Mcgoldrick Lumber Company v. Benewah County

• Decision Date: 20 July 1934
• Docket Number: 6000,6001
• Citation: Mcgoldrick Lumber Company v. Benewah County, 35 P.2d 659, 54 Idaho 704 (Idaho 1934)
• Parties: MCGOLDRICK LUMBER COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, v. BENEWAH COUNTY and A. R. CARMAN, Assessor, Benewah County, Idaho, Respondents and Cross-Appellants
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

35 P.2d 659

54 Idaho 704

MCGOLDRICK LUMBER COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, v. BENEWAH COUNTY and A. R. CARMAN, Assessor, Benewah County, Idaho, Respondents and Cross-Appellants

Nos. 6000, 6001

Supreme Court of Idaho

July 20, 1934

TAXATION-ASSESSMENTS-EQUALIZATION-REVIEW-RELIEF GRANTED - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1.Statutes authorizing appeal to district court from decision of county board of equalization in proceeding to review assessment and authorizing district court to "modify" board's determination held not unconstitutional as authorizing judiciary to exercise executive function (I. C. A., secs. 30-1111,61-401,61-409,61-1910,61-1911;Const., art. 2, sec. 1;art. 5, sec. 20;art. 7, secs. 2,5,12;art. 18, sec. 6).

2.Legislature has unlimited power to legislate, where legislation is not prohibited.

3.Statute authorizing district court, on appeal from board of equalization, to affirm, reverse, or "modify," authorizes court to increase assessments, although statutory notice has not been given; "modify" in taxation appeal including the element of increasing (I. C. A., secs 30-1111,61-409,61-1910,61-1911).

4.County board of equalization must determine whether assessments have been made on full cash value and on equal basis throughout county, and, where property has been under or over assessed as compared with other assessments and its assessment is above or below full cash value, board must bring it in line with other property and, where all property has been assessed above or below its full cash value, must increase or decrease all assessments accordingly (I. C. A secs. 61-322,61-401,61-402,61-406,61-1910,61-1911).

5.On appeal from board of equalization, district court, as distinguished from board, has before it for action only property of appealing party, and is restricted to "equalizing," that is, raising or lowering value theretofore placed on property of appealing party to bring it in line with other property in county but may not disturb assessment on property over or under assessed where it is in line with all other property in county (I. C. A., secs 61-322,61-401,61-402,61-406,61-506 to 61-510,61-1910,61-1911).

6.On appeal from board of equalization, district court was required to explicitly find on what basis other property in county was generally assessed, and general rate of assessment as made by assessor and board on lands of appealing party before bringing assessment on appealing party's land in line with other assessments in county, and court's failure to so find required remanding of case (I. C. A., secs. 61-322,61-401,61-402,61-406,61-506 to 61-510,61-1910,61-1911).

APPEAL from the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, for Benewah County.Hon. Bert A. Reed, District Judge.

Appeal and cross-appeal from judgment on appeal from County Board of Equalization.Reversed.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.Costs awarded to appellant.Petition for rehearing denied.

Wm. D. Keeton, for Appellant.

The court had no jurisdiction, power, or authority to raise any values; the raising of values was not an issue, and the raising of values was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.(Sec. 61-409, I. C. A.;Western Ranches v. Custer County, (Mont.)89 F. 577;Cox v. Hawkins,199 Ill. 68, 64 N.E. 1093;Carney v. People,210 Ill. 434, 71 N.E. 365;Cummings v. Stark, 138 Ind. 94, 34 N.E. 444.)

Ed. S. Elder, for Respondents and Cross-Appellants.

In the case of Blomquist v. Board of County Commrs.,25 Idaho 284, 137 P. 174, in discussing the question of an appeal from the board of county commissioners, the court uses this language:

"If an appeal were authorized, it would not necessarily follow that the Court could review and modify the act of such officers when exercising discretion in passing on facts before them."

We submit that the only question before the district court was the question of overvaluation of the property by the assessor, and that there is no question of lack of uniformity or of discrimination.There being no question of discrimination or lack of uniformity before the court, it naturally follows that the court sitting as a tribunal for the equalization of taxes, whose powers are no greater than those of the board of county commissioners sitting as a board of equalization, could not substitute its judgment for that of the assessor's on a question purely of value.

