McGrady v. United States

• Decision Date: 21 October 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 83-0501-0.
• Citation: 650 F. Supp. 379
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Anne C. McGRADY, Executrix of the Estate of Marion McGrady, Plaintiff, v. The UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.

650 F. Supp. 379

Anne C. McGRADY, Executrix of the Estate of Marion McGrady, Plaintiff, v. The UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 83-0501-0.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division.

October 21, 1986.

William Reynolds Williams, Willcox, Hardee, McLeod, Buyck, and Baker, Florence, S.C., for plaintiff.

Wistar Stuckey, Asst. U.S. Atty., Columbia, S.C., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER

WESLEY E. BROWN, Senior District Judge.

This is a medical malpractice action brought by plaintiff, Anne C. McGrady, as the Executrix of the Estate of Marion McGrady. She claims that the negligence of the medical personnel employed by defendant, the United States of America, at the Veterans Administration Hospital in Greenville, South Carolina was the proximate cause of her husband's tragic death. She seeks monetary damages from the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 2671 et seq.

On June 8, 1981, two grisly homicides occurred in Greenville, South Carolina. Col. Marion McGrady (ret.) was one of the victims slain by Aubrey Grizzle, who had been lying in wait for almost five hours inside a parking structure adjacent to the office building where Col. McGrady worked. Col. McGrady was a distinguished officer and citizen of the United States and a respected and loved husband and father.

The State tried Grizzle for these killings. A State court rejected Grizzle's plea of insanity defense. Grizzle was convicted by a jury of both murders and is incarcerated in a penal facility in South Carolina, serving two life sentences. Counsel advised this Court during the trial of this civil matter that the convictions were affirmed on appeal.

On the morning of June 8, 1981, Grizzle came to the Veterans Administration Hospital in Greenville without a prearranged appointment and was examined by the medical personnel of the psychiatric clinic. He was, however, a psychiatric outpatient of the South Carolina State Mental Health Center at Greenville for many years and was being routinely treated and counselled by psychiatrists from that State mental health facility. Plaintiff alleges that the medical personnel at the Veterans Administration Hospital ("VA") knew or should have known of Grizzle's schizophrenic mental condition and his propensity towards violence which would be a danger to himself and to others. Plaintiff contends that the VA medical personnel negligently failed to diagnose Grizzle as suffering from psychotic delusion and failing to alert McGrady of Grizzle's potential dangerous behavior. Plaintiff contends that the defendant's negligence is the proximate cause of the death of Col. McGrady.¹ Defendant denies any claim of liability by plaintiff, asserting that the attending physician, Dr. Joseph Nannarello, and the medical personnel of the psychiatric clinic of the VA were not negligent in the course of rendering any required medical services to Grizzle on the morning of June 8, 1981. Defendant contends that neither Dr. Nannarello nor the medical personnel failed to comply with a recognized standard of medical care which would be exercised by similar physicians and medical personnel under similar circumstances. Specifically, defendant contends that there was no factual basis upon which Dr. Nannarello could rely in invoking the South Carolina civil commitment statute to involuntarily confine Grizzle in an appropriate mental health facility. Nor was there any evidence of specific threats by Grizzle revealed in the course of the physician-patient consultation, which would give rise to a duty to warn Col. McGrady that Grizzle was potentially dangerous to him.

The factual background of this litigation is not in substantial dispute. The parties have stipulated to much of historical facts which were reported in the medical files of Aubrey Grizzle. There is no dispute that Grizzle was diagnosed as suffering from various physical maladies as well as a mental disorder clinically known as schizophrenia (undifferentiated type), and that he had been confined in state mental health wards by orders of the State Probate Court pursuant to the State civil commitment statute. There is also no dispute that the jury in the criminal trial of Grizzle found him guilty of murdering Col. McGrady and another person on June 8, 1981, after he had been examined by the medical staff and was counselled by Dr. Nannarello at the VA earlier on the same date. The fact that Grizzle killed two persons following his visit at the VA does not, ipso facto, lead to such a conclusion that the medical personnel or Dr. Nannarello was negligent in his clinical consultation and assessment of the stability of Grizzle's mental condition. Fortified by hindsight upon the tragic events that had already occurred, it seems easy for the plaintiff to find an expert witness who will provide an opinion that the killings would not have occurred had Dr. Nannarello sought a judicial determination to commit Grizzle involuntarily on the morning of June 8, 1981. But proof of negligence may not be established, with the aid of hindsight, by merely showing an undesirable or even an injurious result. Res ipsa loquitur is not recognized as a legal doctrine in tort actions in South Carolina. McLain v. Carolina Power & Light Company, 286 F.2d 816, 819 (4th Cir.1961) (applying South Carolina law). Despite many recent advances in medical knowledge and medical technologies, a physician is not an insurer of a cure nor is he a guarantor of the result of his prescriptive treatment.

