McGrath v. Peterson

• Decision Date: 12 January 1916
• Docket Number: No. 50.,50.
• Citation: 127 Md. 412,96 A. 551
• Parties: McGRATH v. PETERSON.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

96 A. 551

127 Md. 412

McGRATH

v. PETERSON.

No. 50.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 12, 1916.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Somerset County; Henry L. D. Stanford, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Action by Charles L. Peterson against Elizabeth W. McGrath. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial awarded.

Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, BURKE, THOMAS, PATTISON, URNER, STOCKBRIDGE, and CONSTABLE, JJ.

Gordon Tull, of Princess Anne, for appellant. Miles & Myers, of Princess Anne, for appellee.

CONSTABLE, J. This suit was instituted by the appellee to recover damages from the appellant for breach of a written contract of sale of land; and, upon the appellee recovering judgment in the amount fixed by the contract for the breach thereof, this appeal arises.

The appellant, among other pleas, filed two for defense upon equitable grounds, and, upon demurrers to them being sustained, pleaded over by filing a plea averring that the alleged contract had been procured by the fraud of the appellee, and also filed two additional pleas for defense on equitable grounds. Demurrers again to the equitable pleas were sustained.

We are of the opinion the demurrers were properly sustained. Everything that could have been proved under the equitable pleas could have properly been made matters of defense under the plea of fraud. This court has recently, in passing upon section 86, art. 75, of the Code, declared that a defense which is good at law cannot be pleaded on equitable grounds. Flack v. Barlow, 110 Md. 159, 72 Atl. 678, 17 Ann. Cas. 538; Robey v. State, Use of Mallory, 94 Md. 61, 50 Atl. 411, 89 Am. St. Rep. 405; Stump v. Warfield, 104 Md. 551, 65 Atl. 346, 118 Am. St Rep. 434, 10 Ann. Cas. 249.

There were four exceptions taken to the rulings of the court, three on questions of evidence and one on the prayers. The settlement of the question of whether or not the court was correct in granting the appellee's only prayer presents the controlling point in the case. This prayer, in effect, was a demurrer to the appellant's evidence in support of her plea of fraud, for by it the court instructed the jury, as a matter of law, that there was no legally sufficient evidence in the case to show that the contract sued upon had been procured by fraud, and that if they believed the appellant signed the contract their verdict must be for the appellee. Of course, in considering this prayer, it is hardly necessary to remark at this day that, before the court can grant such an instruction, it must assume the truth of all the evidence tending to sustain the claim or defense, as the case may be, and all inferences of fact fairly deducible from it; and this though such evidence be contradicted in every particular by the opposing evidence. Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 144.

The controversy arose over the attempted sale of a farm belonging to the appellee in Somerset county. The entire negotiations for the sale with the appellant were carried on through the agent of the appellee, H. D. Yates, a real estate broker, and his associate, Mr. Brisbane. The appellant was the owner of a farm which she had previously placed in the hands of Yates to sell. Mr. Brisbane first opened the negotiations with the appellant for the purchase of the Peterson (or appellee's) farm by asking the appellant to purchase it. The appellant testified she told him she would not buy it until she had sold her own place. A few days later Brisbane was back, and she and her husband both told him she would not make a contract to take the place for they were "not going to do anything to get into trouble," meaning they were not In good health and would have to put on a mortgage unless they first got the money by a sale of her own place. A few days later Mr. Yates went to the appellant's home and tried to induce her to buy the place, but she gave him the same reasons she had given Brisbane. Later it appears that the appellant's daughter paid $50, without the knowledge or consent of the appellant, to Yates, for an option on the same farm; and it was testified by the daughter that the purchase was to be for herself, but she never received nor signed a contract, Yates telling her that it was her "mother he wanted." The appellant further testified, in response to an inquiry as to why she signed the contract:

"Because Mr. Yates— I met him on the street here one day, and he told me that my daughter had been to his house and put up $50, and it was necessary for me to sign in order to save the $50, and wanted to know when I would go to his house to sign the contract."

Later she went to his house and signed the contract, at which time, in testifying as to what he said to her, said:

"I told him I wasn't going to get into any trouble. I wasn't going to do anything to get into trouble, and he told me there wasn't any trouble or anything; it was only to show that when he sold my place, I would take that."

Her place has never been sold.

The appellant further testified that the contract was not read to her, and she had not read it herself and knew none of its provisions, giving as the reason that Yates said he was in a hurry and had work to do, and that she trusted him because she had explained to him that she did not want to get into any trouble.

The daughter of the appellant testified as follows:

"Q. Now, Mrs. Bowe, do you remember any statement that was made by Mr. Yates to Mrs. McGrath about signing a contract? A. He told her it was necessary for her to sign, or I should lose the money. He told her it meant nothing, except that when he sold her place she would take the Peterson place."

It appears to us that the court below, in granting the prayer of the appellee in the face of the above testimony, must have acted upon the theory that the appellant was bound by her act in signing the contract, since she testified she had signed it without reading or scrutinizing it, when admittedly she could read, and...