McGowan v. General Dynamics Corp., 85-1975
| Decision Date | 26 June 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-1975,85-1975 |
| Citation | 794 F.2d 361 |
| Parties | 41 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 158, 41 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,552 Deborah McGOWAN, Appellant, v. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Edwin A. Keaton, Camden, Ark., for appellant.
Teresa M. Wineland, El Dorado, Ark., for appellee.
Before ROSS, Circuit Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, and MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
Deborah McGowan appeals from an order of the district court 1 denying her relief for alleged discriminatory hiring practices used by General Dynamics Corporation (the Corporation) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981. For reversal, McGowan contends that the district court erred (1) in denying her motions to compel the Corporation to produce personnel and employment records for all clerical and hourly positions filled by the Corporation since November 1981; (2) in denying her a hearing on her second motion to compel and in denying her motions for continuance; and (3) in concluding that the Corporation articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its denial of her applications for employment. Upon review of the record, we affirm.
McGowan, a white woman, is married to a black male employee of the Corporation. She attended college for four years majoring in secretarial science, but withdrew thirty-two hours short of a degree. Her resume indicates limited experience as a clerk/typist and as a tutor of typing and reading skills.
In her complaint, McGowan alleged that she filed applications for "any clerical or line job" with the Corporation in November 1981, and on other occasions 2 when she was aware that openings for jobs of this nature would soon occur. The Corporation filled numerous clerk and line positions after McGowan initially applied for employment. Although the Corporation considered McGowan for three clerical positions and one line position, it hired other applicants for those positions. McGowan contended that the Corporation refused to hire her for these positions or to consider her for other positions on grounds of her interracial marriage and/or because her husband had previously filed discrimination charges against the Corporation. 3
On July 24, 1984, the district court entered an order setting the case for trial on December 12. The court's order specifically required discovery to be completed and all motions to be filed in time to allow the opposing party to file its response thirty days prior to trial. McGowan did not serve her first request for the production of documents and things on the Corporation until October 25, 1984. The Corporation responded on November 12, 1984, providing most of the documents requested, but objecting to three requests for personnel and employment records for all clerical and hourly positions filled by the Corporation since November 1984, 4 based on the burden imposed upon the Corporation by the requests and the irrelevance of the requested material. These records included data relating to 121 clerical positions and 600 line jobs. On November 26, 1981, McGowan filed a motion to compel production of the documents in question, which the district court denied following a hearing. The trial date was rescheduled for May 6, 1985.
In February and March 1985, McGowan submitted supplemental requests for documents to the Corporation. In at least one of these requests, McGowan sought the personnel and employment records previously requested from the Corporation. The Corporation filed the same objections in response to McGowan's supplemental request. On March 29, 1985, McGowan filed a second motion to compel production of the disputed documents. The district court denied the motion on May 2, 1985. McGowan's motions for continuance were also denied, and the case proceeded to trial as scheduled.
The district court found for the Corporation, dismissing McGowan's complaint with prejudice. In the judgment of the court, McGowan established a prima facie case of discrimination, but failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered by the Corporation for its refusals to hire her (i.e. the superior qualifications of the successful applicants) were pretextual. This appeal followed.
Generally, parties may obtain discovery regarding any unprivileged matter so long as it is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). In addition, the frequency and extent of discovery may be limited by the trial court if it determines that a party's request is unduly burdensome or expensive. Id. Appellate review of a trial court's determination concerning discovery matters is very narrow. Prow v. Medtronic, Inc., 770 F.2d 117, 122 (8th Cir.1985). Reversal is inappropriate absent a "gross abuse of discretion resulting in fundamental unfairness in the trial of the case." Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89, 96 (8th Cir.1977).
Contrary to McGowan's contentions on appeal, she has failed to demonstrate that such an abuse of discretion occurred in the instant case. The three discovery requests at issue in McGowan's motions to compel were extremely broad in scope, both in terms of the period of time and the number of jobs, job openings, applicants and resultant documents they encompassed. Notably, McGowan made no effort to limit the scope of her requests even after the trial court's denial of her initial motion to compel. Moreover, the information sought by McGowan through her requests and motions to compel was, very probably, irrelevant to her claims in the pending action. Data derived from the requested documents would be insufficient from a statistical standpoint to be probative of the Corporation's hiring practices as they relate to interracially married persons or to relatives of plaintiffs bringing discrimination suits against the Corporation due to the low number of job applicants and corporate employees who present either of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Amador v. 3M Co. (In re Bair Hugger Forced Air Warming Devices Prods. Liab. Litig.)
...to reverse."Appellate review of a trial court's determination concerning discovery matters is very narrow." McGowan v. Gen. Dynamics Corp. , 794 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 1986). "[W]e will only reverse upon a showing of a ‘gross abuse of discretion resulting in fundamental unfairness in the t......
-
Vallejo v. Amgen, Inc.
...district court's discovery ruling "absent a ‘gross abuse of discretion resulting in fundamental unfairness.’ " McGowan v. Gen. Dynamics Corp. , 794 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting Voegeli v. Lewis , 568 F.2d 89, 96 (8th Cir. 1977) ).Vallejo asserts that the magistrate judge misunders......
-
WWP, Inc. v. Wounded Warriors Family Support, Inc.
...WWFS's request was excessively broad, and WWFS never attempted to narrow the scope of its request. See McGowan v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 794 F.2d 361, 363-64 (8th Cir.1986) (holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a broad discovery request in part because the movant......
-
Gov't of Ghana v. Proenergy Servs., LLC
...unfairness in the trial of the case.’ ” Tenkku v. Normandy Bank, 348 F.3d 737, 743 (8th Cir.2003) (quoting McGowan v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 794 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir.1986)). Ghana argues that the district court erred in its ruling because settlement agreements are routinely found relevant. ......