GIVENS, J. Budge, C. J., Holden, J., and Johnson, D. J., concur.Morgan, J., dissents.

OPINION

GIVENS, J.

The McGoldrick Lumber Company petitioned the board of county commissioners of Benewah county, sitting as a board of equalization, to reduce the assessments on certain lands and property belonging to the company.The board made reductions on some lands, but no increases, the lumber company thereupon appealed to the district court, because all reductions were not allowed as requested, which court upon a hearing anew, both reduced and increased appellant's assessments.

The lumber company appealed from that portion of the judgment which increased the assessments, on the grounds that no notice had been given by the board portending such increase as required by section 61-409, I. C. A.; that the board had not asked the district court for any increase and that no findings were made sufficient to justify either the increase or the refusal to reduce the assessments originally complained of as too high.

The county likewise appealed on the grounds that no appeal lies from the district court to this court in such proceedings and that the statute authorizing an appeal to the district court from the board is unconstitutional, and that if those points be not well taken the only issue was one of overassessment.

First Nat. Bank v. Board of Commrs., 40 Idaho 391, 232 P. 905, held the statute providing for an appeal as herein valid, and an examination of the authorities discloses that such is the majority rule.(Seethe cases reported and cited in Silven v. Osage County Commrs., 76 Kan. 687, 92 P. 604, 14 Ann. Cas. 163, 13 L. R. A., N. S., 716, 14 Am. and Eng. Ann. Cases, 163, and Hopper v. Oklahoma County, 43 Okla. 288, 143 P. 4, L.R.A. 1915B 875.)

It is, however, contended that on appeal from the board of county commissioners sitting as a board of equalization the court may not by way of modification in effect make an assessment, that the court may only reverse or affirm, on the theory that the assessment of property for taxation purposes is under the Constitution the exclusive function of the executive, which power may not thus be usurped by the judiciary because of section 1, article 2:

"The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted."

This proposition must, and apparently is considered to rest upon the major premise that assessing (that is for taxation purposes) is by the Constitution made exclusively an executive function.

Article 2 of the Constitution, merely declares the three governmental divisions or departments, and says nothing about assessment for taxation purposes being in any one of the departments.

A careful examination of the Constitution discloses that the only sections thereof referring to the matter of taxation are found in article 7.Section 6 of article 18, provides for the election of the county assessor, but does not prescribe his duties nor does any other section of article 18, and no provisions of article 7, provide who shall assess the property for taxation purposes, the whole matter being left to the legislature under sections 2and5 of article 7.

Section 12 of article 7, provides that the county commissioners shall constitute a board of equalization for their respective counties "under such rules and regulations as shall be prescribed by law."(Italics ours.)

Section 20 of article 5, provides as follows:

"The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law."(Italics ours.)

The legislature under section 12 of article 7, andsection 20 of article 5, has provided first, for the county commissioners to act as a board of equalization, section 61-401, I. C. A., and that an appeal may be taken therefrom, section 61-1910, I. C. A., and that on such appeal the court may reverse, affirm or modify, and as is indicated hereafter the word modify may include increasing or decreasing.(Italics ours.)

It is rather axiomatic that under our Constitution unless legislation is prohibited the legislature has unlimited power in its field.Not only has the Constitution not prohibited the legislature, but it has expressly authorized it to make rules and regulations for the county boards of equalization and also to define the scope of appeals to the district court(Knox v. L. N. Dantzler Lumber Co., 148 Miss. 834, 114 So. 873, 876), and it will be noted that section 1, article 1, of the Mississippi Constitution is similar to section 1, article 2, of the Idaho Constitution, andsection 156, article 6, of the Mississippi Constitution is similar to section 20, article 5, of the Idaho Constitution.

The board of county commissioners sitting as a board of equalization and the district court on appeal from their action are not by the statutes hereafter considered and elucidated assessing the property, but are equalizing it therefore the statute providing for the appeal herein is not unconstitutional (In re Westlake Ave., 40 Wash. 144, 82 P....