McGovern v. Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 04 May 1971
• Citation: 269 N.E.2d 445,359 Mass. 443
• Parties: Martin A. McGOVERN v. MIDDLESEX MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY (and a companion case 1 ).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 445

269 N.E.2d 445

359 Mass. 443

Martin A. McGOVERN v. MIDDLESEX MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY (and a companion case

¹

).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued April 8, 1971.

Decided May 4, 1971.

David W. Woods, Concord, for insurer.

Lawrence E. Hyde, Boston, for claimant.

Before TAURO, C.J., and SPIEGEL, REARDON, QUIRICO, and BRAUCHER, JJ.

BRAUCHER, Justice.

These are two petitions under G.L. c. 251 (the Uniform Arbitration Act for Commercial Disputes), one by a claimant to confirm the award of an arbitrator under Coverage U, 'Protection Against Uninsured Motorists,' of a motor vehicle insurance policy, and the other by the insurer to vacate the award. The petition to confirm was allowed and the petition to vacate was denied. The cases are before us on the insurer's exceptions.

The following facts are not in dispute. The policy was issued to the claimant's mother and the claimant is an insured as her son residing in the same household. He was injured when a vehicle in which he was a passenger collided with a stone wall. He made a claim upon the insurer and demanded arbitration, and a hearing was held before the arbitrator and an award made. There was no transcript of the hearing before the arbitrator.

The judge excluded evidence offered by the insurer, through the testimony of the arbitrator and of counsel for the insurer (1) that there was no evidence before the arbitrator that the vehicle was uninsured; (2) that the lack of such evidence was argued at the arbitration hearing; and (3) that after the award was made the arbitrator said to counsel for the insurer, 'I assume if there was insurance, you guys wouldn't be here.' The judge also excluded a letter from the insurer to counsel for the claimant, dated about two months before the arbitration hearing, reporting receipt of a letter from the registry of motor vehicles 'indicating that the cancellation * * * of the insurance on the * * * vehicle was invalid' and stating that 'this matter needs to be investigated further.'

By G.L. c. 251, § 11, the court is to confirm an award unless grounds are seasonably urged for vacating or modifying or correcting it. See HOLMSTEN REFRINGERATION, INC. V. REFRIGERATED STORAGE CENTER, INC., MASS., 260 N.E.2D 216.^A Section 12(a) states five grounds for vacating an award. The insurer moved to vacate the award on all five grounds, but has abandoned all but two: '(3) the arbitrators exceeded their powers; * * * (5) there was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under section two and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection * * *.'

The arbitration clause of the policy ² confers on the arbitrator power to decide whether 'a particular situation of fact comes within the policy provisions (at least when their meaning has been determined). * * * Examples of such matters are whether the other motorist was or could be identified, whether he was insured, * * *.' Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Garney, 348 Mass. 627, 632, 205 N.E.2d 8, 12. The parties are 'not entitled to a statement of reasons. * * * The findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the award is based need not be given.' Fazio v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. Ltd., 347 Mass. 254, 258, 197 N.E.2d 598, 601. In the absence of fraud an arbitration decision is binding though there may have been committed an error of law or fact in reaching that decision. Glenn Acres, Inc. v. Cliffwood Corp., 353 Mass. 150, 155, 228 N.E.2d 835. The Uniform Arbitration Act as promulgated in 1955 provided for vacating an award which 'is so...