McGowan v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 1439-A

• Decision Date: 12 April 1972
• Docket Number: No. 1439-A,1439-A
• Citation: 110 R.I. 17,289 A.2d 428
• Parties: , 60 A.L.R.3d 853 Leo Patrick McGOWAN, Administrator for the Estate of Richard B. Dupont v. CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 428

289 A.2d 428

110 R.I. 17, 60 A.L.R.3d 853

Leo Patrick McGOWAN, Administrator for the Estate of Richard B. Dupont v. CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. 1439-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 12, 1972.

[110 R.I. 21] Goldman, Grady & Biafore, Thomas J. Grady, Providence, for plaintiff.

Hinckley, Allen, Salisbury & Parsons, Thomas D. Gidley, Providence, for defendants.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

This civil action concerns the terms of an accident policy issued by Connecticut General Life Insurance Company (the insurer). A jury-waived trial was held before a justice of the Superior Court. He found that the plaintiff's intestate's death was within the policy's coverage. The essential facts which give rise to this litigation are undisputed.

During 1966, the insurer issued a group policy covering the members of the Atlantic Automobile Adventure Club, Inc. Richard B. Dupont was a member of the club. Membership in the club was restricted to holders of credit cards that are issued by a nationally known distributor of gasoline and other allied automotive products. The club's dues, which included the cost of the insurance, were usually added to the member's monthly bill. The premium charged the deceased amounted to $2.20 a month.

The policy gave a limited type of coverage. It listed a schedule of benefits paid for the accidental loss of life, sight, limbs and fingers provided the loss was the result of the insured's being injured while 'boarding, alighting from, traveling in, or upon being struck by a Passenger Conveyance.' Benefits were also due if the insured's loss was due to his exposure to the elements 'after boarding and by reason of an accident to a Public Conveyance.'

On March 30, 1967, Dupont was the operator of a motorcycle that was involved in a collision with a motor vehicle owned by a Rhode Island corporation that specialized in the sale and distribution of building materials. The collision occurred in Seekonk, Massachusetts. The Corporation's motor vehicle is a 1964 'GMC' six-wheel, stakebody truck. ¹ At the time of the collision the truck was returning to Rhode Island after having delivered a load of lumber to a Massachusetts customer. The insured died from injuries he sustained from the collision. If the administrator's suit is successful, the insurer owes the estate $25,000.

The sole and pivotal issue of this appeal is whether the deceased's injuries were caused by a 'passenger conveyance,' as that term is defined in the policy. The pertinent portion of the policy reads:

'Passenger Conveyance. The term Passenger Conveyance means a private automobile or a Public Conveyance. The term Public Conveyance means any conveyance licensed for the transportation of passengers or a military air transport plane.'

The administrator contends that the insurer's definition of a 'passenger conveyance' is patently ambiguous. He argues that the 'GMC' truck can be described as a 'private automobile.' The insurer, quite understandably, takes a different view of things. It maintains that the vehicle which came in contact with the deceased's motorcycle cannot be classified as a 'passenger conveyance.'

Although the tragic consequences of the cycle and truck collision are regrettable, this court is still obligated to respect the express terms and conditions of the insurance contract. The policy must be examined in its entirety and the words used must be given their plain everyday meaning. Factory Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 106 R.I. 632, 262 A.2d 370 (1970); Nagy v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 100 R.I. 734, 219 A.2d 396 (1966). In taking an overall view of the policy, equal emphasis must be given to all its relevant parts. A policy is not to be described as ambiguous because a word is viewed in isolation or a phrase is taken out of context. A court should not, through an effort to seek out ambiguity when there is no ambiguity, make an insurer assume a liability not imposed by the policy.

There have been many instances where a variety of vehicles, including trucks, have been held to be an 'automobile' with the result that the claim fell within the provisions of the policy. Some courts have said a truck, in the light of the policy's provisions, was a 'private motor driven automobile.' Such a result was reached because each court, after examining the policy then before it, concluded that the word automobile was being employed in its generic sense, that is, any self-propelled vehicle which is designed to carry people or property over the highway. ² There are, of course, courts which have ruled that in present times an automobile describes a motor vehicle which is propelled by gasoline, electricity, or other fuel, and is suitable and intended for the conveyance of persons. ³

Our research has failed to disclose any instance where a court has construed the language found in the clause in dispute. While the generic word, 'automobile,' is broad enough to include all forms of selfpropelled...