McGrath v. Vinzant, 75--1282

• Decision Date: 01 June 1976
• Docket Number: No. 75--1282,75--1282
• Citation: McGrath v. Vinzant, 528 F.2d 681 (1st Cir. 1976)
• Parties: James McGRATH, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Douglas VINZANT et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 681

528 F.2d 681

James McGRATH, Petitioner-Appellant, v.Douglas VINZANT et al., Respondents.

No. 75--1282.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Argued Oct. 9, 1975.

Decided Jan. 16, 1976.

Certiorari Dismissed June 1, 1976.

See 96 S.Ct. 2221.

David M. Skeels, Brookline, Mass., for petitioner-appellant.

Dennis J. LaCroix, Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., with whom Francis X. Bellotti Atty. Gen., and John J. Irwin, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Chief, Crim. Bureau, were on brief, for respondents.

Before ALDRICH, McENTEE and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judges.

LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge.

Appellant was tried and convicted in the Massachusetts Superior Court of rape, kidnapping and assault with a dangerous weapon, and his conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court.Commonwealth v. McGrath, 1973 Mass. A.S. 1387, 303 N.E.2d 108(1973).He then brought this petition for habeas corpus, from the denial of which he now appeals.The single question presented is whether his rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution were violated when, during the state trial, the judge refused to order the rape victim, then on the witness stand, to reveal her current home address, to which she had moved shortly after she had been attacked.

The victim, a Miss Linda Perry, was called by the state.Apart from her address since the incident ¹(which occurred four months before the trial) her identity and associations were rather fully revealed.She testified that she had grown up in South Boston, had one sibling, a 13 year old brother, and was 22 years old; that at the time of the incident she had been living alone in a one bedroom apartment in a highrise building at 75 St. Alphonsus Street, Boston, near the Mission Hill Church; and that she had then been employed by Business Equipment Corporation, 100 Shawmut Avenue, Boston, a firm for which she had worked as a secretary to three salesmen for a year and a half.She was presently working as a private secretary at 294 Washington Street, Boston, with an insurance and real estate firm known as Driscoll Pearce.

Concerning the incident, Miss Perry testified that she had gone from her place of employment at 5 p.m. to the nearby parking garage where she had left the car which she drove to work.It was after dark, and there was no illumination inside.As she was approaching the car she was suddenly confronted by the petitioner, a stranger, who emerged from the dark holding a pistol.He forced her into her car with him, and raped her.After raping her, he would not let her leave the car, saying he was afraid that she would tell the police.Miss Perry testified that she kept talking, hoping that she would not be harmed or killed.Several hours later police officers (who also testified at the trial) noticed the occupied parked car in the then-deserted garage, and arrested defendant after observing the pistol on the car floor.The pistol, a fully operable .38, was loaded with six cartridges.A search of petitioner's person revealed 14 other .38 cartridges.

Petitioner, although he did not take the stand or present other evidence, was vigorously and competently represented by his present counsel.Hearings outside the jury were held on the question of fresh complaint and on search and seizure; numerous exceptions were taken to rulings of the court.The cross-examination of Miss Perry and of the medical and police witnesses was searching.The trial lasted for several days.

The defense's unsuccessful effort to elicit Miss Perry's current address arose at the beginning of its cross-examination:

'Q.At the time this incident happened, you were living at 75 Alphonsus?

A.St. Alphonsus Street.

Q.Where are you living now?

MR. ZALKIND: I pray your Honor's judgment.

THE COURT: Excluded.

MR. SKEELS: Note my exception.

THE COURT: You don't want an address to summons the girl, do you?

MR. SKEELS: I think this would be important.

THE COURT: Do you want the address to summons the girl?

MR. SKEELS: No, because she is on the stand.

THE COURT: All right, I will exclude it.

MR. SKEELS: Note my exception.

THE COURT: Yes.'

There were no further efforts to elicit her current address, ² and it remains unknown.What light, if any, the address would have shed on any of the proceedings, or on Miss Perry's character and credibility, likewise remains unknown.

