McGoodwin v. McGoodwin

• Citation: 671 S.W.2d 880
• Decision Date: 20 June 1984
• Docket Number: No. C-2464,C-2464
• Parties: James L. McGOODWIN et al., Petitioners, v. Patsy R. McGOODWIN, Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Page 880

671 S.W.2d 880

James L. McGOODWIN et al., Petitioners, v. Patsy R. McGOODWIN, Respondent.

No. C-2464.

Supreme Court of Texas.

June 20, 1984.

Rehearing Denied July 18, 1984.

George G. Barber, Arlington, for petitioners.

Danny D. Burns, Fort Worth, for respondent.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

BARROW, Justice.

Our opinion and judgment delivered on March 4, 1984 are withdrawn, and the following is substituted.

This is a suit to enforce a lien. Patsy McGoodwin sued her former husband, James L. McGoodwin, and his son, James R. McGoodwin, seeking to force the sale of a certain tract of land. After a bench trial, the trial court decreed that the property be sold to satisfy Patsy's claim. The court of appeals affirmed. 656 S.W.2d 202 (1983). We modify those judgments, and as modified we affirm.

James and Patsy acquired the twenty-two acres of land now in question during their marriage. They moved onto the property, and James has lived there ever since. James and Patsy were divorced, and by its divorce decree the court approved a property settlement agreement reached by the parties and divided their property according to that agreement. The agreement awarded James the twenty-two acres of land as his separate property. In return, James agreed to pay Patsy "$22,500 as consideration for the conveyance of [Patsy's] 1/2 interest" in the land. Patsy agreed to convey her interest upon payment of the consideration by James. James has not paid this consideration, but asserts full ownership. After the divorce, James conveyed a remainder interest in the land to his son as a gift and reserved a life estate to himself.

Patsy brought this suit to subject the land to forced sale to satisfy her claim for the unpaid consideration. Patsy claims that a vendor's lien in her favor is implied by the property settlement agreement between her and James. The trial court agreed and ordered the vendor's lien foreclosed and the property sold. In addition, the court held the deed from James to his son void. This latter holding is not attacked before this court. James insists, however, that no vendor's lien arose from the property settlement agreement. Since the land in question is his homestead, James contends, it is exempt from forced sale to satisfy his debt to her.

The issue to be decided is a narrow one. Does a divorce decree that approves a property settlement agreement by which the husband agrees to pay a sum of money as consideration for the wife's interest in a particular piece of real estate imply a vendor's lien in favor of the wife? The significance of this issue is clear. A vendor's lien is a lien for purchase money. If Patsy holds such a lien, she is entitled to enforce it through foreclosure notwithstanding James's homestead claim. Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 50.

James contends that Patsy is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from litigating this issue. We disagree. This case does not involve the doctrine of res judicata. Patsy does not, by the instant suit, seek to create a lien the creation of which could have been litigated in the divorce suit. Rather, she seeks to enforce a vendor's lien that she contends arose when the divorce decree was rendered. She has not, nor could she have, litigated this cause of action in a previous suit. Cf. DeBord v. Muller, 446 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.1969); Goldberg v. Goldberg, 425 S.W.2d 830 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1968, no writ).

Correct resolution of the question presented requires first an understanding of the effect given a marital property settlement agreement by Texas law. Such an agreement, though incorporated into a final divorce decree, is treated as a contract, and its legal force and its meaning are governed by the law of contracts, not by the law of judgments. Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex.1967); Ex parte Jones, 163 Tex. 513, 358 S.W.2d 370, 375 (1962); Martinez v. Guajardo, 464 S.W.2d 944, 946-47 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1971, no writ). The property settlement provision now considered is one that directs the payment of money as consideration for the conveyance of an interest in real estate. Its construction, therefore, is dictated by the law regarding contracts for the sale of land.

Established Texas law holds that when no express lien is reserved in a deed and the purchase money is not paid, a lien nevertheless arises by implication in favor of the vendor to secure payment of the purchase money. That vendor's lien may be enforced in a suit brought for that purpose. White, Smith & Baldwin v. Downs, 40 Tex. 225, 226, 231-32 (1874); Briscoe v. Bronaugh, 1 Tex. 326, 329-30 (1846); Delley v. Unknown Stockholders of the Brotherly and Sisterly Club of Christ, Inc., 509 S.W.2d 709, 714 (Tex.Civ.App.--Tyler 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In the seminal...