McGowan v. Christiansen, Civil No. 2:09-CV-14539
Decision Date | 18 December 2018 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 2:09-CV-14539 |
Citation | 353 F.Supp.3d 662 |
Parties | Demetric MCGOWAN, Petitioner, v. John CHRISTIANSEN, Respondent |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Colleen P. Fitzharris, Jessica Lynn Lefort, Loren E. Khogali, Federal Defender Office, Detroit, MI, for Petitioner.
Mark G. Sands, Andrea M. Christensen-Brown, Bruce H. Edwards, Cheri L. Bruinsma, Linus R. Banghart-Linn, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for Respondent.
This matter is on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Petitioner, through counsel Colleen P. Fitzharris of the Federal Defender Office, seeks habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he challenges his conviction for possession with intent to distribute 50-450 grams of cocaine, felony firearm, felon in possession of a firearm, carrying a concealed weapon, and being a third felony habitual offender. Petitioner was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by the suppression of exculpatory evidence, the Court GRANTS the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court denies petitioner's remaining claims.
Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial in the Monroe County Circuit Court. This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v. Smith , 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009) :
Police received an anonymous tip of drug use at an apartment, received consent from the resident to conduct a search, and discovered drugs in the apartment. The apartment occupant was on parole and agreed to arrange a purchase for three and one-half ounces of cocaine from her supplier, defendant. Defendant called the occupant turned informant when he was on his way with the drugs. When he arrived, defendant was arrested carrying three and one-half ounces of cocaine and a gun. Conversely, defendant claimed that he merely carried three and one-half grams of cocaine. Defendant asserted that he did not intend to deliver the cocaine, but rather, it was for his own personal use. He further testified that he came to visit the informant for commercial sex.
People v. McGowan , No. 275781, 2008 WL 723945, * 1 (Mich.Ct.App. March 18, 2008).
Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id., lv. den. 482 Mich. 1030, 769 N.W.2d 202 (2008).
Petitioner filed his original petition for writ of habeas corpus in 2009. After being permitted to amend the petition, the case was held in abeyance to permit petitioner to return to the state courts to exhaust additional claims.
Petitioner filed a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment with the trial court, which was denied. People v. McGowan , No. 06-35201-FH (Monroe County Circuit Court, January 20, 2012). The Michigan appellate courts denied petitioner leave to appeal. People v. McGowan , No. 308520 (Mich.Ct.App. August 24, 2012); lv. den. 493 Mich. 967, 829 N.W.2d 223 (2013).
On August 27, 2013, petitioner, through his new counsel, S. Allen Early, filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus.
This Court granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus, finding that petitioner was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel when his attorney gave him, before trial, inaccurate advice that the sentencing guidelines range after trial would be 45–93 months (3 3/4 years–8 3/4 years) when in fact it was 78–195 month (6 1/2 years–16 1/4 years), which caused petitioner to reject the prosecutor's plea bargain offer and receive a much greater sentence after being convicted at trial, namely, 195 months (16 years, 3 months) to forty years in prison. McGowan v. Burt , No. 43 F.Supp.3d 761 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
The Sixth Circuit reversed the Court's decision. The Sixth Circuit also remanded the matter to this Court for consideration of petitioner's remaining claims. McGowan v. Burt , 788 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2015) ; cert den. ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 415, 193 L.Ed.2d 328 (2015).
The Court reopened the case to the Court's active docket. The Court granted Mr. Early's request to withdraw as counsel and appointed the Federal Defender Office to represent petitioner. The parties filed supplemental briefs. The Court subsequently granted petitioner's motion to hold the petition in abeyance so that he could properly exhaust his third claim.
Petitioner filed a second motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. The judge denied the motion after conducting oral arguments on the motion. (Tr. 6/30/17, pp. 16-20, ECF 64-5, Pg ID 1829-33).
The Court subsequently granted petitioner's motion to reopen the petition. Petitioner seeks habeas relief on the following grounds:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
A. Claim # 3. The Brady/Giglio claim.
Petitioner claims that the prosecutor or the police violated Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and Giglio v. United States , 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) by withholding or failing to disclose that the officer in charge of the case, Lieutenant Luke Davis, systematically embezzled money and property seized from drug suspects between March of 2006 and December of 2008. This time period includes the period of petitioner's arrest and conviction. Lieutenant Davis was not charged until 2011. On May 13, 2013, Lieutenant Davis pleaded no-contest to racketeering in the Monroe County Circuit Court. (See Petitioner's Exhibit B, ECF 57-2, Pg ID 1595-98). Petitioner argues that this evidence of corruption on the part of Lieutenant Davis in the performance of his duties would have affected the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and undermines confidence in the verdict. The Court grants relief on this claim.
Respondent initially argues that this Court should not entertain this claim because it is beyond the scope of the remand order from the Sixth Circuit, in which the Sixth Circuit ordered this Court to consider petitioner's pretermitted claims. Respondent argues that petitioner's original and first amended habeas petition did not contain any Brady claim and thus cannot be considered on remand.
"A remand directing a specific, narrow course of action is fairly considered a limited remand." Hargrave-Thomas v. Yukins , 450 F.Supp.2d 711, 721 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (citing United States v. O'Dell , 320 F.3d 674, 680–81 (6th Cir. 2003) ).
When a limited remand is issued by the appellate court, "[t]he mandate rule ‘compels compliance on remand with the dictates of the superior court and forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate court.’ " Id. (quoting O'Dell , 320 F.3d at 679 (internal quotation omitted). "A district court is bound to the scope of the remand issued by the court of appeals." Id. (quoting United States v. Campbell , 168 F.3d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 1999) ). "The scope of a remand is determined by examining the entire order or opinion, to determine whether and how the court of appeals intended to limit a remand." Carter v. Mitchell , 829 F.3d 455, 463 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Scott v. Churchill , 377 F.3d 565, 570 (6th Cir. 2004) ).
Although petitioner did not raise a Brady claim in his original pro se petition, petitioner's original counsel, Lawrence J. Bunting, filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus, raising a new claim involving newly discovered evidence that Lieutenant Davis had been charged with several criminal charges alleging corruption on his part. (See ECF 12, Pg ID 965-66). This amended petition was later superseded by a second amended petition filed by S. Allen Early, who...
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