Petitioner rests his claim of constitutional error on Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 88 S.Ct. 748, 19 L.Ed.2d 956(1968), andAlford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624(1931).In Smith v. Illinois, a government undercover agent, as here the principal witness against the defendant, was permitted to testify without giving either his actual name or his address.In reversing, the Court said, 390 U.S. at 131, 88 S.Ct. at 750,

'(W)hen the credibility of a witness is in issue, the very starting point in 'exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth'(SeePointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923(1965)) through cross-examination must necessarily be to ask the witness who he is and where he lives.The witness' name and address open countless avenues of in-court examination and out-of-court investigation.To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.'

The Smith Court quoted from Alford v. United States, supra, a case in which a government witness' residence (apparently a prison) had been withheld over objection, as follows:

'. . . The question 'Where do you live?' was not only an appropriate preliminary to the cross-examination of the witness, but on its face, without any such declaration of purpose as was made by counsel here, was an essential step in identifying the witness with his environment, to which cross-examination may always be directed . . .'

390 U.S. at 132, 88 S.Ct. at 750.

In the present case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court cited Smith and Alford as standing for the 'general rule that, without any obligation to explain the purpose of his inquiry, a defendant has a constitutional right . . . to ask a prosecution witness to disclose his present place of residence.'Commonwealth v. McGrath, 303 N.E.2d at 113.It felt, however, that the present case was within a well-recognized exception, arising when 'consideration of the safety of the witness might justify nondisclosure of his present address.'Id.;Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. at 133--34, 88 S.Ct. 748(White & Marshall, JJ., concurring).See, e.g., United States v. Alston, 460 F.2d 48(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 871, 93 S.Ct. 200, 34 L.Ed.2d 122(1972);United States v. Saletko, 452 F.2d 193(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1040, 92 S.Ct. 1311, 31 L.Ed.2d 581(1971).Though frankly troubled by the failure of the prosecution to have shown 'an actual threat to the witness,'³303 N.E.2d at 114, the Court believed that the coalescence of a number of factors prevented an abridgement of petitioner's constitutional right of confrontation from having occurred.These were: (1) the nature of the crime charged, demonstrating a threat 'inherent in the situation,'seeUnited States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119, 1128(7th Cir.1970), petition for cert. dismissed, 401 U.S. 967, 91 S.Ct. 990, 28 L.Ed.2d 250, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 905, 91 S.Ct. 1366, 28 L.Ed.2d 645(1971);(2) the disclosure of the victim's home address at the time of the offense four months before trial, coupled with the lack of any restriction on cross-examination beyond nondisclosure of the victim's current address; and (3) the fact that although 'the colloquy between defence counsel and the judge gave the defendant an opportunity to explain the need for an answer . . . defendant did not take advantage of that opportunity.'Such an explanation, the Court said, would have enabled the judge to weigh the defendant's requirements against the danger to the witness.303 N.E.2d at 114.

We agree with the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court.It gave appropriate recognition to the general constitutional rule that without any obligation to explain the purpose of his inquiry, a defendant has a right to require disclosure of a witness' current address.But the 'rule' is not, like a rule of plane geometry, absolute.The Supreme Court recognized in Alford,282 U.S. at 694, 51 S.Ct. 218, the discretionary power of the trial judge to exclude questions which tend merely to 'harass, annoy or humiliate,' and Justice White, in his concurring opinion in Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. at 133--34, 88 S.Ct. at 750, 751, said that he would 'place in the same category those inquiries which tend to endanger the safety of the witness.'In United States v. Alston, 460 F.2d at 51, Judge Goldberg wrote,

'It is true, as Alston urges, that both Alford and Smith reversed criminal convictions because the home address of a witness was not divulged.But it appears to us that the purpose of Alford/Smith was to safeguard the opportunity for a meaningful and open cross-examination, not to require that a witness always divulge his or her home address.'

In Alstonthe court found that as the non-disclosing witness had provided extensive background information, his actual home address was not needed to 'place the witness in his proper setting'; given the implicit threat to the witness' safety and that of his family, solicitation of the address was, in effect, an attempt to 'harass, annoy or humiliate.'Id. at 52.While factually different in some respects, Alston contained many of the same elements as here: a fair inference of danger to the witness; full disclosure of the witness' background apart from his current address; and failure by the defense to pinpoint any special or likely relevance of the address.

Like the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and our dissenting brother, we are unhappy that an explicit claim of danger was not made here by the witness or prosecutor, and that the trial judge did not...