McGowan v. Our Savior's Lutheran Church, s. C2-94-446

Decision Date17 February 1995
Docket NumberNos. C2-94-446,C4-94-447,s. C2-94-446
Citation527 N.W.2d 830
Parties10 IER Cases 909 Diane McGOWAN, Respondent, v. OUR SAVIOR'S LUTHERAN CHURCH, Petitioner, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. An order denying defendant's motion for summary judgment is immediately appealable when defendant's motion is based on the district court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

2. The district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this negligence action because the injuries that form the basis for the employee's claim arose out of and in the course of employment.

Eric J. Magnuson, Sarah E. Morris, Minneapolis, for appellant.

James C. Wicka, Leanne G. Litfin, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

PAGE, Justice.

Diane McGowan commenced this negligence action seeking damages for injuries she sustained as a result of being raped while working as director of the homeless shelter at Our Savior's Lutheran Church. The church, arguing that the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act 1 barred the lawsuit, sought to have it dismissed on summary judgment based on the district court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In response, McGowan argued that her injuries were excluded from coverage under the Act by Minn.Stat. Sec. 176.011, subd. 16 (1994), 2 commonly referred to as the "assault exception" to the Act, because she was the victim of an intentional assault that was personal to her and unrelated to her employment.

The district court denied the church's motion, finding a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the assailant's motive for the attack. The court also concluded there was a question as to whether the "assault exception" to the Act applied in this case. The church filed a direct appeal and a petition for discretionary review in the court of appeals. The court of appeals dismissed the direct appeal, holding that it was an appeal from a nonappealable order, and denied the petition for discretionary review.

The church raises two issues for our consideration, one procedural and one substantive. Procedurally, we are asked to decide whether an order denying an employer's motion for summary judgment in an employee's negligence action is immediately appealable when dismissal of the action is sought based on the district court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We are next asked to decide whether the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this negligence action. We hold that an order denying summary judgment in an employee's negligence action is immediately appealable when dismissal is sought based on the district court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We also hold the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this negligence action because the injuries that form the basis for McGowan's claim do not fall within the assault exception to the Workers' Compensation Act. We reverse the court of appeals.

On April 4, 1989, while working in her office at the church's homeless shelter, McGowan was raped by a shelter client, Eulalio Hernandez-Perez. McGowan had come into contact with her assailant on two occasions prior to the rape. Each of these contacts occurred at the shelter in conjunction with her work responsibilities. McGowan never had any contact with Hernandez-Perez away from the shelter. Her first encounter with him was on March 27, 1989, when he entered her office to see a social worker from the Homeless Assistance Project. Her second encounter was a day or two later when he entered her office and offered to teach her and other staff members how to speak Spanish. While in the office on that second occasion, Hernandez-Perez made McGowan feel uncomfortable by sitting too close to her. 3 At some point, Hernandez-Perez touched McGowan's arm, prompting one of the male staff members to reprimand him and tell him not to touch her again. After this incident, McGowan informed all of the staff members that she did not want to be left alone with Hernandez-Perez.

On the afternoon of April 4, 1989, the church custodian came to McGowan's office shortly after she returned from a meeting and told her the pastor was having trouble with a disruptive man in the assembly hall. The man was Hernandez-Perez. In an attempt to defuse the situation, McGowan escorted Hernandez-Perez to her office to talk to him for a few minutes. While there, he became upset, pulled the phone cord out of the wall, closed the office door which locked automatically, and raped her.

The first issue we must address is whether the district court order denying the church's motion for summary judgment is appealable. Generally, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not appealable unless the district court certifies the question presented as important and doubtful. Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 103.03. Here, the district court declined to certify the question presented. An exception to the general rule exists where the motion denied is based on governmental immunity from suit. Anderson v. City of Hopkins, 393 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn.1986) (order is appealable if the motion for summary judgment is based on a claim of governmental immunity from suit). Similarly, immediate appeal is permitted where a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied. Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 88-89, 172 N.W.2d 292, 300 (1969) (order denying motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is appealable as of right), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010, 90 S.Ct. 1239, 25 L.Ed.2d 423 (1970).

The rationale behind allowing immediate review of an order denying dismissal based on governmental immunity is that government officials entitled to immunity should not be forced to endure the expense and delay of proceeding to trial. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815-16, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). In Mitchell, the Court concluded that an order denying summary judgment is appealable if the issue "falls within 'that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.' " Id. at 524-25, 105 S.Ct. at 2814 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949)). The Court went on to note that immunity "is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815. Our decision in Anderson flows directly from the Court's decision in Mitchell.

In Hunt, we relied on essentially the same rationale in concluding that an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was immediately appealable. We stated, "[i]t is more realistic to view such an order not merely as a retention of an action for trial, but as a determination of right, for a defendant is compelled thereby to take up the burden of litigation in this state that might otherwise be avoided." Hunt, 285 Minn. at 89, 172 N.W.2d at 300.

Consistent with the rationale underlying our decisions in Anderson and Hunt, the denial of a motion based on subject matter jurisdiction should not be treated differently. The issue raised by the church's motion falls into "that small class which finally determine claims of right, separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524-25, 105 S.Ct....

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