to pay her the wages and benefits she had lost as a result of her dismissal.

McGlathery's third claim against the university defendants asserted, as an alternative to her first and second claims, that, if § 16–49–23 granted the board the power to delegate its power to dismiss university employees, her dismissal violated policy 9.3 of the university's staff handbook (“policy 9.3”) because, she asserted, she had not been given three weeks' notice of her dismissal and her dismissal had not been approved by the president. McGlathery's complaint alleged that policy 9.3 stated:

“ ‘Staff employees are employees at will and may be terminated without cause by the University upon three weeks notice. Such terminations must ultimately be approved by the President. Termination without cause shall not affect the employee's right to recover unemployment compensation.’ ”

The third claim against the university defendants sought a judgment declaring that McGlathery's dismissal was invalid because it violated policy 9.3, that she was entitled to reinstatement, and that she was entitled to wages and benefits she had lost as a result of her dismissal.

McGlathery's fourth claim against the university defendants asserted that her dismissal without three weeks' notice and without the approval of the president constituted a breach of contract and sought reinstatement and the wages and benefits she had lost as a result of her dismissal. McGlathery's fifth claim against the university defendants asserted that her dismissal was not “in accordance with the laws of the State of Alabama or the policies and procedures of the University” and sought a writ of mandamus directing the university defendants to reinstate her and to pay her the wages and benefits she had lost as a result of her dismissal.

McGlathery's sole claim against Vaughn asserted that Vaughn had intentionally interfered with McGlathery's business or contractual relations with the university and sought compensatory and punitive damages.

The university defendants and Vaughn filed Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, and McGlathery filed a pleading in opposition. Following a hearing, the trial court, on April 21, 2011, entered a judgment granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Because it did not dispose of McGlathery's claim against Dr. Coleman, the trial court certified the judgment as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.

In its judgment, the trial court concluded that Article I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901 (“§ 14”), barred all McGlathery's claims against the university defendants insofar as those claims sought wages and benefits. The trial court further concluded that McGlathery's first two claims against the university defendants failed to state a valid claim for declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus, respectively, because § 16–49–23 granted the board the power to delegate its power to dismiss university employees. The trial court concluded that McGlathery's third claim against the university defendants failed to state a valid claim for declaratory relief because the staff handbook did not constitute an “administrative regulation” for purposes of the declaratory-relief exception to § 14. The trial court concluded that the fourth claim against the university defendants failed to state a valid claim for a writ of mandamus because policy 9.3 stated that staff employees of the university were employees at will who could be dismissed without cause and the language stating that dismissals without cause were to be made with three weeks' notice and with the ultimate approval of the president did not constitute contractually binding promises that would support a breach-of-contract claim.

The trial court concluded that the fifth claim against the university defendants failed to state a valid claim for a writ of mandamus because McGlathery's dismissal did not violate § 16–49–23 and the language of policy 9.3 stating that dismissals without cause were to be made with three weeks' notice and with the ultimate approval of the president did not constitute contractually binding promises.

The trial court concluded that McGlathery's claim of intentional interference with business or contractual relations against Vaughn failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because Vaughn, as a co-employee of McGlathery, was not a “third party” or a “stranger” to the relationship between McGlathery and the university and because Vaughn was entitled to State-agent immunity.

On May 20, 2011, McGlathery filed a postjudgment motion, which the trial court denied on June 15, 2011. McGlathery then timely appealed to this court. Due to lack of jurisdiction, we transferred the appeal to the...