McGowan v. Beecher
| Decision Date | 02 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:20-cv-851 |
| Parties | ANTHONY T. MCGOWAN, Plaintiff, v. JOHN J. BEECHER et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff presently is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF) in Carson City, Montcalm County, Michigan, and the Cooper Street Correctional Facility (JCS) in Jackson, Jackson County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the following officials: DRF Resident Unit Manager (RUM) John H. Beecher; DRF Warden Randee Rewerts; JCS Chaplain Unknown Young; JCS Acting Warden Unknown Floyd; MDOC Director Heidi E. Washington; and MDOC Special Activities Director David M. Leach.
Plaintiff alleges that he is a practitioner of Judaism. He was approved for the Jewish religious diet in August 2018. Plaintiff was housed at DRF from December 20, 2018, to January 2, 2020.
Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, was celebrated in 2019 from the sundown on October 8 until sundown on October 9, and Plaintiff's religion required him to fast during that period. Plaintiff alleges that he was on the schedule to pick up his fasting meal in the morning hours of October 9, 2019. When Plaintiff arrived at food service to pick up his meal on October 9, he was informed Plaintiff that food service had issued the fasting meal bags the prior evening. Plaintiff therefore went without food until the morning of October 10, 2019.
Plaintiff acknowledges that fasting meals were handed out on October 8 and that he was in the dining room on that date. Plaintiff asserts, however, that his itinerary indicated that he was supposed to pick up his meal on October 9, not October 8. Plaintiff filed a grievance on October 10, 2019, complaining that he had been denied his fasting meal on October 9. The Step-I grievance responder denied the grievance, concluding that Yom Kippur meals were provided on October 8, 2019, and that Plaintiff had come through the dining room and received breakfast, lunch, and dinner meals on October 8, 2019, as well as breakfast and dinner meals on October 9, 2019. (Step-I Grievance Response, ECF No. 1-4, PageID.20.) Plaintiff disputes the statement that he received meals on October 9.
Plaintiff appealed the grievance to Step II. On December 11, 2019, Defendant Rewerts upheld the Step-I determination. Defendant Rewerts concluded that Plaintiff had failed to complete his fast by eating breakfast on October 9, 2019. Rewerts indicated that, under policy, Plaintiff would be referred for counseling with the chaplain about conforming his conduct to religious dietary requirements. (Step-II Grievance Response, ECF No. 1-6, PageID.24.)
Plaintiff again appealed the denial of the grievance. At Step III, Richard Russell, the manager of the grievance section, denied the appeal on February 24, 2020, for the reasons stated below. (Step-III Grievance Response, ECF No. 1-8, PageID.29.)
On December 20, 2019, Plaintiff was informed at the Security Classification Committee meeting that he would be transferred to another facility. Plaintiff sent a kite to Defendant Beecher, asking Beecher to remember that Plaintiff was on a kosher/vegan meal plan and should be sent to a facility with a kosher meal program. (DRF Kite, ECF No. 1-7, PageID.26.) Plaintiff was transferred from DRF to JCS on January 2, 2020. JCS does not have a kosher meal program. Plaintiff contends that the transfer was vindictive.
On January 3, 2020, Plaintiff sent a kite to Defendants JCS Chaplain Young, JCS Warden Floyd, and the MDOC Special Activities Director. (JCS Kite, ECF No. 1-10, PageID.32.) He filed a Step-I grievance on January 7, 2020. The grievance coordinator contacted Defendant Young that afternoon, and Defendant Young contacted the JCS transfer coordinator and the MDOC central office, requesting that Plaintiff be transferred as soon as possible to a facility with a Kosher meal program. (Step-I Grievance Response, ECF No. 1-12, PageID.36.) By the time Defendant Young issued the Step-I grievance response on January 9, 2020, Plaintiff already had been moved to another facility. (Step-I Grievance, ECF No. 1-11, PageID.34.) Plaintiff therefore spent less than one week at JCS.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants' denial of his kosher fast bag on October 9, 2019, and his transfer to a prison with no kosher meal program deprived him of his right to exercise his religion, in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Plaintiff also alleges that the denial of his fast bag deprived him of necessary food, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Finally, he contends that Defendants Beecher and Rewerts transferred him to JCS, knowing that it did not have a kosher meal program, in retaliation for Plaintiff having filed a grievance about his denial of the snack bag.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, together with compensatory and punitive damages.
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails "'to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (). The court must determine whether the complaint contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a "'probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not'show[n]'—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) ().
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)
Plaintiff fails to make specific factual allegations against Defendants Leach, and Washington other than his claim that they failed to correctly respond to his grievances or to supervise their subordinates. Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one's subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300(6th Cir. 1999). "[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants Leach and Washington engaged in any active unconstitutional behavior.
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff suggests that he had a due process interest in the correct resolution of his grievances, he fails to state a claim. The courts...
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