McGrath v. Clinton

Decision Date11 December 2009
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 05-2011 (RBW).
Citation674 F.Supp.2d 131
PartiesMatthew Joseph McGRATH, Plaintiff, v. Hillary Rodham CLINTON, Secretary United States Department of State, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

George Michael Chuzi, Kalijarvi, Chuzi & Newman, P.C., Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Brian P. Hudak, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, District Judge.

Plaintiff Matthew McGrath brings this action against Hillary Rodham Clinton, in her official capacity as the Secretary of State,1 under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006), for "reprisal for engaging in protected activity," Complaint ("Compl.") ¶ 1. Currently before the Court is the defendant's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. After carefully considering the party's pleadings, the defendant's motion, and all memoranda of law and exhibits submitted with these filings,2 and for the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that it must grant the defendant's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts underlying this lawsuit are the following.

The plaintiff, a white male, "began his service as a Foreign Service Officer [("FS Officer")] on June 10, 1984" and "was terminated by [the] defendant effective on November 30, 2004," after "serv[ing] in a variety of responsible posts in numerous countries throughout the world. . . ." Id. ¶ 11. The plaintiff "achieved Grade 1—the highest level for a regular [FS Officer]—in a time period much faster than the usual FS Officer [and] . . . [h]is performance ratings from 1984 through 1999 were outstanding." Id. ¶ 12. The plaintiff assumed his position as the Chief of the Division of Cultural Programs for the Department of State (the "Chief") on September 10, 2001, which was under the supervision of S. Van Wunder. Id. ¶ 13. According to the plaintiff, "[w]ithin the first weeks of [his] employment in his new position . . . [Mr.] Wunder[] began to attempt to undermine [the plaintiff's] authority as Chief," Id., "by going directly to [his subordinates] about assignments, instead of going through [him]," Id. ¶ 14. "In late September, 2001, Mr. Wunder began to question [the plaintiff] concerning gossip Mr. Wunder [had] heard that [the plaintiff] had a `big grievance,' which, at the time, [according to the plaintiff,] was inaccurate[, and an inquiry the plaintiff considered] inappropriate since Mr. Wunder had no business interfering with the grievance process as [the plaintiff's] supervisor." Id. ¶ 18.

When the plaintiff first commenced his duties as Chief, he "attempted to have regular staff meetings and then, when he and other employees concluded that each [meeting] was a disruptive and frustrating event, he began having one-on-one meetings with staff instead." Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 24. The plaintiff "did not attempt to resume the . . . group meetings" despite Mr. Wunder's direction to do so at a meeting between the two of them on March 8, 2002, concluding that they would still be "ineffective" and that he "had been holding frequent individual meetings with his staff." Id. ¶ 72.

The plaintiff asserts that "Mr. Wunder treated African American women differently than he did white women in the office—in that he gave white women promotions and better work assignments than African American women." Compl. ¶ 14. The plaintiff claims that "[o]n at least three occasions, Mr. Wunder . . . wanted [the plaintiff] to intervene [in disputes] on the side of the white women." Id. ¶ 21. The plaintiff also claims that "Mr. Wunder . . . cited his own success in terminating an employee to whom Mr. Wunder referred as that `Cuban'Mo Garcia," Id. ¶ 31, although Mr. Wunder flatly denies this allegation, Pl.'s Opp'n, Exhibit ("Ex.") 35 (Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions No. 4). As another example of Mr. Wunder's alleged insensitivity towards minorities, the plaintiff points to his "repeated[] and strong[] disagree[ment] with Mr. Wunder about the allocation of the Division's limited cultural funds."3 Compl. ¶ 20. The defendant acknowledges that the "[p]laintiff routinely objected to the manner in which the Festival Fund was operated," but states that "when Mr. Wunder gave [the p]laintiff the opportunity to prepare a package for the fund's partners suggesting certain modifications, [the p]laintiff refused." Def.'s Mem. at 14. In response to this allegation, the plaintiff states both that "[c]ontrary to [the d]efendant's assertion, [the plaintiff] never refused to complete a plan for reformation of the fund," Pl.'s Opp'n at 6 n. 4, and that he had not prepared a plan for reformation because he "was unwilling to participate in an exercise in futility," Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 78.

According to the plaintiff, in the fall of 2001 Mr. Wunder "began pressing [him] to prepare documentation that would lead to the termination of the employment [of] an elderly disabled African American female employee, E.J. Montgomery," Compl. ¶ 31, which the plaintiff refused to do, Id. ¶ 32, telling Mr. Wunder that his "instructions . . . [were] unethical and illegal discrimination based upon Ms. Montgomery's age, race, and disability," Id. ¶ 33. "Mr. Wunder specifically denies that he directed [the p]laintiff to document Ms. Montgomery's performance to terminate her," Def.'s Mem. at 23-24, and the defendant notes that "Ms. Montgomery continue[d] to be an employee of the State Department" as of the date the defendant filed her summary judgment motion,4 Id. at 26. While the plaintiff was on leave in January and February, 2002, he contends that Mr. Wunder began assigning "large amount[s] of work . . . to Ms. Montgomery," Compl ¶ 34, which the plaintiff believes was motivated by Mr. Wunder's desire to create "a set-up for her anticipated failure," Id. ¶ 35. However, Ms. Montgomery indicated that she doesn't recall any additional duties assigned to her by Mr. Wunder during February, 2002. Def.'s Mem., Ex. 42 (Mar. 16, 2005 Deposition of Evangeline Montgomery ("Montgomery Dep.")) at 354. Around this same time, Mr. Wunder rescinded Ms. Montgomery's travel authorization, which had previously been approved by the plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 35. The defendant explains this action, stating that "Mr. Wunder concedes that he rescinded [the p]laintiff's approval of Ms. Montgomery's travel because [the p]laintiff had improperly authorized travel that was not directly tied to matters that Ms. Montgomery was working on." Def.'s Mem. at 25. The plaintiff highlights Mr. Wunder's inconsistency on this matter, noting that he also "claimed that his decision to deny travel for Ms. Montgomery was connected to a review of all travel in the office" during his Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") testimony. Pl.'s Opp'n at 16.