A physician is required to demonstrate that degree of care, skill, and knowledge in the performance of his professional services ordinarily possessed and exercised by other physicians who practice in his field under similar circumstances. The mere fact that a plaintiff's expert witness is of the opinion that he would have chosen a different approach or method in the diagnosis or treatment of a patient is not dispositive of determining the liability issue in a medical malpractice suit. Indeed, the threshold inquiry in this case is whether or not Dr. Nannarello failed to use that degree of reasonable care and skill in reaching his clinical judgment on Grizzle's mental condition on June 8, 1981 so as to constitute a breach of the recognized medical standards ordinarily exercised by members of that professional specialty under similar circumstances. The Court has considered the testimony adduced at trial, the documentary evidence and factual stipulations introduced into the record, the briefs of the parties and the applicable law. This Opinion shall constitute the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, as required by Rule 52(a), F.R.Civ.P.

Grizzle was a large stature person. He stood over six feet tall and weighed more than 250 pounds. As a young man growing up in Greenville, South Carolina, he aspired to become a professional boxer. His ambition, however, was cut short by a crushing blow to his right cheek in a boxing match when he was 20 years old. He sustained from this injury various symptoms of psychosomatic disorders which Grizzle frequently complained of having recurring acute headaches, sinus problems, impaired visual acuity and partial hearing loss. For a brief period in 1957, Grizzle enlisted for the military service. He was unable to adapt to the disciplined life of military duty. He complained of his physical maladies and argued with his superiors. The Army medical staff diagnosed that Grizzle had a schzoid personality and determined that his ailments were non-service connected disabilities. After spending two months in the service, Grizzle was discharged by the Army in April 1957.

Grizzle returned to his hometown in Greenville. He had known Col. McGrady, and they were friends for many years. Col. McGrady was an Army officer who retired in 1961 with a distinguished record of service. Following his retirement from the military service, Col. McGrady was employed as the district manager for an electrical fixtures wholesale company in Greenville. The closeness of their relationship was such that Col. McGrady hired Grizzle to work for him in the business of selling electrical fixtures. Col. McGrady also tried unsuccessfully to persuade military officials to have Grizzle's medical conditions declared as service connected disabilities so that Grizzle could become eligible for VA medical benefits. Between February 1965 and August 1966, the medical records showed that Grizzle was hospitalized in a South Carolina state hospital and a VA hospital in Augusta, Georgia for treatment of physical and mental problems. Each admission for hospitalization did not last longer than one and one-half months.

In January 1969, United States Secret Service agents came to Col. McGrady's house and asked for Grizzle's whereabouts. Apparently Grizzle had made some threatening statements against the life of President Richard Nixon. Col. McGrady agreed to help the Secret Service agents find Grizzle. The federal officers found Grizzle and proceeded to arrest him. Grizzle resisted by pulling a gun on them. The federal officers shot Grizzle in the leg. The record shows that Grizzle was charged in a complaint with making an oral threat to take the life of the President of the United States. A judge of this District Court ordered Grizzle be examined by the psychiatric institution at Springfield, Missouri. Although he was found competent to stand trial, the medical staff recommended his commitment to a mental health facility "until he ceases to have delusional ideas concerning his Army experience." The federal charge was dismissed on May 5, 1969, after Grizzle was committed to the State Hospital in Columbia, South Carolina by order of a State judge. During the next six years, Grizzle was detained at that State Hospital as an involuntary psychiatric patient. His federal habeas corpus petition in 1975 challenging the legality of his indeterminative confinement...