McGraw v. Canton

• Decision Date: 18 June 1891
• Citation: 22 A. 132,74 Md. 554
• Parties: MCGRAW ET AL. v. CANTON ET AL. MCGRAW v. MCGRAW ET AL.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

22 A. 132

74 Md. 554

MCGRAW ET AL. v. CANTON ET AL.

MCGRAW v. MCGRAW ET AL.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 18, 1891

Appeal from circuit court of Baltimore city.

Argued before ALVEY, C.J., and MILLER, MCSHERRY, and BRISCOE, JJ.

James McColgan and Ruddell & Hall, for appellants.

J J. Gallagher, John B. McGraw, and Wm. S. Bryan Jr., for appellees.

BRISCOE J.

There are two appeals in this case from orders of the circuit court of Baltimore city. The main question turns upon the right of the court to allow counsel fees to Messrs. Ruddell & Hall and McColgan for services rendered in setting aside a fraudulent deed from James McGraw to Susan L. Canton. The facts disclosed by the record are these: On the 1st day of April 1881, James McGraw made a will devising all his property real and personal, except one lot of ground, to his daughter Susan L. Canton, in trust for her use and benefit of his children. Shortly after his death, a deed dated the 22d day of April, 1881, was placed upon record in Baltimore city, which conveyed the bulk of his property to Susan L. Canton absolutely. On petition of William J. McGraw, this deed was set aside upon the ground of fraud, and the reasons therefor are set forth in the opinion of this court reported in the case of Canton v. McGraw, 67 Md. 585, 11 A. 287. The sum of $3,000 was allowed by the court as counsel fees out of the trust-estate. The amount of property recovered and brought into the trust-estate by reason of the suit is variously estimated by the witnesses from $7,000 to $21,000. The evidence in the case shows that the children of James McGraw, other than William J., opposed the effort to vacate the deed, and preferred that the property should pass to Mrs. Canton under the deed. They did not unite in employing Messrs. Ruddell & Hall and McColgan, and were not willing to recognize their services. Their testimony is full and explicit to the effect that they did not accept the services as rendered, and were not benefited by them, and that they stood ready to execute any acquittance to Susan L. Canton as if the deed of James McGraw to her had never been annulled. Now, we know of no legal principle by which these defendants, upon the facts of the case, can be required to contribute to the payment of counsel fees to one whom they did not employ, and whose services they claim were adverse to their interest. It was held in Strike's Case, 1 Bland, 98, that agreements between solicitors and suitors relative to professional services must be enforced like other contracts, and could not be introduced into and settled as a part of the case. The chancellor said, in dismissing the petition, that he knew of no practice of this court nor of any analogous proceeding of the English court which would authorize the introduction of claims of this sort into a cause depending or about to be disposed of, and that contracts between solicitors and suitors relative to professional services are to be settled and decided upon in like manner as all other contracts. This case was affirmed by this court in Marshall v. Cooper, 43 Md. 62, and we there said that this has been the universal practice in this state. We have, however, been referred to the Brydon Case, 21 A. 712, (decided in the January term, 1891, of this court,) as establishing a different rule to...