On January 17, 2002, shortly before the plaintiff was scheduled to be on extended leave commencing the following day,5 Compl. ¶¶ 22, 24, "Mr. Wunder asked [the plaintiff] if there were any pending projects" he had not completed, Id. ¶ 22. Since the plaintiff "did not consider the signing of a Certificate of Appreciation by the Secretary of State [for presentation to a jazz musician at a reception that the plaintiff did not believe would occur] to be a[n] urgent pending matter at the time he spoke with Mr. Wunder," the plaintiff replied that there were none. Id. ¶ 23. Shortly after speaking to Mr. Wunder, however, the plaintiff "became concerned that the matter concerning the presentation of [the] award to the musician might still occur prior to [the plaintiff's] return from home leave," Id. ¶ 24, but the plaintiff could not locate Mr. Wunder to tell him about the matter, Id. ¶ 25. Included in the plaintiff's responsibilities for the award ceremony was drafting talking points for the Secretary and organizing the printing of the Certificate of Appreciation for the awardee. Def.'s Mem., Ex. 16 (Mar. 16, 2005 Deposition of Van Samuel Wunder ("Wunder Dep.")) at 456-57. Although the plaintiff could not find Mr. Wunder before departing for his extended home leave, he "wrote a cover memorandum explaining the situation and left the memorandum and file [for] Mr. Wunder." Compl. ¶ 25. "[T]he ceremony occurred [on January 20, 2002] with [former Secretary of State Colin Powell's6 wife] handing a blank certificate to [the awardee's] daughter." Def.'s Mem. at 10; Def.'s Mem., Ex. 16 (Wunder Dep.) at 457-59. Although "[s]ubsequently, Secretary Powell signed and shipped a finalized certificate to [the awardee]," Def.'s Mem. at 10; Def.'s Mem., Ex. 16 (Wunder Dep.) at 457-59, Mr. Wunder, displeased with what had occurred, wrote the plaintiff an e-mail immediately after the ceremony was completed expressing his "displeasure with [the p]laintiff's performance . . . ." Def.'s Mem. at 10.

In addition to the Award Ceremony incident, the defendant highlights a number of other minor incidents during the plaintiff's tenure as Chief of the Division of Cultural Programs, including the plaintiff's inattentiveness to budget constraints and his lack of communication with his subordinates and supervisors. Def.'s Mem. at 11. Specifically, the defendant claims that the plaintiff significantly overran budgetary constraints on one project, Id., and that several subordinates "each confirmed that [the p]laintiff was noticeably absent or `non-existent' in his supervisory role and that they were frustrated working for him because he gave them no guidance or information," Id.; see Id. at 11-12 ("[A] number of [the p]laintiff's subordinates, who were principally responsible for certain . . . programs, were often left in the dark as to budgeting details of their own projects, as [the p]laintiff did not meet with them to review budgets and plans."). The plaintiff, however, states that...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Bloom v. McHugh
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • December 6, 2011
    ...duties, benefits or work hours.” Runkle v. Gonzales, 391 F.Supp.2d 210, 225 (D.D.C.2005) (emphasis added); accord McGrath v. Clinton, 674 F.Supp.2d 131, 147 (D.D.C.2009); Harris v. Potter, 310 F.Supp.2d 18, 21 (D.D.C.2004); see also Keith v. Duffey, 77 F.Supp.2d 46, 51 (D.D.C.1999) ( “It wo......
  • Hunter v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 09–1491 (ABJ).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • November 29, 2012
    ...ordinarily insufficient “for permitting a jury to conclude that the employer is lying about the underlying facts”); McGrath v. Clinton, 674 F.Supp.2d 131, 145 (D.D.C.2009) (plaintiff's only evidence that employer was lying about its stated reasons were “his own allegations,” which was insuf......
  • Moran v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • August 20, 2012
    ...must provide proof that the employer is lying about its stated reasons for the adverse actions. See id.; see also McGrath v. Clinton, 674 F.Supp.2d 131, 145 (D.D.C.2009) (plaintiff's only evidence that employer was lying about its stated reasons were “his own allegations,” which was insuffi......
  • Moran v. U.S. Capitol Police
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • February 12, 2015
    ...provide evidence that the employer is lying about its stated reasons for the adverse actions. See id. ; see also McGrath v. Clinton, 674 F.Supp.2d 131, 145 (D.D.C.2009) (the plaintiff's only evidence that employer was lying about its stated reasons were “his own allegations,” which was insu......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT